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Preface 
 
For the past 50 years I  have been fascinated by the psychology of natural and 
revealed knowledge. This fascination began when I was a pupil in 6th Grade and was 
shown to be unconsciously an Apollinarian heretic for thinking that in Jesus the 
divine nature and person substituted for the human soul. At Fenwick High School in 
Oak Park, IL, my Dominican teachers introduced me to the philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas via an English paraphrase of Thomas Summa theologiae, in which 
the question structure of St. Thomas work was replaced by the doctrinaire structure 
of the commentators. The philosophical concepts used to illucidate the teachings of 
revelation fascinated me: how they came to be, however, remained a mystery that 
even my teachers could not explain, instead they taught us to take them on faith, 
suggesting that they derived from divinely inspired intuitions given to St. Thomas. 
From this fideist conceptualism, my teachers at the Aquinas Institute, School of 
Philosophy, in River Forest, IL would later deliver me. From Professors Benedict 
Ashley, Humbert Kane, Ralph Powell and above all J. Athanasius Weisheipl, I 
learned that metaphysics is grounded in empirical natural science and that theology 
is grounded in biblical narrative and biblical theology. Thus it was, that in 1967, 
within a matter of weeks, I wrote my dissertation for the Dominican lectorate degree, 
treating the topic Experiential, conceptual and intuitive moments in the knowledge 
of faith Starting with the problematic addressed in the Modernist controversy, I 
undertook first to elaborate a psychology of normal cognition as a basis of a study of 
the conceptual and non-conceptual elements in the knowledge of faith and the nature 
of dogma. Relying heavily on secondary literature, in particular Louis-Marie Regis 
and Victor White, Karl Rahner and Eduard Schillebeeckx, I attempted to elaborate a 
comprehensive thomistic psychology of natural and supernatural knowledge. 
 When I had finished the dissertation, I knew that I would someday have to 
redo it, working this time not from secondary literature but rather from the texts of 
St. Thomas himself. Since then I have been gathering materials for such a revision. 
Methodologically I have learned to read Aquinas first historically in the context of 
his medieval world view. But to really understand him, it is then necessary to 
translate his thinking into our own contemporary scientific world view, hence the 
need for an ongoing dialog with contemporary science. As a librarian in the 
Tübingen University Library for the past 25 years, I have been strategically well 
placed to keep abreast of recent developments not only in thomistic studies but also 
and above all in contemporary empirical cognition theory. In particular I have been 
following developments in neurobiological and evolutionary cognition theory, in the 
psychology of language and in the social psychology of cognition. Over the years I 
have also closely followed contemporary developments in modern philosophical and 
theological epistemology. The ongoing infallibility debate in Catholic theology has 
led me to elaborate a theory of error to complement prevailing theories of truth. To 
work through this mass of gathered materials will take several years; thus I have 
decided to publish now the original dissertation unchanged. However, over the 
decades I have come to see many things more clearly. These new insights have 
found expression in two recent papers, which, because they lack documentation, 
have not yet been published. These papers are included here to bring the dissertation 
 v
up to date. The first paper The phenomenology of cognition according to Thomas 
Aquinas attempts to synthesize for the first time all of the diverse themes discussed 
by Aquinas in the course of his manifold discussions of natural cognition. The 
second paper Philosophia und sacra doctrina: Neue Erkenntnisse zur Bestimmung 
der Verhältnisse zwischen Wissenschaft und Philosophie, Bibel und Theologie 
examines the relationship between natural and revealed knowledge, showing how the 
latter, for Thomas Aquinas, is firmly rooted in Holy Scripture. Thus taken together, 
these two papers provide a framework reflecting the current state of my thinking on 
the matters covered in the dissertation. 
 In conclusion, I wish to dedicate this work to my teachers in River Forest, Ill., 
Dubuque, Iowa, and Tübingen, Germany. Without their help and encouragement, I 
would never have come so far in my understanding of the mind of Thomas Aquinas. 
In particular I wish to name the following professors in alphabetical order: Benedict 
Ashley, Humbert Kane, Hans Küng, Ralph Powell, William A. Wallace, Georg 
Wieland, and J. Athanasius Weisheipl. 
 
 
P.S. The text of the 1967 dissertation was scanned and and then converted to WORD  by an 
OCR program. In this way, numerous minute typographical and format errors were introduced 
into the text, which I have subsequently done my best to correct. For those errors which I 
failed to notice and correct, I beg the readers understanding and indulgence 
 
 
 
  
 1 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF !OGNITION A!!ORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS 
Thomas Riplinger 
 
 
Overview 
 
1. My approach to Aquinas theory of cognition........................................................................1 
 
2. Heuristic principles ................................................................................................................1 
 
3. The distinction between phenomenon and concept................................................................4 
 
4. Functional concepts and definitions.......................................................................................6 
 
5. !onsciousness ........................................................................................................................6 
 
6. Knowing with the external senses ..........................................................................................7 
 
7. Knowing with the internal senses: the concomiting and the imaging senses.........................8 
 
8. Animal intelligence, the estimative sense and the value memory........................................10 
 
9. Analysing an act of cognition...............................................................................................12 
 
10. The first act of the mind, simple intellection .....................................................................13 
 
11. Abstraction .........................................................................................................................14 
 
12. Judgment ............................................................................................................................17 
 
13. Definition and division.......................................................................................................18 
 
14. Reasoning ...........................................................................................................................20 
 
15 Inductive and deductive reasoning ......................................................................................21 
 
16. Verbal and non-verbal thinking..........................................................................................23 
 
17. Everyday knowledge and science.......................................................................................25 
 
  
 2 
18. The Scientific questions and the subject/object of science ................................................29 
 
19. Truth and certitude .............................................................................................................31 
 
20. The universal and the singular ...........................................................................................33 
 
21. A theory of error.................................................................................................................34 
 
22. In place of a summary ........................................................................................................35 
 
 
Appendix: Recovering the empirical basis of Thomas Aquinas"s cognition theory                 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF !OGNITION A!!ORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS 
 
 
1. My approach to Aquinas theory of cognition 
For some 50 years now, I have been studying the texts of St. Thomas on cognition.  Over 
the years periods of intensive study of the texts have alternated with periods of reflection without 
reference to concrete texts and long periods in which the topic lay fallow, because I was occupied 
with other concerns. These long periods of gestation gave me a distance to the texts, thus 
enabling me to grasp the big picture more clearly than I did when working strictly with the texts 
themselves. Thus each time I return to the texts, I am surprised to find that I understand them 
better than the last time I looked at them. In what follows, I proposed to synthesize my current 
understanding of St. Thomas thinking on cognition without reference to specific texts, hoping 
that when I retire in four years I will have the strength and ability to rewrite my Dubuque masters 
thesis on Thomas theory of knowledge to provide the textual basis for what I describe here. 
 
2. Heuristic principles 
From Ashley and Weisheipl I learned to read the texts of St. Thomas in the historical 
context of Aquinas natural science. At the same time I learned, however, that to understand 
Aristotles and Thomas natural science, one must attempt to transpose it into the natural science 
of our own day. Thus, when Thomas speaks of lumen, it is not enough to simply translate it as 
light; we must then also call up our own knowledge of visible light as a specific portion of the 
spectrum of electromagnetic radiation emitted by or absorbed by molecules constituting the 
emitter or receiver of this light. Similarly, when Thomas talks about sound, we must think of 
compression waves in a medium. Again what is audible sound is only a small segment of the 
spectrum of such waves. The same holds true for the other proper sensibles and for the sense 
organs that perceive them. In each case, we must translate Aquinas remarks into our own 
science, because this is what he would do if he were talking to us today. In the text that follows, I 
will not attempt to analyse texts or to reconstruct Thomass own natural science background. This 
work I did some 30 years ago when I wrote and partially reworked my lectorate thesis on 
Experiential conceptual and intuitive moments in the knowledge of faith, This was a close textual 
study of Aquinas theory of natural human cognition and its application to theological cognition. 
This is the text I hope to rework in the years to come. Instead I shall present here only my own 
interpretation of Thomas positions as transposed into the natural and social science of our own 
day. 
I have deliberately entitled this text a phenomenology of knowledge according to St. 
Thomas. To understand what he says on cognition, it is not enough to read the corresponding 
rational explanations he gives of cognitive phenomena, since the rational explanations he 
gives can blind us to the phenomena he is attempting to explain. Abstract concepts like species 
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impressa, intellectus agens cannot be understood properly unless they are consciously related 
to the concrete phenomena they are introduced to explain. Thus it is necessary to reconstruct the 
phenomenology of cognition that underlies Aquinas rational analysis. Failing to do this has led 
baroque and modern commentators on Thomas texts to misunderstand his analysis and thus to 
construct a platonist-augustinian, metaphysical epistemology, because they failed to attend to 
the perceptual basis for Thomas conceptual development. 
It is my conviction that, because Thomas was forced to confront the platonic-augustinian 
epistemology he found in the sacra doctrina (= sacra scriptura) and thus in the church fathers, he 
was thus able to see more clearly than Aristotle what natural human knowledge is about and how 
natural and social science and metaphysics differ essentially from a theology contained in and 
based on revelation. As St. Thomas saw it, the angelic mode of knowing corresponded by and 
large to the Platonic-patristic account of cognition. By thus contrasting the angelic and the human 
modes of thinking, Aquinas was able to see more clearly than Aristotle what was proper to the 
human mode of knowing and what was not proper to it. 
 
3. The distinction between phenomenon and concept 
Before attempting to reconstruct a modern phenomenology of cognition corresponding to 
the phenomenology of cognition Thomas himself had in mind as he posed his analytical 
questions and constructed his reasoned answers, it is necessary to attend to an important 
distinction. In knowledge we have to do with four distinct but interrelated realities: the knowing 
person, the powers or faculties by which the person knows, the acts of knowing proceeding from 
these powers and the objects known in these acts. The relationship between the knowing person 
and the known object is superficially clear. In the act of knowing, the known is presented to the 
knower and the knower realizes the  known in a new mode of being, the cognitive mode. The act 
of knowledge, however, does not proceed immediately from the knower as such; it is a composite 
act involving distinct organs of the knowing human person, to which distinct powers of knowing 
belong.. The act of knowing is the act of the person as far as its origin and term are concerned, it 
is, however, at the same time under a different aspect, the act of the knowing potency and of its 
proper organ(s). Because the outward organs of sense cognition are easily distinguishable from 
one another and from the other organs of the body, we are capable of analysing their construction 
and function to get a quite detailed picture of how they work. Of the so-called internal senses, we 
have very little perceptual knowledge to go on. We cannot establish their exact location or their 
specific organs in the nervous system nor can we analyse in detail their functions and 
interworkings. We conclude to their existence by identifying diverse,  more or less clearly 
distinguished functional complexes, which, upon observation, indicate to us the existence and 
something of the character of a corresponding organ and faculty. But -- and this is most 
important -- we cannot see the individual organ; indeed, we cannot even be certain that it is a 
single organ. By the same token, we cannot see their functioning when in act. What we see is 
only the result of their working. Thus we know the internal cognitive organs and faculties not 
directly but indirectly, not in themselves but only in their function, not as things but only as 
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principles. Time and again, neoscholastic epistemology falls into the trap of thinking it is dealing 
with things rather than functions. It is not the eye that sees (except analogically), it is I that sees 
through the eye, it is not the intellect that thinks, but I who thinks through the intellect. . 
In knowing, the knower becomes the known in a special, intentional  way. Intentional 
existence is generally thought to be a psychological concept for Thomist. To my great surprise, 
some two decades ago I discovered that it was for Thomas a physico-chemical concept which is 
analogically used in his psychology. Thomas introduces the notion to explain the role of the 
medium in indirect sensation. In vision, for instance, the image of the visible object is transmitted 
to the eye of the beholder by the medium of light. Light is so constituted that it is able to receive 
an impression of the object emitting or reflecting it and to carry this impression more or less 
unchanged to the eye it affects. It is this actualisation of the medium by taking on  
a physio-chemical impression of an object without losing its own identity that Aquinas call 
intentional. The same holds true for air as the medium of hearing and smelling; in both cases, 
the object impresses an image of itself physio-chemically upon the medium, and this medium 
transmits that image to the corresponding sense. Thus, in the medium, be it light or air, an image 
of the colored or sounding or smelling object has intentional existence.  
Returning to the phenomenon of knowing, Thomas defines knowing as the presence of 
the known to the knower by being formed by the knower. This cognitive unity between the 
knower and the known is best seen in conscious knowing, when we reflect upon the fact that we 
know. Granted, there are many acts of unconscious knowing going on all the time, whether 
waking or sleeping. For instance, at the present moment as I write these lines, without my 
attending to them, the tactile sense organs of my inner  arms are constantly monitoring, i.e. 
knowing, the temperature and texture of the tabletop upon which they rest and automatically 
they are stimulating the sweat glands in the associated area of my skin to exude moisture to avoid 
overheating. Normally, I do not attend to this process; it goes on unconsciously, only when a 
change takes place, e.g. when I move my arm to a neighboring place on the tabletop which is 
cooler or warmer, only then do I become aware of such unconscious knowing. Even in conscious 
knowing, however, we are not normally aware of which powers are acting at any one moment; 
we become aware of them in actu signato (, i.e. as such, inasmuch as they are what they are) only 
reflexively; in the original act of knowing they were quasi-conscious in actu exercito (i.e. as the 
functional principles of the knowing act). We are most aware of our external sense powers and 
their organs. We have eyes that see, ears that hear, a nose that smells, a tongue that tastes, an 
epidermis that feels. We understand the function of these organs and powers spontaneously and 
easily, because we can observe their functioning. 
 
 
4. Functional concepts and definitions 
When it comes to the internal senses and the powers of intellection and volition, we have 
no clearly identifiable organ whose functioning we can observe. We can only observe the 
products of these inner organs and powers, e.g. the fact that the sensations received from different 
  
 6 
organs are somehow compounded, that they are retained and combined over time, that they are 
manipulated. On the basis of such products, we conclude to the existence of  a faculty or power; 
on the basis of the faculty, we conclude to the existence of an organ. Though we cannot observe 
either the acts or the powers or the organs, we can name them and define them in terms of their 
final causality. Here it is important to note that we know nothing more about them than that 
they must exist and that they must be so constituted as to be able to function to give rise to the 
product we observe. Science and philosophy are full of such functional concepts, which 
contain nothing more than a very remote genus minimally understood and a specific difference 
expressed only by a final cause. Neoscholasticism made the mistake of thinking that such 
definitions were metaphysical and thus somehow more expressive of an essence than any 
descriptive or otherwise causal definition. This is not so! The definition of man as a rational 
animalsays no more than that something in the remote genus animal,   not otherwise defined -- 
is able to produce reasons -- also not otherwise defined. Of course, the  more one studies 
human beings, the more one can elaborate on this definition, thus filling in what kind of an 
animal man is and what kind of reasons ma produces and how he produces them. But this 
knowledge is read into not read out of the original functional definition animal rationale. 
 
5. !onsciousness 
The central problem of any philosophy of mind is the phenomenon of consciousness. It is 
easier to say what consciousness is not,  than to say what it is. It is definitely not a ghost in a 
machine or a homunculus sitting in front of a set of computer monitors. Perhaps the best positive 
definition is Karl Rahners: consciousness is the presence of the knower to himself, i.e. Bei-sich-
sein. !onsciousness is like an infinite set of chinese boxes. Each time we open a box, we find 
another box. Each time we reflect on a cognitive act, we reflect on an act of reflecting and so 
further. The problem with defining what consciousness is, is that we have no points of reference 
except for consciousness itself. We have good reason for attributing consciousness in one form or 
other to higher animals, but we really do not know what their experience of consciousness is like. 
We can speculate, as Thomas felt compelled to do, about the consciousness of angels and 
disembodied spirits, but again we can only fall back on our own experience as a point of 
reference.  What is clear is that in consciousness we use images and words as symbols for the 
things present to us in cognition. From this point of view, the metaphor of consciousness as a 
computer expert watching various processes running simultaneously on a set of monitors in front 
of him,  does have something to be said for it, as long as one remembers that it is only a 
metaphor. The point is, that the I of consciousness is not identical with any single faculty, 
neither sense nor intellect; it is a complex phenomenon in which sense and intellect are both 
involved simultaneously, without our being able to put them apart. 
 
6. Knowing with the external senses 
All human knowledge, for Thomas begins in the external senses. We have no innate 
concepts; even the first and most general concept of common being is derived from the senses. 
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Thus our phenomenology of cognition must begin with the external senses. The human organism 
is endowed with a variety of special organs capable of being impressed with forms derived from 
outside agents acting on them physio-chemically in such a way that, retaining their natural form 
and character, they take on an impression from the outside agent; this impression is a semblance 
of the affecting agent under the aspect with which it interacts with the sense organ. Thus a red 
apple absorbs most of the visible electro-magnetic spectrum, reflecting only light of the so-called 
red frequency. This red light reflected from the apple is focused by the lens  of the eye to cast a 
red image on the retina of the eye. This red image affects the receptor cells of the eye which are 
sensitive to light of this frequency, evoking in them a chemical change in a pattern corresponding 
proportionately to the size and shape of the image cast onto the retina. This chemical change in 
the receptor cells is what Thomas means when he speaks of  the species impressa, i.e. the 
impressed species. This species is not in itself cognitive, but as effectiing the faculty/organ, 
which is passive to it, it reduces the faculty/organ to act making it knowing.Thus, although not 
in itself cognitive, the impressed species  is an instrumental cause of cognition, since it makes the 
outside object present to the organism under the particular aspect communicated, in this case 
color. Thanks to this impressed image, the external sense becomes knowing, which at this stage 
of pureexternal sensation,  means simply that the thus actualised potency  causes spontaneous 
reactions in other organs of the body. All we know about knowing at this initial stage is that the 
sensing organ is able to trigger reactions from other organs. External sensation as such is pre-
conscious, it becomes conscious only in reflection 
Whereas Aristotle and Thomas were able to locate in a gross way the organs of sight, 
hearing , smelling, tasting and feeling, we are able to construct a much more detailed picture of 
the structure of these organs. Thus we can identify the lens of the eye, which is responsible for 
focussing and projecting an image of the seen object on the retina. We know that the rods and 
cones of the retina are the specific organs responding to light and reacting to color. Much more 
clearly than Aristotle and Thomas, we see that the sense of touch is not one single power but a 
whole complex of powers, each with its own proper organ. Thus there are receptors in the 
epidermis for light, heat, texture, etc. There are organs sensitive to equilibrium, electrical charge, 
magnetic orientation. It is possible that there are other tactile organs, which have not yet been 
discovered. Thus by identifying the specific organs and the specific functions of these organs, the 
original functional concept or definition becomes differentiated and articulated. The original 
gross definition in terms of a grossly identified function as the final cause, is transformed into a 
real definition by identifying the material and formal causes 
 
 
7. Knowing with the internal senses: the concomiting and the imaging senses 
 Responding to this chemical change, which is the impressed species, the organ of sight 
sends a message via the optic nerve to the central nervous system, in particular to the brain, 
where again electro-chemical changes take place, corresponding again to the impressed species 
of the apple affecting the eye. In the course of the passage of the impressed species through this 
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neural network, the red object, which we know to be an apple but which at this level is simply 
something red,, comes to be perceived in a perceptual complex, in which it is  related it not only 
to other objects in our momentary field of vision, but also  with perceptions of itself and other 
objects coming from other external senses, i.e. from the auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile 
senses. To this function of combining percepts from the different external senses to form a 
complex percept incorporating all the impressions of an external object received in a particular 
moment, Thomas, following Aristotle, gave the name sensus communis, usually but 
misleadingly translated as common sense I prefer to call it the concomiting sense, since its 
function is to unify all the impressions coming from different senses at any one moment. Because 
we cannot identify the proper organ of this sense, we have to do here with a functional concept in 
the sense explained above. All we know about this sense is that it functions to produce a 
unification of discrete percepts into a complex percept combining, at any one moment, all the 
impressions of an object (together with its perceptual environment) as these impressions are 
received by the different external senses. Thus we cannot see the specific organ or organs 
corresponding to the concomiting function or its faculty; we must reason to their existence 
without seeing them. We can, very well, using modern brain scanning techniques, identify areas 
of the brain which are active in such complex perceptions, but this knowledge is not sufficient to 
enable us to identify the proper organ of the concomiting sense from the organs of the other 
external and internal senses. Again we have to do with a functional concept or definition with 
minimal elaboration. 
Our inability to identify the specific organs of the functions we attribute to the internal 
senses, means that we have only generic knowledge of their functions and thus only generic 
knowledge of the corresponding faculties and organs. For the external senses, we can identify the 
specific functions and the corresponding specific organs. Thus we can divide a generic notion 
like that of the sense of touch into a whole set of specific powers and organs. For the external 
senses we can identify the material cause (the respective organ), the formal cause (the physio-
chemical structure in its active and inactive states), and the proximate final cause, what happens 
exactly when it is activated. With the internal senses, things are different. Being unable to 
identify the specific organs, we are unable to identify the specific formal causes and the specific 
final causes. Identifying only a generic final cause, we are unable to decide whether the particular 
sense is one or many. Thus, when we speak of a concomiting sense we are speaking loosely 
and improperly. We have yet to discover what specific senses and organs are contained virtually 
in this generic concept. Here again, it is essential to recall that we have no intuition of essences. 
The only way we can proceed from a generic to a specific concept is to discover empirically what 
species are contained within a genus. Only when we have identified all the species belonging to 
the genus do we have actual comprehensive knowledge of the genus. Prior to that moment, what 
is c onta ine d in the  ge n u s b u t n o t a r tic ula te d in our specific knowledge is contained in our concept 
only virtually and is thus speaking pure and simply, is unknown to us. Virtual knowledge can be 
actualised only on the basis of empirical evidence. 
Following Aquinas account of cognition, we next note that the mind has the ability to 
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store and recall such complex percepts of the moment and thus to relate them to each other 
temporally. This ability to retain previous perceptions is, for Aristotle and Thomas, the proper 
function of the phantasia, usually translated as imagination. To avoid misunderstanding, I 
prefer, however to speak of the imaging sense or to use the German term Vorstellungskraft, 
i.e. an internal sense that presents things to us independently of their here and now acting on one 
or the other of our sense organs and powers. As space is the innate structure of the concomiting 
sense, time is the innate structure of the imaging sense. Though it does not as such know time, it 
relates percepts temporally by retaining them sequentially. Thus, thanks to the imaging sense, we 
are able to recall sensations we had a moment, a day, a year, a decade, a lifetime before. The 
imaging power re-presents them, thus connecting us to previous states of the object known, 
insofar as these were manifested to us in previous sensation. Thus it is possible to speak of a (re-
)presenting sense, which is what the German term means. Because the imaging sense is able to 
know objects not immediately acting upon the organism, indeed to know them in their previous 
states, i.e.  as they previously affected the knower, or in their presumed future states, i.e. as they 
will presumably affect the organism at a future time and date, the imaging sense needs something 
in which to see, hear, smell, taste or feel the object thus known. Thus, unlike the external senses 
and the concomiting sense, the imaging sense produces an image of the object as the term of its 
act. Thomas calls this image the expressed species. When we speak of seeing something in the 
minds eye it is this expressed species that we are talking about. 
Though functionally distinct, the concomiting and the imaging senses normally work 
together. In our consciousness, we are constantly alternating between them, at one moment 
attending more to the outside world impinging on our external senses and thus to its expression 
in  the concomiting sense, in the next moment, we attend more to the expressions of our inner 
world called up by the  imaging sense. Because the concomiting and the imaging senses work 
together so closely, we are unable, despite the most refined brain-scanning techniques, to 
distinguish their proper organs, what is clear,  however, is that they are especially related to the 
cerebral cortex, where it is possible to identify sensory regions corresponding to the different 
organs and areas of the body. As with the concomitting sense, there is good reason to believe that 
the imaging sense is only generically one, and that it is specifically divided among quite a 
number of related faculties each with its proper organ and function. Once again we have to do 
here with a functional concept identified by a generic final cause and thus needing further 
definition and elaboration by identifying the proper material and formal causes 
The ability to store and recall past sensory images is only one of the functions which 
Thomas, following Aristotle, attributes to the imaging sense. The other major function is to 
associate and to manipulate previously received impressions of the outside and the inside worlds. 
Thanks to the imaging sense we are able to conjure up images of objects not only never 
personally perceived, like dinosaurs, but also of objects which never existed at all except in 
imagination, e.g. unicorns. In conscious thinking, the imaging sense is constantly calling up 
images to accompany verbal thought. This is useful but dangerous when we are dealing with 
highly abstract notions or with functional concepts, since it is easy to confuse the concept with its 
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associated image and thus to attribute to the concept, properties belonging to the image. This is 
exactly what occurs when we reify mental concepts by mistaking a sensual metaphor for the 
sensory basis of the concept. Neoscholasticism, like modern philosophy generally, made the 
mistake of attributing to the concept functions actually proper to the complex percept presented 
by the concomiting and imaging senses.  
When Thomas talks about the relationship between sense and intellect, he speaks about 
phantasmata The name is related to phantasia, his name for the imaging sense, but it means in 
fact much more than simply the image called up by the imaging sense at any particular moment. 
In fact, the phantasm is the whole sensory complex associated with a particular object of 
knowledge. Its counterpart, as Thomas explains in the !ommentary on the metaphysics is the 
experimentum, i.e. everything known sensorally about the object of knowledge to date. In this 
sense, Thomas can speak of phantasms even when the object is immediately present to the 
external senses, since such immediate presence calls up automatically a whole panoply of past 
experiences of the object, including even the words we used in thinking and talking about it in 
the past and the images of it which we project into the future. Thus, in the rest of this paper, the 
words phantasm and phantasms are always to be understood in this complex sense- 
 
8. Animal intelligence, the estimative sense and the value memory 
Following Aristotle, Thomas discusses two further generic internal senses, the estimative 
sense and the memory. His texts on these two senses are short and, at first sight at least, not very 
expressive. Thus they are passed over quickly in most neoscholastic accounts of cognition. This 
is a catastrophe, for they are the primary and absolutely essential key to grasping Aquinas 
understanding of cognition. 
In the !ommentary on the metaphysics, Thomas explains how not only man but also 
higher animals develop experience by recognizing relationships between the objects sensed and  
their own proper needs. Thomas speaks here of a vis aestimativa, i.e. an estimative sense which 
forms, on the basis of innate determinations, concrete value judgments about what sense objects 
are useful and what sense objects are harmful to its organism; these concrete value judgments are 
responsible for the behavior of the animal. The higher the animal is in the order of intelligence, 
the more differentiated and complex are its patterns of behavior. In higher animals, this power is 
able to recognize not only concrete relationships to its own immediate needs, but also 
relationships between different objects in relation to its needs. Thus a dog is able to follow the 
scent of meat to the place where food in the form of meat will be found. With Aristotle, Thomas 
recognized that, whereas such value judgments were innate in lower animals, the higher the 
animal is in the hierarchy of intelligence, the more it has to learn to recognize such relationships. 
Thus higher animals, like ourselves, learn by experience. Such learned relationships are stored in 
what Thomas calls memoria, of which memory is a literal but misleading translation. Most of 
what we understand by memory is in fact the function of the imaging power in Aquinass sense. 
Thus in this paper I shall use value memory or relational memory to designate this faculty. 
Regarding the estimative sense, Thomas notes that in man it is freed from the direct ordering to 
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specific organic needs and thus he gives it a special name, vis cogitativa, i.e. the  thinking 
sense The fact is, that much if not most of what we attribute to  intelligence is in fact the 
functioning of the thinking sense rather than of intelligence in the strict sense of the spiritual 
knowledge of universals. To designate the whole complex of estimative or thinking sense and 
experiential memory, I shall use the term animal intelligence. 
Aristotle and Thomas had little knowledge of what higher animals are able to show in the 
way of intelligent behavior. Ethological studies on our higher primate cousins, the gorillas, 
chimpanzees and bonobos, reveal how complex animal experience can be. Higher Primates have 
mental maps of their environment, not only spatially but also temporally. Thus they are able to 
seek out deliberately sources of food that are in season. Thus they know from experience that the 
round red objects (e.g. apples) which are so fresh and sweet to the taste are found only under a 
certain type of tree and only in a certain season of the year. They are also able to grasp concrete 
relationships between goals and means deliberately seeking out appropriate objects and forming 
them into suitable tools to achieve distant goals. They know their place in complex social 
relationships and are capable of communicating with each other in various ways to cultivate these 
relationships and to coordinate social cooperation. They are even able to prevaricate, deliberately 
misleading other members of the troop to prevent them from taking a piece of food, for instance, 
that the lying animal wants to keep for himself. The most important and spectacular discovery 
about animal intelligence in higher primates is their ability to learn and to use symbolic 
languages taught them by researchers. This ability long remained unrecognised, because their 
voice apparatus is ill suited to producing human sounds. More recent researchers have had 
remarkable success in teaching them visual language, either the standard American gesture 
vocabulary for the deaf and or a variety of artificial machine or token languages. Here they 
manifest the ability to recognize their own identity and proper name, to identify symbols with not 
only with individual concrete objects but also with classes of objects showing  not only visibly 
similarities but also functional similarities in the absence of visible similarity. They are also 
capable of forming such symbols into sentences, in particular into imperative sentences like 
Give Washoe drink! Tickle Sara etc. In isolated instances, adult animals have been observed 
passing on linguistic skills to their children, using them for more efficient communication. All of 
these observations should be a warning to us not to underestimate the power of animal 
intelligence, or to attribute to the spiritual intellect, functions which really belong to the 
repertoire of animal intelligence. 
 
9. Analysing an act of cognition 
Before going on to discuss the higher, spiritual powers of intellection and volition, it is 
well to go back and to analyse phenomenologically a particular act of cognition. As my 
illustration, I take a stone I brought back with me from my last visit to America. The stone I have 
in mind is a piece of Galena ore, this is the crystalline form of native lead found in the general 
area of Dubuque, where I passed so many years of my life. What happens when I know this 
stone? 
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First of all I should note, that I do not have the stone before me as I now begin to reflect 
on my acts of knowing it. It is physically on the shelf in our living room book case. But it is 
present to me here and now in my office at the University through my imaging power. In my 
mind I can see it, feel it, taste and smell it, even hear it. I can do this because I have done 
precisely those things in the past. Indeed even before I got this particular piece of Galena ore, I 
had handled similar pieces in mineralogy stores and exhibits, and even before that I had seen 
pictures of and read descriptions of Galena ore. All of these past experiences merge with my 
present imaging of the particular Galena stone I brought back from America. Remarkably, I do 
not even need to close my eyes to the world around me, in order to recall these earlier 
experiences of Galena ore generally and of my own stone in particular. On the contrary, at the 
very moment I type these words into my computer, looking now at the keyboard now at the 
monitor, I am seeing myself sensing and handling and reflecting about my piece of lead and the 
pieces of lead or that I have handled physically or imaginatively in the past. At the same time, I 
recall my emotional interaction (value judgments in the estimative sense) with my piece of lead 
ore, I recall my desire to acquire such a piece as I went to visit the mine in Schullsburg, I 
remember my joy at finding such an excellent piece on sale. I remember my feelings as I showed 
it to my family and my friends and all the emotionally colored associations that were evoked 
every time I thought of it or took it up to admire it in the past. All this takes place on the sensual 
level when I contemplate taking up and handling my piece of lead ore here and now at the 
computer where I am recording my reflections on this act of cognition. 
Were I a chimpanzee or a bonobo, I would be able to name my piece of lead ore with the 
corresponding sign for lead and to form a concrete perceptual concept (experimentum) of lead 
identified by a congeries of particular classes of perception, e.g. the brown-grey color, the dull 
shimmer, the weight in the hand, the cubic shape, the soft texture, the soft, dull sound when 
struck. Armed with such a concrete perceptual concept consisting of a congeries of attributes, a 
chimpanzee would be able to apply its symbol of lead to other stones showing similar properties. 
What the chimpanzee could not know, is that one can melt down this stone to produce objects 
formed of the molten metal, that plates of metallic lead can be used to construct electrical storage 
batteries or to insulate sources of atomic radiation. The chimpanzee is capable of recognizing 
more or less immediate concrete relationships. Thus he might use my stone to crack a nut or 
perhaps even to hammer it into shape to use it as a tool, but the intricate relations between solid 
and molten lead, between lead and electricity or radiation are well beyond his ken. What 
distinguishes my reactions to my piece of lead ore from those of a chimpanzee or bonobo, is that 
I can recognize not only concrete relatedness but also the relation as such which is the ratio i.e. 
the reason for the existence of the relationship.. Such reasoning is the clue to human 
understanding and what distinguishes human from animal intelligence. As human beings, we 
have an intellect enabling  us to grasp relations as universals. This is where language came in. 
Higher primates can use language, but they cannot invent it, though they can indeed invent 
compound words to express concepts for which they have no single symbols. 
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10. The first act of the mind, simple intellection 
 To return to my example of contemplating my lead stone while reflecting on my 
contemplation of it, ...  The whole time, while doing this,  I am not only imaging my stone and 
my handling of it, >I am talking to myself about my reflection. This conversation with myself as 
a substitute for my intended reader is what finds expression on these pages as I write them. The 
moment I think of or image an object, I spontaneously and immediately become conscious of the 
name I habitually give it -- except of course when I happen to forget the name, which with 
increasing age happens all the more frequently. Generally we have no recollection of how in the 
first place we learned the words we use; they are simply there when we need them. I do however 
remember how my 16 month old son Emanuel learned the German word Stern to designate a 
star. It was night on our terrace as I stood there holding him and looking up to the sky. Suddenly 
he became restless and began pointing to the sky saying Unh, unh, unh  ever more intensely. 
Having no idea what he was trying to express, I tried putting him down, or asking him if he 
wanted to go to the toilet, but when he kept insisting, I began looking in the direction he was 
pointing in and to name things that he might have been looking at, the sky as a whole, the roof of 
the house, the light etc. With each unsatisfactory word he became more and more restless until I 
pronounced the word Stern. Suddenly he relaxed, Aaaah he said, ceasing to point to the sky 
and embracing me all the more intensely.  Stern was clearly the name he had been  looking for 
to name the bright point of light he had perceived on the blue-black sky. Whether this was an act 
of animal or human intelligence, I cannot say, though given Emanuels age at the time, I am 
inclined to attribute it to animal intelligence. 
For this act of naming things, the scholastics coined the term simple apprehension. It is 
a misleading term, because it appears to say that we somehow apprehend essences in a simple act 
of intellection. This is not the case! Aquinass term intelligentia incomposita, is a bit better, but 
also not entirely satisfactory. The problem arises, because my act of naming something can be 
primitive or elaborate, depending upon how much I know about the meaning of the word I use to 
name the object I am contemplating. For my son Emanuel, Stern meant nothing more than a 
brillian point of white light against a dark background overhead; for me, Stern means a very 
large heavenly body burning nuclear fuel, shining as it did many years ago, because it is  light 
years distant. Depending upon how elaborate my concept is, my simple intelligence of the 
object signified by the word I use to symbolize it can vary from a minimal sensuous concept, 
such as a small child or a chimpanzee might have, through to the elaborate phenomenal 
description and causal definition of an astrophysicist. 
But even the astrophysicist cannot comprehend in a single moment everything he knows 
about stars. To do so, he must give a long lecture or better write a book. Even the expert has no 
simple apprehension of the whole essence in elaborated form! He must articulate his 
understanding step by step, using words to designate individual aspects, components and 
functions and calling up the appropriate phantasms. Thus human knowing is always discursive, 
moving from one aspect or component to the next. When I contemplate my piece of lead ore, I 
turn my attention now to the color, then to the shape, then to the weight etc. Only the most 
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primitive concepts like being, no-thing oneness, composition, separation, thing, etc 
can be comprehended in a truly simple act; all other things simply apprehended are virtually 
quite complex; they are simply apprehended only in the sense that, in the act of simple 
contemplation, prior to judgmental predication of an object, a single name stands for the complex 
being and for the complex essence of the thing at hand. That essence, however, initially at least, 
is not known in itself as essence, but it is known only as something unique, i.e. something 
having an essence, though it is not yet known what this essence is.  As we have seen above, even 
in a simple definition like man is a rational animal, there is a wealth of meaning latent in the 
composition of the words rational and animal. But this wealth of meaning is for the most part 
only virtually present, it is by no means actual in any single act of knowing. If I want to elaborate 
what is contained under these words, I must compose long strings of other words to express what 
the original word means. Thus, when I contemplate my stone, for each aspect appropriate words 
come to expression. But I apprehend and comprehend them only sequentially, not simply. In this 
sense, there is no such thing as simple apprehension and it would be better to return to 
Aquinass usage and talk about simple intellection. 
 
11. Abstraction 
Failing to attend to what Thomas says about the discursive character of mind, the 
neothomists were mislead by the term simple apprehension into thinking that we enjoy some sort 
of intuitive grasp of essence. That is Platonism, not Aristotle and not Aquinas! We do not 
apprehend essences, we construct them on the basis of our complex phantasms! Simple 
apprehension is often confused with abstraction. At other places, Thomas explains that we 
abstract essences from the phantasms. Thomas explains that our ability to grasp the universal in 
things transcends the order of physical things and must therefore be the act of a spiritual, not an 
organic power. This power he calls intellect. The problem, for Thomas, as for Aristotle, is how 
does the essence of the thing perceived get into the intellect. That the thing known somehow 
comes to be in the intellect is beyond question, for that is precisely the definition of knowing. 
Somehow the intellect must become the thing known, but how? In the order of sensation, we say 
how one organ affects the next physio-chemically or electro-chemically. But matter cannot 
impress itself physically on immaterial being. How then does the material thing known come to 
be in the intellect? Aquinas answer to this question is the doctrine of abstraction. There are, he 
argues following Aristotle,  in reality two intellectual powers, the passive or possible intellect in 
which the form of the external object is reproduced as an impressed species and an active or 
agent intellect, which uses the phantasm (i.e. the whole sensual complex percept) as an 
instrument to educe a likeness of the object from the potency of the possible intellect. 
This theory has been the object of reams of speculation by Thomists over the centuries. 
Most of this speculation has been misled and false, because it supposes that there is some sort of 
intuitive grasp of being and essence at the start of intellectual cognition. This speculation has 
gone awry, because it fails to attend to Aquinas phenomenology of cognition and reifies his 
functional concepts. Above all it, confuses the via inventionis, the way of discovery with the via 
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discendi, i.e. the way of dogmatic instruction. What neoscholastics take to be intuition of the 
essence in the intellectual concept is in fact intellectual insight into the empirically elaborated 
phantasm, the perceptual concept or experimentum. 
How did I get my concept of Galena lead? Once upon a time, my Father opened his 
fishing kit and pulled out a sinker and put it into my hand. This, he said  is a piece of lead. 
Look how heavy it is for its size. Because it is so heavy, it is used as a sinker to make sure that 
the baited hook does not swim too close to the surface when fishing. Sensorially, I noted the  
appearance of this strange object, noting that though formed in different sizes and shapes, it had 
the same dull grey metallic color, the same softness to the touch, the same heaviness. This 
congeries of sensual attributes became my descriptive definition of the substance designated 
lead in English plombe in French, Blei in German. Later in science classes I would learn 
that lead has a low melting point, that it is an electrical conductor and an insulator against atomic 
radiation, that it has a specific atomic weight and structure. Later still, paging through books on 
minerology and visiting mineral fairs, I learned that Galena was a particular lead ore 
characterized by a brownish grey color, a dull metallic shine, a cubic crystalline form. In this 
way, over the years, I have been building up a concept of lead, articulating for myself what was 
virtually contained in the concept behind the word, that I first learned, when my Father showed 
me the sinker. Nowhere in all these acts did I ever intuit an essence of lead. On the contrary, I  
built up over the years an increasingly complex descriptive definition of lead in terms of the 
sensible properties of lead and its ores, and I am on the way to developing a causal definition in 
terms of the material cause (molecules composed of atoms composed of electrons, protons, and 
neutrons, themselves composed of quarks), the formal cause (the molecular structure, the electron 
levels, the structure of the atomic core), the final cause (the set of physical, chemical and 
energetic properties explained by the molecular and atomic structure) and the efficient cause, 
atomic decomposition of heavier elements under earthly conditions or atomic fusion in certain 
types of decaying stars). 
Let us go back, however, to my first encounter with the word and the object lead. In my 
first apprehension of the lead sinker, I had little more than a higher monkeys concept of lead. I 
associated the word with a collection of sensual properties and a certain utility as an instrument 
for fishing. In this sense I knew it as a class name for substances of similar color, texture, weight, 
etc. Sooner or later, however, I realized that, underlying this common name for a class of 
perceptual objects was something universal, being applicable not only to the class of objects 
manifesting this set of properties, but also to the class of all products made of this materia, like 
white or red lead paint, despite the fact that these products showed none of the properties 
belonging to the sensuous or animal concept lead. In this sense, a universal concept lead has 
been abstracted from all the actually or potentially sensible  material occurrences of the 
substance lead. Thus the idea of lead is separable from all its material occurrences; it is 
immaterial. Being immaterial, it cannot be lodged in any material organ of knowing like the 
external and internal senses. A special immaterial potency is required. This potency Thomas calls 
the intellectus possibilis because it contains potentially in some way, at least, everything that 
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can be known. But then the question arises, how is the object known brought to existence, ie. 
made known, in the possible intellect. To explain this, transfer over the material-immaterial 
barrier, Thomas, following Aristotle, postulates the existence of an agent intellect. 
Note that  possible intellect and agent intellect are functional concepts of the type 
described above. Indeed, unlike the internal senses, they are separated from matter and physical 
reality completely; thus they have no organ that we can claim as a remote genus; when we call 
them a power or faculty we are simply saying that they are not always in act and that their 
acts therefore do not exhaust their potency. All we know about them is that they are something 
immaterial capable of performing the functions we attribute to them. Abstraction is also a 
funtional concept. It names, but does not describe a process we cannot observe. It says nothing 
about whether this process takes place in an instant or in time. It says nothing about how it takes 
place. It is in fact a metaphorical term. We tend to visualize the agent intellect as a kind of robot 
with a claw arm to fasten onto a potential universal concept in the possible intellect and thus 
draw it out for viewing like one pulls out a photo from a pack of photos. Of course it is nothing 
like this. Indeed, the very idea of abstraction is itself so abstract that it can be applied to the  
long discursive process of defining and dividing concepts which constitutes the via inventionis. 
Unfortunately, Thomas himself is partially responsible for the false impression that 
definitions and divisions are abstracted or intuited by insight into concepts. Although he warns in 
In Eth Nic., lect. 7 that learning first philosophy without sufficient experience is learning mere 
empty words, in fact, especially in his Summen he generally makes no special effort to help the 
reader elaborate the necessary phantasms or to detail the complex dialectical/discursive process 
by which a concept is constructed. Instead he appears to postulate definitions as though they be 
immediately intelligible, whereas in fact they are intelligible only when reflected back on 
adequate phantasms / experimentum. This fact was lost on the neothomists, who turned to the 
Summen as the expression not only of Thomas" theology, but also of his philosophy. Ignoring the 
dialectical quaestio-structure of the Summen, they read the corpus of the articles as though they 
were euclidic/cartesian deductions from intuitively grasped intellectual principles, thus turning 
Aquinas" empirical/dialectical method of discovery into a rationalistic/conceptualistic method of 
postulation, leaving the reader in the dark about the phantasms needed to ground all scientific 
principles. What they took to be insight into concepts is in fact insight into phantasms and 
metaphors based on phantasms. Without these, however, what most neothomists learned were in 
fact empty words that they then artistically juggled around  to deduce ever more complex theses 
without empirical grounding. 
 Abstraction, therefore, is anything but an immediate intuition of essences; it is a long 
drawn out process in which empirically perceived attributes are recognized as universal 
properties and recorded as such by the immaterial intellect. In my example of how I constructed 
my concept of lead, as described above, I have attempted to reconstruct the phenomenology of 
the abstracting process. In this process, consciousness plays a part as the agent appearing to 
perform the various tasks. I believe that it was this experience of the role of conscious as 
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directing cognition that gave Aristotle and following him Thomas, the idea of an agent intellect. 
But, note carefully there is here only an analogy. The agent intellect is not consciousness itself. 
!onsciousness is a complex act involving agent and possible intellect and the internal and 
external senses.  
 
12. Judgment 
Simple intellection is the necessary prelude to judgment, the second act of the mind in 
Aquinas aristotelian scheme. To form a judgment about whether a particular set of words is an 
accurate definition of a particular reality, requires that we first know the meaning of all the terms 
in the proposition. That was the function of simple intellection, to insure that we know the 
meaning of the terms involved in a proposition. Thus when I read or hear a proposition proferred 
by someone other than myself, I respond by looking up, so to speak, the meaning of the words in 
the statement, thus evoking a phantasm corresponding to their meaning; then I compare their 
significance in context as expressed in the phantasm I have called up with phantasms 
corresponding to my own present and previous experience and  propositional knowledge. If on 
the other hand, I am forming the proposition myself for the first time, then I have sought out 
appropriate words corresponding to the diverse aspect of my phantasm and have linked them 
together in such a way as to state that the object in question is as I have described it. In this way, 
in the via inventionis, we build up definitions and divisions through judgments. We do not intuit 
them. Only in a secondary sense, namely when we use already acquired definitions to form new 
propositional judgments is it possible to speak in a metaphorical sense of our intuiting the 
meaning of the terms we use. 
It is through judgment, that truth enters the picture. When I simply think lead without 
making any judgment about its properties or definition, I do not yet have knowledge in the strict 
sense. The object is present to my mind, but I do not know it to be such. Knowing begins when  I 
judge that this particular stone in my hand is a piece of lead ore, or when I judge that lead has a 
dull grey metallic color. This is where truth and falsehood come in. These judgments are either 
true or false; they can be verified or falsified empirically by attending to experience. When I have 
made a successful effort to do so, I know them reflectively as being true or false; and when I 
again reflect on the reliability of the tests I have undertaken, I proceed to a further level of 
reflexive judgment which tells me that they are certainly or only probably or perhaps only 
possibly true or false. 
!areful observation of animal behavior shows that animals too make judgments. For the 
most part these are simple judgments about the utility or inutility of an object for the organism. 
This animal judgment is the function of the estimative sense. In the higher primates we find 
much more subtle forms of judgment, relating things not only to the knower but also to 
themselves, as when a chimpanzee seeks out a suitable reed to fashion it into a tool for extracting 
ants from their nest. Studies of linguistic behavior among higher primates shows them forming 
propositions about things and about their relationships to things as well as, rudimentarily at least, 
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about relationships between the things in themselves. Thus they form sentences like  cup /  red, 
ice-cream / sweet. These judgments, as far as we can see, are always particular judgments, 
referring either to individual objects and proceses or to classes thereof. They are never universal 
in the sense that the proposition lead is a dull grey metal is universal, inasmuch as we also 
know the exceptions to the rule, namely that in various compounds it can appear in white or red 
colors and without metallic shimmer. Thus, what distinguishes human from animal thinking is 
not the ability to name and to judge particulars, but rather the ability to know truth, i.e. to know 
that something really is the way we know it to be. Such true knowledge is articulated about 
things, about definitions and divisions , about attributes and relationships. 
 
13. Definition and division 
In formal logic, definition and division is associated with simple apprehension. There is a 
sense in which this is correct. To formulate a judgment, we must know the meaning of the terms 
used, and this, in respect to a particular judgment, is the function of the simple intellection 
presupposed by the judgment. But this special sense of the term is misleading. We do not intuit 
definitions in the via inventionis, we construct them, and we use empirically based judgments to 
do so. Basically, there are three types of definitions: nominal, descriptive and causal. Nominal 
definitions consist of little more than pointing at the phenomeon named, without communicating 
any more information about the entity or phenomenon thus named. A special type of nominal 
definition is the substitution of a synonym for the term; this is what dictionary definitions usually 
do, sometimes adding references to related terms or to antonyms, or otherwise indicating how 
and in what contexts the term is used. Definitions in bi- or multi-lingual dictionaries likewise 
belong to the class of nominal definitions, giving the equivalent words or expressions in other 
languages. Descriptive definitions are put together on the basis of observations, identifying 
attributes and functions of the thing defined as being regular and typical for it. In the ideal case, 
such attributes and functions are proper to the thing defined, but often we have to do only with a 
more or less typical congeries of accidents sufficient to distinguish the thing from similar things. 
Such is the case when we attempt to define/describe a particular species of dogs. Dog is an 
English word used conventionally to name domesticated canines of various races; an exact 
delimitation with respect to various kinds of wild canines is difficult to draw, thus the class of 
canines designated by the English word for dog might be different from the class of canines 
designated by the Swahili word for dog. While we generally are able to give adequate descriptive 
criteria to identify generic natural kinds, we often have difficulty identifying species and putting 
together appropriate descriptive definitions to distinguish them from other species of their 
generic kind. !ausal definitions go a step further, since they tell us specific information about the 
essence of the entity in question. There are four kinds of causes. The material cause is roughly 
speaking the stuff out of which something is made or constituted. Material causes can be 
identified as either proximite or remote. The remote material cause of a dog is body or flesh; the 
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proximaate material cause is the organized body with its specific organs typical of the canine 
class The formal cause is the internal principle of organisation and function. The formal cause of 
a dog is a soul (anima) suited to giving proper structure to the organs of the body typical of the 
species and to give distinctive direction to the functions of that body. Each attribute and each 
function has its proper formal cause in the order of accidents; but the whole organism has a 
substantial formal cause which is responsible for all the natural accidental forms. Whereas we 
can see and isolate organs, we cannot see or isolate formal causes. Rather we postulate them on 
the basis of what we see different parts of a living body to be doing. Formal causes are thus 
closely related to behavioral descriptive definitions. When we recognize that a particular attribute 
or function is native to the organism, we recognize that this attribute or function must have an 
internal principle. This principle we call its form. The basis for this usage is the exterior, visible 
 form of bodies and their organs, such visible forms serve  as the prime analogate for the 
abstract concept of form that we build up by identifying all sorts of invisible forms. Just as 
we have no immediate intuition of essences, so also do we have no immediate access to 
substantial or proper accidental forms: we know them only inasmuch as we postulate them to 
explain the attributes and behavior that we are able to perceive as regular, unique and typical. 
This means that formal and final causality are closely related. In describing the functional 
concept, I pointed out that functional definitions belong to the order of final causes. What we 
observe an entity to be doing regularly and typically is what we call its final cause. In the 
functional definition, we combine a remote material cause with a proximate, though partial final 
cause to name and thus to characterize a corresponding formal cause which we cannot directly 
observe. The fourth kind of case is the efficient cause. In the case of living things, the immediate 
efficient cause of the living thing is its parent(s). Non-living things are generated by atomic or 
chemical agents, often such agents are instrumental, deriving their power to produce substantial 
changes from a remote generator. Thus lightening is produced by an imbalance of electrical 
energy between clouds or between clouds and the earth. 
The purpose of science is to discover such natural causes. To do so, it is imperative to 
observe the being under investigation. This means that science seeks first to develop adequate 
descriptive definitions, then to identify the causes responsible for the phenomena observed, thus 
gradually building up a causal definition. Besides the causal definition, there is another type of 
definition which is misleadingly called metaphysical. The metaphysical definition attempts to 
identify the proximate genus and the specific difference of a particular entity and thus of the 
corresponding concept. Such definitions are obtained by a process of division. We are familiar 
with the taxonomic divisions in biology. The problem with such divisions is that, whereas it is 
relatively easy to identify characteristic factors setting off the divisions of the highest genera, the 
closer one gets to actual things, the more difficult it becomes to identify either the proximate 
genus or the specific difference. Increasingly, rough descriptive definitions have to be used and 
for the very last divisions, we must fall back on functional definitions like rational animal, 
which is a concept of biology, not of metaphysics. 
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14. Reasoning 
Animals, as we have seen, can know concrete relatedness; human beings, by contrast,  
can know and identify the relations underlying concrete relatedness. Truth is one such relation, 
namely the relation of adequacy between the knower and the known. Animals can know truly, 
but they cannot know truth as such, since they cannot know relations as such. Reasoning is an 
everyday phenomenon closely related to grasping truth formally in judgment. Reasoning, roughly 
speaking, is the ability to say why something is the way we think it to be. We answer the 
question why by mustering reasons why. My piece of Galena ore is a brownish grey, because 
its molecular structure absorbs all other frequencies of visible radiation. It is heavy because it has 
a densely packed molecular structure and a large number of heavy atomic particles in its atomic 
core. Besides such examples of reasons for being, we can also identify and formulate reasons for 
knowing. My piece of Galena is metallic brownish grey in color because this is the way it 
appears when I examine it under normal daylight; it is heavy because this is the way I fell it to be 
when I hold it in my hand or the way I measure it to be when I put it on a scale. Reasoning is a 
linkage made between two judgments on the basis of a shared middle term. The fullest 
expression of reasoning is the syllogism. To test the logical consequence of any reason giving, 
we can put it into syllogistic form. Thus the above reasons can be expressed syllogistically: 
Objects with a molecular structure that absorbs visible light in all the frequencies except 
those of brown and grey appear under normal light to be brownish grey. 
But: Galena lead has a molecular structure of this type. 
Therefore, Galena lead appears brownish grey under normal light. 
 
Though we can and do reason about reasoning or about the other acts of the mind, in most 
cases we use reasoning to make connections between percepts and their interpretation. Thus in 
the above examples, reasons are given for the way we perceive Galena lead to have its specific 
color, weight, etc. Thus we use reasoning to confirm and explain percepts. In doing so, we 
prove the thing at hand to be the way we perceive it to be. Such proof gives us certitude, 
certitude that our perceptual judgment is true. Note that such certitude based on proof is no 
substitute for empirical observation. The proof is only as strong as the percepts on which it is 
based. Again, we have no intuition of essences, we know elements of the essence only through 
the analysis and composition/division of perceptual knowledge in judgments. When we reason 
to prove something already known empirically, we only confirm what we already know 
perceptually; the difference being that in the reasoned knowledge we gain the certitude that what 
we observed empirically was not simply a fortuitous aggregate of special cases. When I know 
that Galena lead is brownish red or heavy because it has a corresponding molecular and atomic 
structure, I know in advance, so to speak that this will hold true for all the pieces of Galena lead 
that I will ever hold in my hand in the future, unless of course other chance factors prevent this 
natural attribute from coming to the fore. Reasoning therefore confirms the universality of our 
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observations; it is, however, never a substitute for observation. 
 
15 Inductive and deductive reasoning 
Roughly speaking, Thomas, following Aristotle, distinguishes two kinds of reasoning. 
Induction is a process of reasoning from sense observations. When a given attribute or activity of 
an entity is discovered by observation to occur regularly, typically and uniquely, this set of  
observations can be used as a middle term to ground (prove) that the corresponding attribute or 
activity is a property of the entity in question. The ideal induction is the so called complete 
induction, because it involves observing all occurrences of the corresponding phenomenon. In the 
real world, such complete observation is impossible; even if we were able to examine all possible 
cases here on earth in the course of the whole history of the earth to date, we could still not rule 
out the possibility that in a later period or elsewhere in the cosmos  exceptions might be found. 
Thus, in practice, we have to do with partial, but sufficient inductions only. When I have 
examined a large number of pieces of lead ore of the Galena type, I conclude by induction that 
the brownish-grey color and the cubic form are natural properties because they occur regularly, 
uniquely and typically. The fact that there may be exceptions is then irrelevant. 
The other type of reasoning is deduction. The commonest form of deduction is the  
application of universals to particulars. Knowing that Socrates is a human being, I can conclude 
that he has a sense of humor even before I see him smile or laugh. We are constantly drawing 
conclusions of this type, hardly attending to the fact that this is a form of reasoning. Thus on the 
basis of observations we make of our partners in traffic, we make reasoned predictions of how 
they will probably react when they see us coming. Indeed social life is based largely on 
deductions we make from general observations to predict the reactions of our social partners. 
In the sciences, however, deduction plays a special role. In the Platonic-Scotistic-
!artesian-Kantian tradition, deduction is a method for discovering new truths by intuiting the 
essence of an entity and concluding thereof to the existence of a hitherto unknown property of 
that essence. For Aquinas, however, there is no intuition of essences and therefore no deduction 
of unobserved properties, except in the hypothetical-deductive method which will be described 
below. Only angels can see the properties of a being by contemplating its essence. Human 
beings have no intuitive knowledge of the contents of their concepts or ideas; hence we must 
construct our concepts of an entitys essence by observing and making judgments about the 
properties, activities and causes of the entity in question. Thus I construct a concept of Galena 
ore by observing its properties and activities. In this way I build up a descriptive definition. By 
observing how Galena lead is formed and how it reacts physically and chemically to heat, 
solvents, etc. I learn to identify what it is composed of (material cause) and what structure it must 
have (formal cause) to manifest the properties and activities (final cause) which I observe. None 
of this is given in my first concept of Galena ore when someone shows me a piece of it and 
tells me that this kind of stone is called Galena. If however, the person introducing me to this 
stone goes on to tell me that Galena is a form of native lead ore, and if I know that metallic lead 
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generally has a dull grey metallic shimmer and is heavier than most other materials for its size, I 
can indeed deduce that it will probably have a greyish color and feel heavy even before I 
actually see its color or feel its weight. Such deductive discovery methods, however, are the 
exception rather than the rule. Normally we know the thing to be the way it is by observation, not 
by deduction. Instead we use deduction to confirm and explain what we know by observation. 
Thus, when I observe that Galena is heavy and when I discover, or am told, that it is a massive 
ore of native lead, then I know why it is heavy, because, namely, it has metallic lead as its 
principal component (material cause). Knowing why proves it to be the way it is. Thus my 
causal explanation of the being of a thing is also a causal explanation of my knowing that being, 
though not in such a way that I can dispense with observation. Deduction thus has two principal 
functions, the first (and foremost) is to explain, the second (and secondary) is to certify or prove. 
When I know why something is the way it is, I know it more certainly than when I only know it 
by observation to be that way. 
In his theory of science, Thomas prefers to speak of demonstration rather than deduction. 
This usage does justice to the primary role of deduction as explanation rather than discovery or 
proof. The aim of demonstration is to explain the phenomenon in question by giving reasons why 
it is the way it is and not otherwise. In the demonstration a commonly shared descriptive or 
causal definition is used to link a subject to a predicate. Thus in the example cited above, 
heaviness is demonstrated to be a property of Galena ore because lead is heavy and because 
Galena is an ore composed principally of lead. This is a demonstration in the order of material 
causality. Many demonstrations are in the order of final causality. When I know that lead has a 
specific weight, I can predict that its atoms will take a particular path in the mass-spectrograph 
and that it will sink in liquid mercury  
As mentioned above, there is in modern science a method of deductive reasoning which 
can lead to discovering properties, activities and causes prior to observation. This is the so-called 
hypothetico-deductive method used so often in modern science. On the basis of analogical 
reasoning from other similar cases, a hypothesis about a certain natural phenomenon is formed 
and then tested experimentally to see of it can be verified. Thus I might argue that by reason of 
its molecular structure, Galena lead may have a slightly different melting point than pure metallic 
lead. To know whether or not this is true, I must test it empirically by experiment: I must melt a 
sufficient number of Galena crystals and measure their melting-point in order to show that this 
melting point is regular, unique and typical and thus natural to Galena lead. Such hypothetical 
deductions are not known to be true until they are verified (or falsified); thus they are no 
substitute for sense observation. They have the advantage, however, of directing sense 
observation by setting the parameters for controlled experiment. But until they are verified or 
falsified, they have only more or less probable truth value 
 
16. Verbal and non-verbal thinking 
As we have seen above,  the imaging power needs to produce an expressed species in 
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which it and the estimative/cogitative sense reflect all they know about the particular object 
known. This expressed species, as we have seen, is called the phantasm. Though the visible 
element tends to dominate the phantasm, effectively the phantasm combines the data from all the 
senses, including the common sensibles and the locative dimension recognized by the 
concomiting sense, the time dimension recognized by the imagination, and the whole panoply of 
concrete relationships recognized by animal intelligence. For the same reason that the imaging 
sense needs an expressed species to represent objects not or no longer present to the organism 
physically, so also, the intellect needs an expressed species in which to contemplate its objects. 
Insofar as it is simply a matter of the intellects contemplating ideas in the concrete singular 
objects of sense knowledge, independent of physical presence or absence, the phantasm is able to 
play this role, because the intellect is capable of reflecting upon sense knowing and thus on the 
phantasm. This, indeed is what happens all the time when we think about singulars or concrete 
classes. What is specific to the intellect, however, is that it has the ability to recognize relations 
universal in character, among the things known as related in sensory knowledge. Though the 
phantasm here remains the necessary substrate of such knowledge, the phantasm is not capable of 
representing the universal as such. Thus the intellect needs its own expressed species; this entity 
Aquinas calls the verbum mentale, the mental word. Though Thomas infers the existence of a 
mental word to explain intellection, what stands behind this inference is the empirical fact that 
when we think, we think for the most part in words of our native or learned second language. 
!oncentrating on the inference, rather than attending to empirical experience, Neothomists either 
ignored or even went so far as to deny a relationship between the inferentially derived notion of 
the verbum mentale and the empirically recognized phenomenon of verbal thinking known in 
day-to-day experience. As a result of this grave mistake, the neoscholastics mystified the verbum 
mentale as some sort of metaphysical entity beyond the realm of experience. Recovering the 
empirical roots of this idea is essential to understanding Thomas account of knowing. 
Under verbum mentale we have not to understand some abstract metaphysical entity, 
uncomposed and abstracted from all experience. On the contrary, it  is only a generic concept for 
the whole phenomenon of thinking with verbal and non-verbal symbols. Under mental words we 
understand not only the simple words we use as names of things, but also compounded words 
used to name things when we have no simple word at hand. With words we name not only 
objects and their attributes and behavior in the outer world, but also entities and their attributes 
and functions in our inner world. Thus words can stand not only for concrete things  and their 
concrete relationships in the outer world -- this is the way higher primates operate with words -- 
but they also can stand for our mental acts and their activities and products. Thus our names 
stand primarily for the things themselves, secondarily for our phantasms of them and tertiarily for 
out concepts or ideas of them, phantasms and concepts being symbols for the things themselves.. 
Whether our names for these three entities are simple or compound is a matter of linguistic 
convention and differs from one language to the other. 
What is interesting in intellectual knowing is the role of words in relation to concepts, 
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concepthere being used in the strict sense of an intellectually known, universal relation, based 
on sensually known, concrete relatedness -- I prefer to use the word idea to designate the 
complex of phantasm and concept taken together in their innate relationship to each other. As 
shown above, we have no intuition of essences, thus we have no direct intuitive knowledge of the 
content of our concepts. To recognize to what they pertain concretely, we must reflect them back 
on our phantasms; to recognize the relations they express, we must likewise reflect them back on 
the phantasm, whereby we can often use phantasms as analogies and metaphors to illustrate our 
more abstract concepts. We use words to name our concepts, but also to elucidate them, 
ina smuc h a s w e  u se  w or d s to  de f ine  a nd divide their meaning. Once having learned the definition 
or division by simple or reasoned judgment we do have something akin to concept intuition, not 
in the via inventionis, but in subsequent usage. Thus when I utter or think a name, this name 
stands not only for the concrete individuals I know to belong to its class, but also for my 
developed idea as an interactive combination of phantasm and concept.  This idea in its virtual 
entirety is the basis of the simple intelligence presupposed  to making simple or inferred 
judgments. But again, what I know in simple intelligence is not actual, but only virtual. That is to 
say, at the moment of my simple intellection I do not possess actually the content of my idea; to 
possess this content actually, I must go through a more or less complex series of judgments and 
inferences; indeed I might have to write a whole book to explain my idea. At the moment of 
using a word to form a judgment, my knowledge of the content of my idea remains virtual: 
though I could, if challenged, call up my knowledge of the ideas content, I do not do so actually 
at this moment. This virtual ability to recall learned definitions and divisions is what creates the 
impression that we have an intuitive knowledge of essences: we are able to think them without 
repeating the whole procedure of how we arrived at them in the first place. In this sense, the 
essence is indeed present to me virtually,  but not actually when I form or read/hear a sentence 
using that word. 
Thus understood, mental word refers not only to simple names but also to definitions, 
divisions, judgments and inferences, and, in fact, it would be more correct to speak of mental 
words, since isolated simple names are the exception rather than the rule. Mental words are the 
words we use when we think. Thus they are language specific, though the underlying relation is 
universal in se, though not always identical in actual usage. How detailed our concepts are 
depends very much on the language we use. The Inuit have dozens of words for the various 
forms of snow, whereas English speakers generally distinguish only between powder and wet 
snow. Names can serve as tools for developing concepts. Though my English language 
distinction of only two forms of snow does not do justice to the Inuit set of concepts, by a 
process of translation and explanation, calling attention to different attributes of snow in the 
phantasm, I can learn/elaborate the Inuits conceptual set, finding and forming names to identify 
all the species of snow belonging to it. One of the tools for doing this is the use of nominal 
definitions based on etymology. In concrete languages like German, by contrast to abstract 
languages like English, the phantasms associated with a concept show through such etymological 
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definitions, whereas in English they must be consciously called up. 
The ability of words to stand not only for concepts but also for phantasms makes it 
possible to construct analogical and metaphorical concepts. When I say that the stars are like 
lanterns in the sky, I associate my phantasm of the starry sky with my idea (concept plus 
phantasm) of lantern. Though the mental words we use are normally words from the natural 
languages we have learned, we also have the ability to create artificial symbolic words, as in 
mathematics and mathematical logic. Each of us has had the experience, now and then, of 
thinking non-verbally, for instance when listening to music or contemplating a picture. Whether 
or not such thinking is in the intellectual order or in the order of animal intelligence, is difficult 
to say; I am inclined to think it to be the latter. A similar question arises regarding certain 
meditation states, in which the person deliberately voids the mind of phantasms and mental 
words. It is conceivable that in such states, the intelligence and the imagination are turned off and 
the cognitive is reduced to pure animal consciousness. A further question regards mystical states, 
in which the person transcends the order of ideas to feel a transcendent presence beyond the 
phantasm/concept form of thinking. 
 
17. Everyday knowledge and science 
T homa s w a s not c o n c e r ne d  to  give  a  ge ne r a l account of ordinary, day to day knowing; his 
aim was to explain scientific knowing. Nevertheless, to appreciate what he says about science, 
we need to keep in mind the picture he had of everyday knowing. We can do this by attending to 
the examples he uses in discussing knowledge in general and scientific knowing in particular; we 
can also find important hints when he talks about the interaction of knowing and willing and 
about the intellectual virtues and prudence. What is clear is that simple intelligence, judgment 
and reasoning are day-to-day phenomena. To direct our reactions to our environment we are 
continually making judgments about that environment on the basis of sense perceptions and 
reasoned inference. About the motives and attitudes of people we deal with we are constantly 
drawing inferences and verifying, correcting or falsifying them in the course of our dealings with 
them. The same holds true when we contemplate particular objects. The judgments we make in 
this way are mostly particular judgments about individuals or classes of individuals sharing some 
common trait. Often we make inferences from the general to the particular, thus giving reasons 
why we believe things to be as we perceive them. Our conversation is so full of such judgments 
and inferences, that we hardly attend to them. By contrast to the kind of judgments and 
inferences we daily use, the examples cited by Aristotle and Thomas for the most part seem 
trivial, that Socrates is risibile because he is rational is of no interest to anyone except the writers 
of logic books. 
One of the areas where we use judgments and inference in the everyday sense is in 
history. Here we are constantly asking how things were in the past and why they happened in one 
way and not in another. We answer the question about how things were by mustering evidence 
and reconstructing what happened by inference from individual pieces of evidence We also try to 
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identify the reasons why things happened as they did. We ask about personal motives and 
mistaken judgments, about innate tendencies and fortuitous events. We draw conclusions on the 
basis of our historical knowledge to interpret the present and to predict the future. Most such 
judgments are probable rather than certain: Seldom do we find ironclad evidence, and even 
documentary proof is most often open to interpretation or even falsification. History is in our 
blood, even people who show no interest in political or cultural history are generally interested in 
their personal history and the history of their families and friends. Indeed most of our 
conversation consists of telling or listening to stories. There are even indications that higher 
animals know the past, not of course formally as such, but in actu exercito as the basis for their 
experience. The fact for instance that animals, specifically elephants and higher primates mourn 
their dead indicates that they can concretely distinguish between past and present. Here there is 
need for further investigation of what in human knowledge of the future may in fact be attributed 
to animal intelligence The fact that history deals with particulars and that it is mostly only 
probable led Aristotle and Thomas following him, to deny that history is a science. This is really 
a moot question that depends on the way one defines science, which itself is an artefact, not a 
natural thing. There is no question that history is a scientific discipline in the modern sense. It is 
an ordered body of knowledge with established rules for gathering and interpreting evidence and 
for drawing conclusions on the basis of evidence. The aim of its arguments is not only to 
establish facts, but also to explain them causally or intellectually. The fact that for the most part it 
yields only probable knowledge does not make it less scientific; most of  natural and social 
science likewise yields only probable knowledge. 
!losely related to history is prognosis, or in its scientific form futurology. Prognosis is 
also an everyday form of knowing. We use it constantly in behavior, in that we attempt to assess 
beforehand what effects our actions will produce or how our partner in action will presumably 
react. Prognosis, being future to sense perception, is always inferential. On the basis of existing 
knowledge we infer what is going to happen. Prognosis normally has to do with the singular 
and the concrete. Even when we make use of scientific universals, it is the singular  that we 
attempt to know. An interesting question is whether animals, more specifically, higher primates 
have an ability to know the future. Again there is evidence that they do; tool-making and social 
behavior  require that the purpose for the action be known as the reason for performing the action 
one way or the other. Here again we recall what Thomas says about the role of experience in 
animal judgment. Thus, what distinguishes human from animal prognosis is not the fact of 
predicting the future, but rather the ability of man to identify the specific reasons for his 
inference, whereas in the animal inference is instinctive. 
The model for science for the ancient Greeks was undoubtedly mathematics, in particular, 
Euclidian geometry. Here one finds exemplified the ideals of certainty, clear and distinct 
definitions and compelling reasoning, i.e. proofs of reason. In mathematics we do indeed intuit 
essences; they are clear to us as soon as we understand the terms or make the construction. 
Mathematical questions and their answers can be put into strict logical form, with one inference 
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derived syllogistically from another. Theoretically it is possible to follow each line of inference 
back to the very first axioms of the science. On the basis of this model, Platonists of all colors 
through the ages have rejected the idea of a science of nature, at best they grant the existence of a 
natural science using mathematical methods. Aristotle too recognized the existence of and the 
advantages of such mathematical natural science, but he went on to show that it is also possible 
to develop a descriptive science of nature based on natural principles of being and knowing. 
Such descriptive science, which uses reasoning to explain rather than to prove, is what scientists 
engage in when they attempt to interpret the results of their experiments and mathematical 
models. It is false to disparage such scientific work as mere popular science. Mathematical 
models are not ends in themselves, they aim at telling us about nature as it really is, to sharpen 
our observations and to interpret what we observe. As will be explained below, natural science in 
many cases attains only probability, but even when it attains certainty, this certitude is only 
relative, ut in pluribus (=as a general rule) as Thomas would say, because natural causes can be 
impeded from producing their proper effects by other fortuitous causes. 
For Thomas, following Aristotle, natural science points beyond itself at several points. In 
the order of physics, the existence of moved movers points to the need for an unmoved mover as 
the initial source of motion, even when, as Aristotle believed, the motion of the universe might 
be eternal. Phase changes and chemical changes also point to the need for a pure act to account 
for the fact that in changeable beings actuality is an act of potency and therefore impure. i.e. 
mixed with unactualized potency. The fact that the cosmos as we know it is filled with finality 
also points beyond the cosmos of changeable being to an order of immaterial being  with natural 
ends. In psychology, the discussion of how we know truth points to immaterial truth as the 
ground of material truth and shows that the ability of the human mind to know truth indicates that 
we have within us immaterial faculties of knowing and willing which are signs that our own 
souls are immaterial. In ethics too, we learn that our appetite for happiness cannot be satisfied by 
any form of changeable, material being. We have an innate appetite for the universal and 
therefore immaterial truth and goodness. 
All these leads tell us that there is a realm of being beyond the realm of changeable, 
material being, which is what we know perceptually. The realization that this is the case 
constitutes what Thomas calls the negative judgment of separation and is the midwife to the 
birth of a new science beyond the natural and social sciences, a science of being as common to 
material and immaterial forms of being. This is what Thomas calls metaphysics. Metaphysics 
is not, for Thomas, a study of immaterial being as such: about of immaterial being we know too 
little and too indirectly to constitute a special science, since we know it only as the remote cause 
of physical being and of human knowing and volition. It is not the study of abstract being: 
abstracting being from the diverse manifestations of being ranging from purely mental to the 
most supreme real being yields only an empty concept of is-ness, with which we can do 
nothing. Likewise it is not the study of pure being as distinguished not only from changeable, 
material being, but also from immaterial being composed of potency and act:  pure being as such 
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we know only at the end of metaphysics when we reason to the existence of a supreme mover, 
supreme being, supreme end, etc. and recognize that, the existence of such pure being as the 
cause of participated being, intimates an analogical concept of being applicable to both 
participated and un-participated being. Metaphysics is likewise not the study of common being: 
though it is true that everything from God to mental and fictitious being is contained in the first 
and most primitive concept of being which we apprehend at the birth of intellectual activity, all 
of these diverse forms of being are contained only confusedly and virtually in this primitive 
concept and we have no way to reduce this confusion and virtuality to act except through the long 
process of sensuous and intellectual inquiry. Finally, metaphysics, for Aquinas at least, is not the 
study of a concept of being as such, which is the notion of metaphysics that, as Ludger 
Honnefelder has shown, has been the common opinion ever since Scotus and which has been the 
object of Kants critique. On the contrary, for Thomas, the object of metaphysics is defined by 
the negative judgment of separation to be a dimension of being shared by material and material 
being, a dimension, if you will, which, thanks to the separation judgment, now lights up within 
changeable being as we perceive and experience it. The object of metaphysics is separated, not 
abstracted from perceived, changeable being. This separation makes clear that changeable being 
has a hitherto unnoticed dimension of being. !onsequently, metaphysics, though it recognizes 
that its concepts transcend the perceptual world, is, like all other human science, dependant on 
phantasms for its contact with reality. Without a concrete phantasm to which it is related, a 
metaphysical concept is empty and unreal. The difference between metaphysics and the natural 
sciences is that, in metaphysics, one consciously attends to the way the concepts transcend 
empirical experience. This is what gives metaphysics its formal identity over against the natural 
sciences of changeable being. 
It would go to far to elaborate at this point on the practical sciences which Thomas, 
following Aristotle, distinguishes over against natural science, mathematics and metaphysics. 
Among these ethics and logic are the principle forms of practical science. There are also practical 
sciences of technology and the arts. Social science, having as its object the relationships between 
human beings has both a practical and a speculative side and must be treated separately. 
 
18. The Scientific questions and the subject/object of science 
The clue to Aristotelian scientific methodology is the scheme of the four questions, which 
Aquinas uses to structure his Summa theologiae. The four questions are: 
 an sit?                 -- Is there a subject worthy of scientific inquiry. 
 quid sit?              -- What is the nature of this subject 
 quale sit?             -- What are the attributes of this subject? 
 propter quid sit?  -- Why do these attributes inhere in this subject 
The first question is answered empirically by calling attention to phenomena manifesting the 
subject of inquiry Arguments in the order of final causality can be used to confirm such 
observations. The second question is answered by constructing definitions and divisions. 
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Dialectically the inquiry begins usually by analysing the current and historical (etymological) use 
of the word to name the subject of inquiry and its empirically recognized manifestations; this 
inquiry leads to a nominal definition. The mustering of the phenomena associated empirically 
with the subject of inquiry serves to answer the third question primarily, but secondarily it 
answers the second question as well, by making possible the formulation of a descriptive 
definition. As explained above, such descriptive definitions start with the nearest possible genus 
and then select a regular, typical and unique congeries of attributes as an expression of the 
specific difference.. Further inquiry about the various manifestations of the subject of inquiry 
makes it possible to identify causes. Again as explained above there are four genera of causes, 
material, formal, efficient and final. The ideal definition (overlooking the so-called 
metaphysical definition mentioned above) is a list of the four causes of a natural thing or an 
artefact. Such a causal definition is the ultimate answer to question two, but it also provides the 
basis for answering question four about the reason for the properties of the subject of inquiry. In 
effect, each property of a subject of inquiry has its specific causes in both the order of knowing 
and the order of being. 
As explained above, most definitions in science are of the functional type. Functional 
definitions combine a remote genus with a particular attribute or function as the sign of an 
otherwise unknown formal cause: in this way they are primarily definitions in the order of final 
causality, but as pointing to an intrinsic formal cause, they are secondarily definitions in the order 
of formal causality. The definition of man as a rational animal is a classic example of such a 
functional definition. It is a property of functional definitions to grow in conceptual depth as we 
get to know better the subject defined. Both the remote genus and the specific function are known 
initially only rudimentarily. Our first notion of animal contains little more actual information 
than that it is something with moving parts outside of parts (thus distinguishing it from non-
living things and from plants). The more one studies the object, the better one comes to know the 
genus. Thus after studying biology we are able to put together a working definition of higher 
primate which comes very close to describing our human body and its functioning. The same 
holds true for the function chosen as the specific difference. Initially rational means little more 
than the hint that we observe ourselves finding reasons for our thinking and acting. Only after 
long study of all the sciences do we get a clearer picture of everything summed up in the simple 
word rational. 
The fact that such explicit knowledge is contained virtually in the original rudimentary 
concept has led Platonists to think that such implicit knowledge can be made explicit by a study 
of the concept alone, without respect to the phantasms with which it was and remains  associated 
in the course of the via inventionis. This is what they mean when they talk of intuiting essences. 
For Thomas, such detailed knowledge is not implicit but only virtual in the original concept; 
there is no short-cut to explicitating it by the long and complicated process of observation and 
inferential verification. The kind of concept analysis that I was exposed to in the course of my 
encounters with dogmatic Thomism yields only conceptual knowledge when no effort is made to 
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communicate the phantasms on which it was based. Neothomistic philosophy, unfortunately,  is 
full of such conceptual knowledge passing for real knowledge. It is possible to juggle verbal 
c onc e pts a nd divisions a nd to r e a so n  w ith le a rned formulae without having anything but the most 
rudimentary sense impressions of the phenomena, which these notions were introduced to 
explain. Neglecting the empirical, Neothomists took to calling such concepts metaphysical, 
thinking that they could be abstracted from sense phenomena, which were no longer needed 
once the concept had been formulated. Reasoning became for them a method of proving 
propositions and deriving new propositions, all without reference to the empirical data about the 
subject in question. All this was Scotism, Suarezianism and Kantianism but not Thomism. 
The explanation of properties by discovering their causes is the goal of scientific 
demonstration. Demonstrations are of two kinds: quia and propter quid demonstrations. Quia 
demonstrations are used to prove simple facticity by calling attention to causes making subjects 
and their attributes known; most of the time, they are taken from remote, rather than proximate 
causes; often they proceed by induction. Propter quid demonstrations, by contrast require that we 
identify proper causes of being. The principal function of demonstration is to explain and thus, 
secondarily, to certify facts we already know. Demonstrations support, but do not substitute for 
empirical observation. One of the reasons for the ill-conceived 20th century debate about the role 
of  theological reasoning in the context of the development of dogma, is the total 
misunderstanding of the Thomistic notion of demonstration. The notion that we discover new 
truths by reasoning is Scotus, not Aquinas, something even Marie-Dominique !henu and Yves 
!ongar failed to realize in their discussion of doctrinal development. 
In the preceding paragraphs, I have used the word subject of science deliberately. The 
distinction between subject and object of science is important. The subject of a science is the 
entity which the science treats of; in short, it is the principal grammatical subject of the 
judgments made in that science. Thus logic is about mental beings, mathematics is about  
numbers and geometrical figures. general natural science is about changeable being in general, 
physics is about locally moving entities on earth, astrophysics about the heavenly bodies moving 
locally, chemistry is about substances changing as to their qualities, biology is about living 
beings identified by metabolism, growth and reproduction, and in the case of animals, sense and 
appetite directed bodily motion. These are the things these sciences talk about, the subjects of 
their judgmental predications. The predicates of such statements are the definitions, descriptions 
and explaining reasons which, in judgment, direct or inferred, are stated to belong to them. The 
object of a science, therefore, is the sum total of such statements about the subject. It lies in the 
nature of human thinking (we know only discursively, i.e. componendo et dividendo) that 
science grows as the number of propositional statements grows. Each new statement actualises  a 
more or less minute aspect of the subject hitherto known only virtually as being contained in 
the subject. It is the predicates which actualise the subject and thus it is only in the set of all 
possible predicates that the subject becomes fully known actually. Of course it is impossible, not 
only for the individual scientist, but also for the whole scientific community through history to 
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identify and to affirm or deny (componendo et dividendo) all the possible predicates applicable to 
a particular subject, even a generic one. Thus our human science remains necessarily partial and 
always capable of further ramification, elaboration and,  not infrequently, correction. 
 
 
19. Truth and certitude 
Truth is, for Aquinas following Aristotle, the conformity of knowledge in the mind with  
reality: adaequation intellectus et re. In most cases, the reality in question is something 
outside the knower, but because we have the power to reflect about ourselves and our acts and 
potencies, the thing in question can be a mental reality as well. Truth is of its nature a reflective 
form of cognition: it is more than knowing truly --animals are capable of that -- it is  knowing 
that we know truly. The bonobo has true knowledge of the fishing pole he makes to fish ants 
out of an anthill. But he does not know that this knowledge is true; he does not even pose the 
question. It is the specific human ability to reflect not only on things, but on our own acts of 
knowing that gives us truth. As indicated above, truth is apprehended only in judgment. 
Reasoned truth is apprehended in reasoning which tells us why a particular judgment/statement is 
true. !ertitude is a step beyond truth. There are degrees in the knowledge of truth. Judgments 
about first principles like the famous axiom being is not non-being enjoy absolute and 
immediate certitude, because by their very terms they cannot ever be otherwise. Judgments about 
the natural attributes of material things, by contrast, enjoy only relative certitude. Relative 
certitude is not a contradiction in terms. The relative certitude that we have in the natural 
sciences means that things and their attributes and activities that we observe in nature to be 
regular, unique and typical (the definition of natural) will always manifest these attributes and  
activities, as long as other factors do not enter the picture to impede them. Thus they are valid for 
the most part, but not always, because they can be impeded. 
 The next grade below natural certitude is probability. In contrast to Aristotle and Thomas 
, we know today that the universe is much larger and much more complex than meets the eye: 
thus it is difficult to make adequate inductions to establish the existence and properties of natural 
objects in it. For the same reason, it is difficult to identify the proper causes of things and their 
properties and functions. One way of posing and answering such questions is the hypothetical-
deductive argumentation used so often in modern science. Thus if I manage to prove my 
deduction experimentally, I attain natural certitude, such as I would not have been able to attain 
by mere superficial observation without controlled experiment. Most of the time in natural 
science, however, it is difficult to make such sufficient inductions to say what is certainly regular, 
unique and typical, since we cannot be sure we have taken all possible causes into account. Thus 
most causal relationships that we posit as the explanation of observed natural phenomena are 
known not as certain, but only as probable. Note, however, that the fact that we know them only 
probably does not make them any less true; thus they have their place in natural and human 
science alongside the relatively small number of certainly true judgments.  The works of 
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Aristotle and Thomas on natural and human science are filled with such probable explanations 
and it is characteristic that neither author makes much of an effort to distinguish between certain 
and probable propositions and reasonings in his natural, social or theological science. What 
counts is their truth, not their certitude. 
The concern with certitude is a heritage of Platonism, and was awakened in medieval 
scholasticism by Scotus and Ockham and their followers. It has been a major preoccupation of 
philosophy and theology ever since. The question of certitude came to the fore when the 
Franciscan school took to analysing the difference between Gods absolute and his ordinary 
power. Absolute certitude meant that a proposition must be rooted in Gods absolute power, since 
with his ordinary power, God could dispose things otherwise than they are known to be by 
observation in this world. To find out, how things are according to the absolute power of God, 
Scotus began looking at the concept itself. If it could be shown that a property belongs to the 
essence of the thing in such a way that no contradiction is possible, then it is certainly a property 
of the thing according to the absolute power of God. With this type of concept analysis Scotus 
introduced a way of thinking which was to flower first under Descartes then under Kant, who 
recognized that such deductions of absolutely certain truths could not be made about things 
outside the mind, but only of the structures of thinking as such. Thus Kant developed the 
transcendental deduction to establish with absolute certitude the structures of thought itself. From 
Kant, this method was taken over into Transcendental Thomism, with which the names of 
Marechal, Rahner and Lonergan are associated. 
For Thomas, by contrast, pure, non-experimental deduction from the concept as such 
plays no role in his science or philosophy. Even metaphysics is for Thomas an empirical science, 
since it begins with the negative judgment of separation that occurs when we discover that there 
are forms of being existing which are not of a material, bodily nature. This occurs with the 
discovery of an unmoved mover in physics, an ungenerated generator in chemistry and the 
discovery of an immaterial dimension to the human person in biology/psychology. Thanks to this 
discovery of immaterial being alongside material being, it becomes possible to develop a science 
of being as such as manifested in concrete material beings. But for the  properties and activities 
of being as such, we are just as dependant upon observation as we are in natural science. We have 
no more intuitive knowledge of refined metaphysical concepts than we do of natural science 
concepts. 
 
20. The universal and the singular 
One of the most misunderstood positions of Aquinas is his statement that the intellect 
does not know the singular directly but only by reflecting on the phantasm. The intellect, he says, 
is concerned with the universal, not the particular; of the singular there can be no scientific 
knowledge. To understand these statements, it is necessary to attend to their context. Thomas by 
no means intends to deny that we know singulars. The fact is that phenomenologically speaking,  
knowledge of singulars constitutes the overwhelming majority part of what we know. With our 
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senses alone, we know nothing but singulars; universals, we have seen, are not intuited but 
abstracted from sense knowledge of a class of singulars. The question for Thomas is not do we 
know singulars but how do we know them. His answer is, that we know them with the senses 
directly, with the intellect only indirectly. To locate direct knowledge of the singular in the 
senses is not to minimize our knowledge of them. As explained above; the organs and faculties 
are not the knower in the strict sense, I am the knower and the organs and faculties are only the 
instrumental cause of my knowing. Thus, with my senses, I really know singulars, and were I not 
to know them, I would know nothing with my intellect, because the intellect contains only ideas 
derived from sense knowledge. 
In ST, I, q.84, a.7-8 , St. Thomas says clearly and unequivocally that the only reason for 
human science is to know the concrete singular! The point of all physics and chemistry is to 
know this particular stone: ut cognoscit hanc lapidem. Distinguishing between the sensual and 
the intellectual faculties, Thomas says that the intellect knows the universal properly and directly, 
but also the singular mediately and indirectly, namely by reflecting back on the phantasms of 
singular objects from which the universal concept was derived by abstraction or on the 
phantasms of singular objects which are recognized to belong to the class objects corresponding 
to the universal. The fact  is that it is impossible for human beings to think without phantasms. 
Ideas without the associated phantasms are empty and meaningless. The phantasm, as described 
above, is the composite of all our sensory perceptions and judgments about the concrete singular 
object or about the sensory class to which that object belongs. The phantasm is produced by the 
imaging sense on the basis of the judgments of animal intelligence otherwise known in man as 
the vis cogitativa or ratio particularis. As we have seen, this animal intelligence in higher 
primates is the ability to recognize concrete relationships , not only between external objects to 
my own organism, but also among the objects themselves of my sensory world, irrespective of 
their relationship to myself. Again it is important to note, that what is known in such animal 
judgments is not the relation as such, for this is a universal transcending the material order, but 
rather the concrete relatedness of the objects, i.e. the relationship between them. The function of 
the animal intelligence is to recognize such concrete relationships and to codify them in the 
imagination as experience. Experience is the basis of all intellection of universals and thus of all 
of our intellectual ideas or concepts. 
Ethological studies demonstrate that at least the higher primates are able to recognize 
concrete classes and therein the individual objects belonging to the class. Using symbols 
provided by the researchers, they can even name such classes and recognize, when confronted 
with a new object that it belongs to this or that class and thus can be called by this or that name. 
What distinguishes the human concept from the animal concept is therefore not its character as a 
class, but rather its formality as a universally recognized relation. Unlike the chimpanzee, we are 
able to identify and to formulate linguistically what it is that constitutes the particular class; i.e. 
we can define the class concept, a chimpanzee cannot do this. Being able to define class 
concepts, we are able to divide them, thus distinguishing them from other related concepts, e.g. 
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from more generic and more specific concepts, and from similar and associated concepts. 
Knowing our concepts as relations with universal applicability, we are able to make judgments 
predicating them of singulars or classes of singulars and we can use them to give reasons for the 
correctness of other judgments, i.e. to give reasons why things are or are not what they appear to 
be. All this is proper to human knowledge as contrasted with animal knowledge, but it involves 
no disparagement of the basic truth that we know singulars and that we indeed know them 
intellectually. 
 
21. A theory of error 
Thomistic epistemology has traditionally been preoccupied with proving that human 
knowledge is true and reliable. Most of the time, Thomists have overshot their goal; so that it 
becomes difficult to see where error can come in. The world in which Aristotle and Thomas lived 
was an orderly world. They had no inkling that the heavens were not crystalline spheres 
transporting the heavenly bodies; they had no inkling that the four elements, earth, water, air, 
fire, are not the ultimate principles of chemical change. Lacking a telescope, they were unable to 
see the structure of the heavens; lacking a microscope, they were unable to see that sensible 
substances have molecular and atomic structures. On the basis of prima facie evidence, they took 
their natural science to be real and certain for the most part. Our situation today is entirely 
different. Our earth, the scene of the overwhelming number of our observations is but a small 
point in a series of local systems within the universe. Though much of what we observe on earth 
can be extrapolated to other heavenly bodies, the astronomical data is full of exotic phenomena 
that we cannot explain, at least not yet. The same holds true for the molecular, atomic and 
subatomic levels. The deeper we go, the more exotic become the phenomena we discover. This 
being the case, we have a very different attitude to scientific truth and certitude than Aristotle or 
St. Thomas had. Though there are still sceptics around, who need to be countered by proofs of 
the reliability of knowledge, the main thrust of an epistemology for our age must be the 
development of a theory of error and unreliability. Until we do this, we will get no hearing in the 
scientific community. 
The elements of a theory of error are available. Experimental physiology can give us a 
pretty clear picture of how the external senses and the concomiting sense function and 
malfunction. In particular, they make clear how our senses often react to but a small sector of 
potentially perceptible spectra like electro-magnetic energy or physical compression waves. To 
the other sectors of such spectra, other animals and plants often prove sensible. With regard to 
the operation of the internal senses, a wealth of empirical data is being accumulated daily, but it 
has yet to be synthesized. Most urgent is the study of the error capabilities of the system 
designated generically as the imaging power. Animal intelligence has only recently become the 
subject of a special science, ethology; only on the basis of detailed studies of animal behavior 
will we be able to get a clear picture of what is constitutive for human knowing. No doubt many 
errors arise at this level. With respect to intelligence, traditional Thomist epistemology asserts 
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that only the most fundamental and rudimentary concepts can be known infallibly and that only 
the first principles are universally true and absolutely certain. Beyond the very first principles of 
e ve r y sc ie nc e , the  so - c a lle d a xioms, e ve r y sc ientific judgment is theoretically fallible. To prove 
that it is certainly true, we would have to trace it back to the first principles. This we can do in 
mathematics, but it is impossible to do so in the natural and social sciences, where the matter is 
simply too complex. This is why it is generally impossible to distinguish between certain and 
probable argumentation in the natural and social sciences, where we almost never have complete 
inductions capable of ruling out exceptions, and where our inferences are incapable of ruling out 
hitherto unobserved factors influencing the effects of the causes that we  have identified. 
 
22. In place of a summary 
!onsciously, this paper ends not with truth but with error. Because Neoscholasticism was 
afraid to confront error, it fell into grave error, completely distorting the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
theory of cognition. What it claims to say to modern scientists finds no hearing, because the 
neoscholastics were afraid of soiling their hands with empirical natural science. Neglecting the 
phantasms, they fled into a metaphysical world of pure concepts, where they felt more 
comfortable. Few scientists followed them, and those who did, usually did so for the wrong 
reasons. Before Thomistic cognition theory can again find a hearing, it must be completely 
rewritten on the basis of contemporary experimental science. In this paper, I have attempted to 
sketch the lines along which such a rewriting might be done, but the task is too big for any one 
person. Unlike the natural science of Thomas day, no one person, not even a genius of the 
calliper of St. Thomas, is able to master the whole of it. Future Thomist cognition theory must be 
a collective effort, to which this paper, I hope, might serve as a stimulus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Oktober 2003  !:\WINNT\PROFILES\RIPL\EIGENE DATEIEN\!OGNIPHAEN-02.DO! 
 
 
 36 
APPENDIX  
Recovering the empirical basis of thomas Aquinass cognition theory 
 
The neoscholastic interpretation of Thomas Aquinass cognition theory suffers from having lost 
its roots in empirical natural science. Thomas, like his mentor Aristotle, thought through his 
philosophy in an intensive dialog with the natural science of his day. It was this natural science 
that provided him with the necessary empirical basis (experimentum) for his theories. Without 
this basis however, the necessary conversio ad phantasmata, which Thomas insists is necessary 
for real scientific knowledge, cannot be carried out. Without this conversio, however, Thomass 
definitions and demonstrations yield no real knowledge, they remain pure nominal. Since the 
beginnings of modern science in the 16th century, this old natural science has been banished 
from sight; modern readers are unable to understand it, because they see the world through the 
spectacles of modern science. Most neoscholastics had little appreciation of modern natural 
science or regarded it as a realm for itself, having little or no connection with what they regarded 
as natural philosophy or, in many cases, special metaphysics. Thus even those neoscholastics, 
who might have been competent to do so, made little or no effort to put what they regarded as 
Thomass epistemology or rational psychology in relation to modern cognition theory. But also 
from the side of modern cognition theory, it is only the recent developments in neurobiological 
interpretation of cognitive processes that make such a rapprochement possible and fruitful. The 
following theses are an attempt to summarize the most important elements of such a correlation. 
 
1. The transmission of images through a medium (diaphanon) assures the contact between a 
distant object and the corresponding senses of vision and hearing. In this transmission, wave 
patterns of light and sound serve as species in medio, by which the emitting or reflecting object 
directly affects the external sense, impressing upon it an image of itself according to the mode of 
the recipient sense, e.g. a visual or acoustic image. Already the species in medio  has, according 
to Thomas esse intentionale, that is to say, it is a sign of the object from which it originates. 
 
2. In the external sense, the object or the medium produces a physio-chemical change in the 
organ of the sense affected. The pattern of this reaction corresponds to the affecting aspect of the 
object and is thus its image, having likewise esse intentionale. This physio-chemical reaction 
pattern is the species impressa. The act of knowing in the external senses is nothing more than 
this physico-chemical activation of the potency of the sense organ and is not yet conscious, 
though it can produce immediate reactions of the nervous system. 
 
3. The internal senses are located in the central nervous system, the common sense being located 
in the spinal nerve and/or in the lowest organs of the brain. The internal senses are actualized 
through neuro-chemical stimuli coming from the external senses. The patterns of these stimuli 
are the species impressa of the internal senses. 
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4. The species expressa of the imagination is the mental picture of the object which we can call 
up at will, even when we are actually apprehending the same or other objects with our external 
senses. This image corresponds presumably to the lowest level of our consciousness, since we 
are able to recognize the difference between internal and external images. 
 
5. The so called animal intelligence (vis aestimativa / vis cogitativa) represents the highest form 
of animal consciousness. Its function is to recognize and judge relationships in sensual and 
imaginative apprehensions. Its expressed species consists of concrete judgments, which taken 
together constitute what Thomas designates by the term experimentum. Experimental studies on 
primates reveal that higher forms of animal intelligence are capable of cognitive achievements 
corresponding to those of two to three year old human children, including the use of simple 
forms of speech using various forms of sign language, since the primate organs of speech are 
insufficiently developed to allow acoustic articulation. 
 
6. The experiential correlate of the agent intellect is our human consciousness. Our 
consciousness uses the species of experimentum as an instrument to activate the potency of the 
passive intellect, evoking in it intellectual images of objects known through the senses. This 
process is called abstraction. Abstraction, however, is not to be understood as some sort of 
intuitive apprehension of the essence of the object. What the intellect apprehends in an initial 
encounter with the object is nothing more than quidity in the sense of ali-quid, namely that 
the object is a distinct something, whose essence is not yet known actively but is only in 
potency in this initial species impressa. What it is, must be found out in a long process of 
empirically based judgments and reasonings. In other words, the concept is always a 
construction based on numerous acts of judgment based on phantasms or experimentum. The 
species expressa of intellectual knowledge are the mental words  (verbum mentale, conceptus 
intellectus) we use in thinking about an object. Such words are combined into sentences 
expressing judgments. Real definitions take the form of judgments predicating the known aspects 
of the object to the object contained in potency in the subject of the sentence. Real divisions are 
likewise judgments taking sentential form. Reasoning is a process of linking known truths 
expressed in sentences to identify causal connection and thus to explain phenomena which we 
observe. Since we have no direct insight into the potential content of our contents, we do not gain 
definitions by intuition nor can we deduce new knowledge directly from the potential content 
of our concepts. 
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CHAPTER I  
POSING THE PROBLEM 
Ao    REVELATION AND FAITH 
At the outer limits of his natural intellectual vision,  beyond the 
horizon of being revealed through his senses,  man detects the pres-
ence of a super-sensible Being who is at once the immanent cause and 
the transcendent goal of all the beings which man's vision reveals.    
Beyond this distant horizon, man cannot of himself pass; the mystery 
that he detects at the outer limits of his perception escapes cognitive 
grasp. Beyond the mere fact of God's existence and his efficient,  
exemplary and formal causality of all things, man can by his natural 
powers know only that this transcendent Being is richer than any earth-
bound concepts can directly express.1 
However,  the God who dwells in this transcendent world hidden 
from man's view,  was not content to leave man with only this faint and 
distant perception of the divine mystery.    Having created man for inti-
mate communion with himself,  "he manifested himself from the start to 
our first parents   and from that time on he ceaselessly kept the 
human race in his care in order to give eternal life to those who per-
severingly do good in search of salvation."2      Not only did God actually 
direct the course of history to bring about this end,  thus revealing 
himself in action,  but also to certain privileged men in the course of 
this saving history he manifested himself more directly,  telling them 
about himself and about his plan of salvation.    In intelligible word and 
imaginative vision God revealed himself time and again to the patriarchs 
and prophets,  and in this way he supplemented and interpreted his self-
manifestation in the saving deeds he performed in history. 
Finally,  not content with even this mode of revelation,   God became 
incarnate in Jesus Christ (Jn.  1: 14).    In the man Jesus Christ, God, 
having clothed himself in human form,  became visible to man: to see 
Jesus is to see the Father (Jn.  14: 9) .     In Christ,  therefore,  the 
revealing Word of God finds its most perfect embodiment.    In him "the 
fullness of the Father dwells" (Colos.  1: 19); he is "the image of the 
invisible God" (Colos   1: 15).    He preaches and teaches "as one having 
authority" (Mk.   1: 22):   "we speak of what we know and we testify to 
what we have seen" (Jn.  3: 11)«    He knows the Father (Jn. 7: 29) and is 
in the Father (Jn.   17: 21); indeed, he and the Father are one (Jn. 10: 
30). 
In Jesus Christ,  Incarnate Word,  the Son of God is present in our 
midst and in human terms that we can understand and assimilate 
he speaks,  preaches,  teaches,  testifies to what he has seen and 
heard in the bosom of the Father.3 
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Jesus Christ is the fullness of revelation in every respect.   He is 
God the revealer.   Together with the Father and the Spirit he is the 
cause and author of revelation as an activity proceeding from the 
Trinity.    Incarnate as a man, he accomplishes this task in a human way 
by words and deeds.    He is also God revealed.    Begotten eternally 
within the Godhead as the expression of God's knowledge of himself,  
the Second Person of the Trinity took human flesh in order to express 
God's self-knowledge in a way which would be suitable to mankind.    In 
his own person,  therefore,  Jesus is the truth which he testifies to and 
teaches.    Jesus Christ is the Way of revelation.    Through Jesus we go 
to the Father, he is the sole means of access to the Father,  the way to 
life and truth (Jn.  14: 5-6).    Jesus is the sign of revelation,  both the 
motive of credibility and the symbolic representation of what he 
announces.    "By the sublimity of his doctrine,  the brilliance of his 
holiness and the power of his works   Christ shows that he is truly 
what he claims to.be,  God among men and that his witness is true."4 At 
the same time his human words and gestures,   indeed his very presence,   
symbolize both the divine person and activity they incarnate and the 
transfigured humanity they bring about in those who believe.    Finally,   
Christ Is man's perfect response to revelation.    In his life are embodied 
the vision,  trust and love which God evokes In the man who accepts his 
revelation.   He does the Father's will in all things and unites himself to 
the Father in prayerful adoration.5 
Having accomplished the work of revelation and salvation for 
which he came into the world,   Jesus Christ returned to the Father. But 
before he passed out of this world he made sure that the good news he 
brought would be made accessible to all men of all nations and all 
future generations .    Thus from the beginning of his public life he 
gathered around himself a band of disciples.    These men,  who had lived 
In intimacy with him and thus possessed a direct,   living experience of 
his person, his Work and his teaching, he commissioned as apostles,  
enjoining them to bear witness to all that they had heard and seen (Acts  
1: 1,  8,  22; 4:20; 10: 39-41; Lk.  1: 2; Jn.  15: 27; 19: 35-57; 1 Jno  1: 1-
5). They were to preach the Gospel throughout the entire world (Mk.   
16: 15), making disciples of all men and teaching them all that Christ 
had commanded them (Mt. 28: 20).    To these disciples and to the Church 
he founded on them,   Christ sent his Spirit,  the Spirit of Truth,  who 
would dwell with them forever (Jn.  14: 16-17),    This Spirit would teach 
them all things and bring to mind everything Christ had told them (Jn, 
14:26).    This same Spirit,  who animated the apostles' oral preaching 
and their governance of the Church,   inspired some of the apostles and 
other apostolic men to commit the message of salvation to writing.    
This enduring written witness to the revelation made to mankind in 
Jesus Christ would serve as permanent foundation for Church life and 
preaching.   At the same time,  and under a similar inspiration,  the 
apostles, in order to insure that the Gospel remain forever whole and 
alive within the Church,  left bishops as their successors,   entrusting to 
them their own teaching role.      "And so," as Vatican IIs Constitution on 
Revelation declares,  "the apostolic preaching,  which is expressed in a 
special way in the inspired books, was to be preserved by a continuous 
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succession of preachers until the end of time."7 
This sacred tradition,  therefore,  and sacred Scripture of both 
the Old and New Testament,  are like a mirror in which the pil-
grim Church on earth looks at God,  from whom she has re-
ceived everything until she is brought finally to see Him as He is, 
face to face (cf.   1 Jn.  3: 2 ) , 8 
God's revelation of himself to mankind is not, however,  a purely 
external and objective affair.    Not all who hear the word of God believe 
and understand (Jn. 6: 64-65):   "I bless thee,   Father,   Lord of heaven 
and earth,  for having hidden these things from the wise men and the 
prudent,  and revealing them to little ones" (Mt,  11: 25).    To Peter's 
confession of faith,  Jesus replied:   "Blessed art thou,  Simon Bar-Jona, 
for flesh and blood has not revealed this to thee,  but my Father in 
heaven" (Mt.   16: 17).    No one comes to Christ unless the Father draws 
him (Jn. 6: 44-45).    "God, who commanded light to shine out of 
darkness, has shone in our hearts,  to give enlightenment concerning the 
knowledge of the glory of God,   shining on the face of Christ Jesus" (2 
Cor. 4: 6). 
This interior enlightenment makes possible the response of faith.    
Faith is "an obedience by which man entrusts his whole self freely to 
God,   offering 'the full submission of intellect and will to God who 
reveals1'and freely assenting to the truth revealed by Him."9      In the 
words of the First Vatican Council: 
  the Catholic Church professes that this faith, which "is the 
beginning of human salvation"  is a supernatural virtue by which 
we,  with the aid and inspiration of the grace of God,  believe that 
the things revealed by Him are true,  not because the intrinsic truth 
of the revealed things has been perceived by the natural light of 
reason, but because of the authority of God himself,  who reveals 
them,  who can neither deceive nor be deceived.10 
This faith is a free gift from God,  the result of God's action moving and 
enlightening the believer:"Although the assent of faith is by no means 
a blind movement of the intellect,  nevertheless,  no one can assent to the 
preaching of the Gospel  without the illumination and  inspiration of the 
Holy Spirit,"11       As the Constitution on Revelation given by Vatican II 
declares:  
If this faith is to be shown,  the grace of God and the interior help 
of the Holy Spirit must precede and assist,  moving the heart and 
turning It to God,  opening the eyes of the mind and giving joy and 
ease to everyone in assenting to the truth and believing it.12 
Faith is an extremely rich reality Involving not only hearing and 
understanding the word of God but also living according to it ( s e e  Mt. 7: 
24-27; Lk. 6-: 43-49).    "He who says that he knows him [ Jesus],  and 
does not keep his commandments,  is a liar and the truth is not in him. 
But he who keeps his word,   in him the love of God is truly perfected; 
and by this we know that we are In him" (1 Jn. 2: 4 -5) .     What does not 
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come from faith is sin (Rom,  14: 23); "faith works through charity" 
(Gal.  5: 6 ) o     Paul invites the Corinthians to "put your own selves to 
test,  whether you are In the faith; prove yourselves" (2 Cor.   13: 5) .  
Nevertheless,   It remains true that In the first place faith involves 
knowledge,  for it is a response to a message.    One must hear the good 
news in order to believe (Rom.  10: 14,   17).    By faith we come to know 
what God has revealed through the prophets and in Christ. 
What God has revealed,  the object of both revelation and faith is 
not merely a collection of abstract truths,  a metaphysical system or an 
ethical code.   An attentive look at the biblical record of revelation 
shows that "what God reveals is himself as a living Person,  as the 
Creator who governs the world, as the Holy One who calls men to a 
service of love,  as the Master of history who guides times and events 
toward a goal that is salvation."13        All the truths revealed about God, 
about mankind,  about Christ and the salvation he brings,  about the new 
life that we live in Christ,  are ordered to making known Him who Is 
Truth in Person.  
Through divine revelation,  God chose to show forth and 
communicate Himself and the eternal decisions  of his will 
regarding the salvation of men.    That Is to say,  He chose "to 
share those divine treasures which totally transcend the 
understanding of the human mind."14 
The full realization of this revelation of God,  although already 
accomplished In principle In Christ,  must wait for the last times.    Only 
at that time will the revelation of Jesus Christ,  our Lord and Savior, 
be fully manifest (see 1 Cor.  1: 7; 2 Thess.   1: 7-10); then will his glory 
be revealed (1 Pet. 4 : 1 3 )  and with it the glory of those who are now 
saved in hope (Rom. 8: 18,  24).    To describe this definitive revelation 
the Synoptics show Christ using the traditional images of blessedness: 
kingdom,  promised land, paradise,  nuptials,  banquet,  treasure,  
salvation,  life,  resurrection,  glory,  etc. 
But,  through these images,  a new thinking begins to dawn:   the 
beatitude of the kingdom will consist essentially in the vision and 
enjoyment of God.    The vision of God,  forbidden to men here 
below (Ex. 33: 20), privilege of the Son (Jn. 6: 46; 1: 18) and his 
Angels (Mt.  18: 10),  will become the privilege of the elect.   
"Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God" (Mt. 5: 8).   
Vision face to face, the final unveiling of the sacred countenance so 
ardently sought for in the Old Testament, will characterize eternal 
life.15 
"We see now," St.  Paul wrote,  "through a mirror,   in an obscure 
manner, but then face to face.   Now I know in part, but then I shall 
know-even as I am known" (1 Cor.  13: 12).    Then our divine sonship 
will be fully realized and we shall,  like Jesus Christ,  see God "as he 
is" (1 Jn. 3: 2) .     In his final vision of heaven,  the author of the 
Apocalypse relates that the servants of God "shall see his face     Night 
shall be no more, and they shall have no need of light of lamp or light 
of sun, for the Lord God will shed light upon them; and they shall reign 
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forever and ever" (Apoc . 22: 4-5).    Clarifying this teaching,  the Church 
has declared that "the souls of all the saints     see the divine essence by 
intuitive vision,  and even face to face,  with no mediating creature 
serving In the capacity of an object seen,  but divine essence 
immediately revealing itself plainly,   clearly, and openly to them."16 
This Intuitive vision in which the saints "see clearly the one and triune 
God Himself,  just as He Is"17  is not some kind of Platonic ideal vision. 
It comes rather 
as the mutual presence of two friends who meet each other,  or like 
a father who stands before his son.    The face-to-face meeting does 
away with all distance between them     The vision of God will be 
mutual knowledge and recognition,  freely consented to,  between 
God and man,   In the most complete reciprocity:   "Then I shall 
know," says Saint Paul,  "even as I am known" (1 Cor.  13: 12).18 
Until that last day "we walk by faith and not by sight" (2 Cor.  5: 7).    
We live now in an economy of word and hearing,  testimony and believing.    
The sign of Christ's flesh,  the signs of the community of believers and 
the sacraments,  the signs of human words are our only way to God.    
Even the revelation made full for us in Christ remains an "in-direct,   
imperfect,  partial and obscure knowledge."19   Nevertheless, this 
economy of sign and belief offers us "a foretaste of the future vision  in 
which the truth is more fully known."20  Faith, as the author of Hebrews 
says (11: 1), "is the substance of things to be hoped for,  the evidence of 
things that are not seen."    The knowledge of faith has the very same 
material object as the beatific vision,  namely,  the divine essence: (1) as 
it subsists  in three persons; (2) as subsisting in the Person of the Word it 
is hypostatically united to human nature,  and (3) as it divinizes men,  
now by grace,  later by glory. 21  Also in its motive it tends to vision,  for 
faith is a response to an invitation to friendship and communion with 
God     The same divine attraction which gives rise to the act of faith 
continues to draw man to persevere until the end when the vision faith 
promises will be realized. 22 
Faith*s orientation to vision has as its consequence the possibility 
of growth in the knowledge of faith.    Faith is not simply a blind a s sent to 
truths of which there is no understanding.    On the contrary,  as the First 
Vatican Council declared: 
  reason,   illustrated by faith,  when it zealously,  piously and 
soberly seeks,  attains with the help of God some understanding of 
the mysteries,  and that a most profitable one,  not only from the 
analogy of those things which it knows naturally, but also from the 
connection of the mysteries among themselves and with the last end 
of man.23 
 
This ever-deepening understanding is also the work of the Holy Spirit 
who "constantly brings faith to completion by his gifts ." 24  This 
"growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which 
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have been handed down" takes place 
through the contemplation and study made by believers,  who 
treasure these things in their hearts (Lk. 2: 19,   51),  through 
the intimate understanding of spiritual things they 
experience, and through the preaching of those who have 
received through episcopal succession the sure gift of truth.25 
This is not to say that the growth of knowledge in faith is without 
limit. Even in its fullest possible realization, the knowledge man gains 
through hearing the word of God and believing never attains the 
immediacy and clarity of vision. The human mind, even when instructed 
in the word of God and interiorly illuminated by faith and the gifts 
is not capable of perceiving those mysteries in the way it does the 
truths which constitute its own proper object.    For divine 
mysteries by their very nature exceed the created intellect so 
much that,   even when handed down by revelation and accepted by 
faith,  they remain covered by the veil of faith itself,  and wrapped 
in a certain mist,  as it were, as long as in this mortal life "we are 
absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith and not by sight" (2 
Cor.  5: 6).26 
For this reason,  the knowledge which faith gives always remains 
bound to the revealing word of God; of which "sacred tradition and 
sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit."27   For the doctrine of faith has 
not been handed down to the human mind "as a philosophical invention to 
be perfected."   Rather,  "it has been entrusted as a divine deposit to the 
Spouse of Christ,  to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted."28   
The Church itself,  even the Magisterium is 
not above the word of God,  but serves it,  teaching only what has 
been handed on,  listening to it devoutly,  guarding it scrupulously,  
and explaining it faithfully by divine commission and with the help 
of the Holy Spirit; it draws from this one deposit of faith everything 
which it presents for belief as divinely revealed.29 
The knowledge which God gives to those who believe in his life is 
"through a mirror in an obscure manner" (1 Cor.   13: 12).    That mirror 
is the word of God deposited in sacred Scripture with tradition. Through 
this mirror "the pilgrim Church on earth looks at God from whom she 
has received everything,  until she is brought to see Him as He is,  face 
to face (cf.  1 Jn. 3: 2 ) . " 3 0  
 
 
B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAITH-KNOW LEDGE 
  
For the theologian who wonders how this mysteriously mirrored 
knowledge of word and faith inserts itself into the general 
psychological structure of human cognition,  a host of questions arise.    
Only one of these problems  is the direct object of my concern in this 
dissertation. The word of God,  as the Second Vatican Council declares,  
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comes to us "expressed in human language, having been made like 
human discourse, just as of old the Word of the eternal Father,  when he 
took to himself the weak flesh of humanity,  became like other men." 31  
How does this word mirror the divine realities to us in such a way that,  
through continually hearing it and reflecting on it in faith,  we are able 
to grow in our perception and understanding of the divine realities of 
which it speaks?    How does it come about that this growth in perception 
and understanding does not leave the word of God behind as the mature 
scientist leaves behind the words of his early teachers? 
In one form or other this question underlies most of the modern 
theological controversies about the nature of revelation,  dogma,  faith 
and theology.    It was implicit in the nineteenth-century debates over 
fideism and rationalism; it came into the open in the modernist crisis; 
and it re-appeared frequently in the subsequent controversies over the 
nature of dogmatic development,  the work of theological reasoning,  and 
the value of dogmatic formulas.    Most recently it finds expression in 
the debates over the relation between Scripture and tradition,   exegesis 
and dogmatics,   and above all in the manifold questions posed by 
demythologizing and the new hermeneutics.     Many outstanding 
theologians have exercised themselves over this question in the last one 
hundred years,   but as yet no adequate solution has been found. 
These controversies and the attempts at solution they provoked 
have not been fruitless.     Through them many aspects of the psychology 
of faith have come to light.     Particularly significant in this regard has 
been the work on the development of dogma.    Increasingly,   theologians 
have come to recognize the need to distinguish between an implicit, 
global intuition of the object of faith and an explicit,   conceptual 
articulation of the'content of that global intuition. 
Already in 1908-1909, Ambroise Gardeil had observed that what 
characterizes the knowledge of revelation is "on the one hand, the 
richness of its content; on the other,   the relatively undefined and 
confused state in which it normally comes to us." 32     As a result we have 
in the knowledge of faith a Irglobal intuition" which is of its very nature 
ordered to further transcription, adaptation, explication and develop 
ment.33 
More explicitly,  E. Hugueny,  writing in 1912 ,   felt  it  necessary 
in speaking of the development of our knowledge of supernatural 
truths to distinguish: 
between one sort of knowledge and another:   between,  on the 
one hand, the intuition,   the experimental  and global  perception 
of  the concrete reali ty in al l  i ts  efficacy,  and,    on the other,  
the discursive ref lection,   the speculat ive analysis ,   the rat ional  
dissection of various concepts with which we attempt to break 
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down,   in ideas which are more explicit  but better proportioned 
to  our  nat ive  unders tanding,  the  impress ion which the  
supernatural  reali ty manifested by revelat ion and accepted by 
fai th has produced in us.34  
According to Hugueny,  the intuitive global perception of the reality is 
given to the believer through the illumination of faith;  i t  is 
transmitted f rom the apostles to the Church,   and f rom one 
generation to the other  within the Church.  35 
I t  i s  "the  essence of  Christ ianity,"  the  ineffable  t ruth  thrust  
in to  the world by the Gospel.    I t  is  to analyze this experience 
and to translate i t  into dist inct  and def ini te  formulas  that  al l  
the effort  of  the second form of religious knowledge is directed.    
The inte l lectual  progress  of  Christ iani ty is  nothing more than 
a  labor  of slowly integrating into discursive thought what 
existed whole and entire in the intuitive thought of its 
founders.36  
 
In the succeeding decades,  as the debate over Marin-Sola 's  
theory of dogmatic development through theological reasoning took the 
center of the stage in discussion of dogmatic development,  this notion of 
an initial,   intuitive and experimental,   global apprehension of the object 
of faith,  the divine reality itself,   seems to have disappeared from the 
scene.    In 1948,  Henri de Lubac revived it as an hypothesis37  and a fierce 
debate followed. 38   De Lubac sharply criticized the notion that the 
original revelation consisted of a series of isolated propositions from 
which later dogmas derived by a process of strict conceptual analysis 
and logical deduction. 39     Suggesting that the whole of revelation and the 
whole of dogma is present to us in Jesus Christ and that "the initial 
adherence to Christ is a total,  concrete and living perception" in  
whose "riches many dogmas at first remain hidden," 40      de Lubac 
proposed that 
in Jesus Christ everything has been given and revealed to us all at 
once   consequently all the explanations which are to come, 
whatever be their tenor and their mode,  will be nothing more than 
the recoining in fractional currency of a treasure already possessed 
in its entirety;  . everything was really,  actually contained in a 
higher state of knowledge,  and not only in principles and 
premises.41 
 
To de Lubac's suggestion,   Charles Boyer gave a vigorous ripost, 42 
Boyer could not see how the knowledge of revelation could be 
communicated in any form except concepts and judgments.    There must,  
therefore,  be a "logical" and not merely an empirical connection 
between the deposit and its development.    This logical connection would 
be verified whenever one truth is contained implicitly in another in such 
a way that by some process of intelligence,  whether reasoning, analysis,   
inference or induction,  one can pass from the one to the other.43     Boyer 
saw in de Lubac's proposal the kind of irrational,  blind mystical 
experience the modernists had earlier proposed.    In justice it must be 
admitted that de Lubac's theory was somewhat vague in its treatment of 
the psychology of this concrete,  total perception in the knowledge of 
 12
faith.    But there is no reason to believe that de Lubac denied the truly 
cognitive and intellectual character of this perception. What de Lubac 
attempted in his suggestion was to provide an alternative to a conception 
of the knowledge of faith as a simple sum of the direct conceptual 
content and conceptual implications of a series of propositions isolated 
from their context. 44 
Another theologian who took issue with de Lubac's theory was F. 
Spedalieri. 45    Spedalieri charged that de Lubac misunderstood the nature 
of propositional judgment and therefore made the mistake of thinking 
that the material object of faith could be the subjectum attributionis in 
itself ,    rather than the meaning predicated of this subject*   Spedalieri 
too saw de Lubac 's  not ion as  a  re turn to  the  modernis t  idea of  
revela tion as an immediate,   i rrat ional  experience     J .  C.  M. van der 
Putte made a similar charge. 46      According to van der Putte,   such a 
global experience would do away with the mediate character  of  
revelation,  making the present-day believer 's  knowledge equivalent  to 
the knowledge of the apostles.    Moreover it  would do away with the 
need for the Church's  preaching.     In  both these at tacks  there is  a 
profound misconception of de Lubac's intention.    De Lubac was quite as 
certain as anyone e lse that  the concrete experience of  the divine reali ty 
in fai th is  mediated by the init ial  experience of  the apostles,   and the 
transmission of  their  conceptualized experience through Scripture with 
tradit ion.  
Despite this  opposi t ion,  however,   more and more theologians are 
coming around to recognizing the necessi ty of  acknowledging the 
existence of the kind of global experience de Lubac had suggested.  47 Two 
forces have been instrumental  in moving these theologians to such a 
position,,    The first is the difficulty of explaining theological and 
dogmatic  progress  in  the  unders tanding of  fa i th  as  a  purely syl logis t ic  
process.    Historically in most  cases an intuit ion of the developed 
dogma or conception-seems to have preceded and guided the explici t  
syllogist ic reasoning by which the conclusion was finally disengaged.    
But more importantly,  the development of Thomistic psychology has in 
recent years accented the role which non-conceptual elements play in the 
normal processes of human cognition,   e . g . ,   the role of phantasms in 
learning,  and role of an intuition of being in the act of judgment. 
C.    PROSPECTUS OF THE ARGUMENT 
The aim of this thesis is to show how imaginative and intuitional 
elements combine with the properly conceptual element to constitute the 
complex act which is the knowledge of faith.    In pursuit of this aim we 
propose to proceed in the following stages. 
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In the next chapter,  as a preparation for the theory we propose 
to elaborate, we will take up in detail the modernist theories of the non-
conceptual element in the knowledge of faith and the significance of the 
stand taken by the Church in the face of the modernist theories. The 
purpose of this investigation is to make clear the requirements our 
theory must fulfill in order to escape the modernist errors. 
In chapter III,  we will set out certain presuppositions to a theory 
of cognition,  principles which will be used in the psychological theory to 
be outlined in chapter IV 
Chapter IV will comprise two sections.    The first will outline the 
process of learning and knowing as it develops by personal experience 
and investigation.   Here we shall take up the relation of phantasms and 
concepts and the non-conceptual intellectual grasp of being in the 
reflection of concepts upon the phantasms.   We shall note the relation of 
linguistic and other forms of symbolic expression to the cognitive 
process.    Since the knowledge of faith is concerned in large measure 
with immaterial realities,  we will consider in some detail the relation 
of image,  concept and intuition in such knowledge.    Finally we will 
consider the .contribution made to knowledge by affectivity,  the so-called 
affective knowledge.    In the second part of this chapter we will turn to 
the process of learning and knowing through communication of meaning 
from one person to another.    There we will be concerned to see how, on 
the basis of the words and symbols used to communicate,  the recipient 
either finds a point of reference in his direct perception or else 
synthesizes a quasi-perception in phantasms of the imagination.    Only in 
the reflection of the conceptual content of the message upon this 
perception or quasi-perception is the meaning actually grasped.    Then 
we will take up the relationship of attestation and belief to the meaning 
which the listener grasps in the phantasms and concepts the communica-
tion evokes. 
Finally in the fifth chapter we will apply the data of the preceding 
analysis to the knowledge of faith.    There we will note first of all the 
way faith's knowledge is tied to sense experience and phantasms. Then 
we will consider the role of the light of faith in assisting the believer to 
grasp the meaning of the Word of God.    Then we will survey the 
relationships between realistic and symbolic images,   images and 
concepts,  presentations and affective attitudes,   in order to appreciate 
the way in which the experiential,  conceptual and intuitive elements 
actually combine to give rise to the global experience of faith.    At last, 
by way of corrolaries, we will suggest certain implications for the 
proper understanding of the relationships between faith and theology and 
between Scripture and dogma. 
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CHAPTER II 
MODERNISM; A FALSE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM 
As the reaction to de Lubac's suggestion indicated, any attempt to 
speak of the role of non-conceptual and experiential or intuitive elements 
in the knowledge of faith must clearly distinguish itself from the proposal 
of the modernists around the turn of the century. Consequently, it will be 
useful to take a closer look at the teaching of the modernists and at the 
reaction of the Church to that teaching. 
A. THE BACKGROUND OF MODERNISM 
At the turn of the twentieth century,  Catholic theology had reached 
an impasse.    The scholastic revival had begun about sixty years before 
in Italy and Germany.    Its leaders were men of vision and talent; they 
felt that In scholastic philosophy,   especially In Thomism, could be 
found a way out of the epistemological chaos of Cartesian rationalism,   
British empiricism,  Kantian conceptualism and German idealism.    By 
1879,  this revival had grown strong enough for Pope Leo XIII to impose 
authoritatively the scholastic teaching and method as the norm for all 
clerical and higher academic education within the Church. 
Leo XIII1 s  intervention was a mixed blessing for the nascent 
scholastic revival.    In many ways it was premature.    An authentic 
return to a way of thinking hidden in forgotten writings six centuries old 
could not be accomplished by legislative fiat; it demanded long,  
painstaking historical spade-work.    But in 1879 this preliminary work 
had hardly begun.    Lacking the guidance of competent historical 
investigations,   the revivers of Thomism could only read the works of 
the thirteenth century masters in the light of their own,  usually 
rationalistic philosophical background,   or else take refuge in the more 
accessible late-scholastic commentaries of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century manualists .    Very often,  therefore,  the philosophy 
elaborated in the scholastic revival was closer to the essentialist 
dogmatism of Christian Wolff than to-the true vision of Thomas. 1 
Even if, however,  the historical work had been done,  the scholastic 
revival held within itself a far more serious weakness.    To revive the 
mummified body of a six-century old way of thinking,  to make Thomism 
a living organism again, an organism capable of growing,   of 
assimilating new experiences and discoveries,  and of eliminating dead 
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and useless members,   required genuinely original thinkers; it demanded 
men who combined a thorough familiarity with the developments in art,   
science and philosophy with a sympathy to the possibility of genuine 
progress in human thought and life.    In fact, however, many of the men 
who led the scholastic revival in the nineteenth century were men of 
talent but not men of genius; they were schoolmasters rather than 
original thinkers.    Worse yet,  many were closed minds who looked to 
Thomism for a prop to shore up a collapsing order,  a weapon against 
the threat of modernization. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century,   the dialogue of the 
revived scholasticism with the modern world had begun in many places . 
Historical studies were advancing rapidly.    Biblical studies, taking 
account of developments in non-Catholic exegesis, were going forward. 
Nevertheless- the general impression made by the "scholastic" theology 
left much to be desired. 
Little account was taken by dogmatic theologians of the historical 
character of revelation or of its psycho-social foundations.    Instead of 
seeing it as a manifestation of the divine Persons themselves through 
the medium of saving action, theologians discussed revelation as a 
purely didactic presentation of a series of more or less disconcerting 
abstract ideas about God and about the nature of man. 2    Words and 
sentences extracted from their literary context with little or no regard 
for the mentality of the sacred author were cited as biblical "proof 
texts" for the most abstruse metaphysical and juridical theses 
of the theologians. 3   Taking as their starting point the propositions of a 
developed dogmatics,  theologians unconsciously read into the dynamic 
and personalistic vision of the biblical revelation the abstract,  
metaphysical explication of this vision by later theology and Church 
teaching . 
A similar exaggerated intellectualism characterized the 
prevailing notion of faith.    Viewing revelation as a kind of juridical 
pronouncement commanding assent to propositions; the prevailing 
theology reduced faith.to but one of its elements,  the element of assent to 
a body of truths exceeding the capacity of the human mind.    That faith 
is also the principle of a personal relation with God,  that it does not stop 
with the proposition but goes on to unite the believer with the divine 
Person whom the propositions reveal,  was an aspect of faith that found 
little or no place in the theology of the day.4 
Attempting to avoid illuminism and irrationalism,  theologians 
presented the assent of faith as though it were substantially a purely 
natural intellectual judgment based upon reasoning from the signs of 
revelation and the notes of the Church.    The supernatural and voluntary 
character of this assent were minimized and no attention at all was 
given to the role of faith as the dynamic principle of a contemplative 
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knowledge of divine things.    The real distinction on the level of habitual 
principles between infused faith,   the science of theology and mystical 
wisdom became in-practice a real separation and compartmentalization 
of the acts of these virtues . 5 
In such a view,  theology itself became a purely natural 
argumentive process whereby the truths of faith were defended against 
the adversaries of the Church's teaching and abstract metaphysical 
conclusions drawn'out of revealed propositions.    Theology appeared 
thus as entirely extrinsic to the knowledge of faith; a theoretical science 
pursued for its own sake or a practical apologetics.    That theology and 
theological reasoning belong to the inner dynamism of faith itself found 
little recognition in the prevailing attitude. 6 
Positing an adequate distinction between the object of faith and the 
object of theology, and insisting on the role of the Church in defining the 
object of faith,  theologians lost sight not only of the notion of theology 
as faith seeking understanding but also of its relation to the sources of 
faith.    Thus theology dissolved into a series of completely separate 
disciplines:   exegesis, historical theology,   speculative theology,   etc.    
The primacy of sacred Scripture in theology was completely obscured.   
Whereas the dogmatic propositions of the Church and the speculative 
theses of theology had originally come into being through the efforts of 
the Church and theologians to understand and interpret the biblical 
revelation,  they now came to stand in their own right. 
B.    THE MODERNIST THEORY 
Modernism represented the first radical reaction to this kind of 
theology.    Going to the opposite extreme,   Loisy and Tyrrell insisted 
that revelation was not a matter of intellectual communication at all, but 
was a pure experience of God.    Rejecting what he called an 
anthropomorphic notion of revelation,   i . e . ,  the Bible's mythical 
representation of God revealing truths by speaking with man as one man 
might with another,   Loisy taught that 
revelation can only have been the awareness man acquired of his 
relationship with God.    What is Christian revelation in its 
principle and point of departure,   if not the perception in the soul of 
Christ,   of the relation which united Christ Himself to God and of 
the relationship which unites all men to their heavenly-Father      
The development of revealed religion is brought about by the 
perception of new relations,  or rather by a more precise and 
distinct determination of the essential relationship, which was seen 
in the beginning, man thus coming to a better and better knowledge 
of both the grandeur of God and the character of his own duty. 7 
What results from the action of God in revelation is an intuitive,   
experiential and heartfelt perception of the man-God relationship.    The 
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propositions of revelation are simply an extrinsic,   subsequent expres- 
sion of this supernatural religious experience. 8 
For our purposes here,  George Tyrrell's teaching as found in his 
Between Scylla and Charybdis offers the best guide to the modernists1 
teaching.   According to Tyrrell,  revelation "belongs rather to the 
category of Impressions than to that of expression." 9       Revelation is  
"not statement but experience." 10        It is an act of God who 
establishes the recipient in mystical contact with himself.    This 
contact has no element of representation.    Revelation is not the 
communication of truth; it is mystical experience. 11 
As experience, however, revelation is incommunicable.    In order 
therefore to preserve the memory of It and to communicate it to others 
insofar as possible,  the recipient of the revelation gives  its content a 
personal expression making uses of the resources of his cultural 
background.    Tyrrell wrote: 
that which is communicated is a certain experience of God's 
presence of providence or fatherhood,  of Christ's saving and 
atoning power over the soul,  of communion with the saints,   of 
the forgiveness of sins,   of the hope of immortality,  which fills 
and inspires the spirit of the prophet,  and spontaneously utters 
and expresses itself through the categories and images with 
which his mind happens to be instructed.12 
This transposition of the experience into imaginative and conceptual 
terms is not the revelation itself but a shadow,  a very relative 
representation of that experience.    Thus the apostles gave 
expression to the impression Christ made on them in imaginative 
terms like,   "Messiah," "Logos," "Second Adam"; later the Church 
would elaborate the more conceptual form of "Word,   consubstantial 
with the Father." 13 
These expressions in image and concept are but the human re-
action, born spontaneously or reflexively elaborated, "to God's 
touch, felt deep within the heart."   They are produced by the 
recipient of the revelation much as a dream is triggered in a 
sleeping man by some external sense experience.14    Only the 
experience itself,  therefore,   is really sacred. 
What is immediately approved,   as it were experientially,   is 
a way of living,  feeling,   and acting with reference to the 
other world.    The explanatory and justificatory conceptions 
subsequently sought out by the mind as postulated by this "way 
of life" have no direct divine approval.15 
In this way a distinction must be made between revelation and theology, 
including within the latter the expressions of both Scripture and dogma. 
"To speak of the development of revelation as though it were a body of 
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statements or theological propositions"  is to confuse two very distinct  
ways of knowing.16 According to Tyrrell, the theological and 
dogmatic expression of the experience is only a provisory formula 
elaborated by the individual or the community in response to the needs 
and spirit of the age.   It does not define objective and intellectual data 
but points to and interprets the experience.17        Indirectly,  however,  
these formulations take on a kind of sacred character for through them,  
under the impulse of the Spirit,   the men of subsequent generations can 
share the prophet's ineffable experience of revelation and can express 
their share in that experience.  The scriptural and dogmatic expressions 
thus render the experience of revelation accessible to everyone.    For 
Tyrrell,  the reception of revelation 
is precisely an act of inward recognition -- a response of spirit 
to spirit,  and not only the mental apprehension and acceptance of 
statements and meanings   . . .     The teaching from outside must 
evoke a revelation in ourselves; the experience of the prophet 
must become experience for us.    It is to this revelation evoked 
within us that we answer by the act of faith,   recognizing it as 
God's word in us and to us .      . . .  Revelation cannot come from 
outside; it can be occasioned,  but it cannot be caused,  by 
instruction.18 
Tyrrell presented his theory as a middle way between two ex-
tremes,   scholastic formalism and radical liberalism    The former,  he 
charged,   over-emphasized the conceptual aspect of faith and conceived 
revelation as a closed theological system within which dogmas are 
logically deduced under the pressure of the necessities of each age.    
The latter rejects all conceptualization of faith and continuity of dogma. 
These two vi'ews were the "Scylla and Charybdis" between which Tyrrell 
sought a safe passage for the Church.19     According to Tyrrell, 
revelation as experience is the element of continuity in the knowledge of 
faith.    The experience is unchanging,   it is the same for all.    In 
contrast,  the conceptualization of this experience is radically 
changeable.    This symbolic expression of the experience develops and 
is transformed from one era to the next.    Tyrrell not only distinguished 
these two moments in the knowledge of faith; he placed a real separation 
between them.   As a result,  the only way he could reunite them was by 
asserting an extrinsic connection between them.20 
   C.    THE ANTI-MODERNIST REACTION  
1.    Lamentabili 
The first action of Rome was to place the more notable modernist 
writings on the Index.    When this action failed to check the movement,  
the Holy Office issued the decree Lamentabili on July 3,   1907. In the 
face of the subjectivistic revelation proposed by the modernists, 
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Lamentabili reaffirmed the objective character of revelation.    
Revelation, according to the decree, is a teaching.    This teaching was 
received from God; it is contained in sacred Scripture and tradition; and 
it is entruste-d to the Church to be transmitted and safeguarded. 
Consequently the decree condemned the proposition that "revelation 
could have been nothing more than the consciousness acquired by man of 
his relation with God." 21      Likewise rejected was a teaching whichLoisy 
had derived from the above,  namely,  that "the dogmas which the Church 
professes as revealed are not truths fallen from heaven,  but .they are 
an interpretation of religious facts which the human mind by laborious 
effort has prepared for itself." 22     Since man never reaches total self-
awareness of his experience of God,   Loisy had concluded that revelation 
must be a continuing event.    Consequently the Holy Office proscribed 
the proposition that "the revelation which constitutes the object of 
Catholic faith was not completed with the apostles."23 
The object of these condemnations must be studiously observed. 
The Church was not denying that revealed truth must be subjectively 
received and assimilated by the believer. 24    In the first proposition 
quoted,  there is no denial of the possibility of a subjective 
consciousness produced by revelation; what is condemned is the 
assertion that revelation consists exclusively in such a subjective 
consciousness.    In the second proposition the offending phrase is the 
last part which asserts that dogmas arise through a purely human 
process of interpretation.    In the third proposition what the Church 
insists on is that the revelation "which constitutes the object of Catholic 
faith" is not yet completed.    But granting that the constitutive phase of 
revelation has come to an end,   it remains possible to speak of an 
interpretive phase of revelation which continues through the divinely 
inspired efforts of the Church and her members to assimilate the content 
of the revelation so constituted. 25    In effect,  these condemnations 
simply state in a negative way what the Church had already affirmed at 
Vatican I,  namely: 
by enduring agreement the Catholic Church has held and holds 
that there is a twofold order of knowledge,   distinct not only in 
principle but also in object:   (1) in principlej   indeed,   because we 
know in one way by natural reason,   in another by divine faith; (2) 
in object,   because in addition to the things which natural reason 
can attain,  mysteries hidden in God are proposed to us for belief 
which,  had they not been divinely revealed,   could not become 
known. 26 
In light of this text we can see in what sense the Church 
understands revealed truth as "truths which have come down from 
heaven." The "mysteries hidden in God" are not attainable by any 
natural reasoning or conceptualizing process, hence they cannot be the 
object of a constant evolution of human consciousness.    Rather they 
constitute a deposit completed at the time of the apostles and entrusted to 
the Church,  not to be improved upon,  but to be assimilated and 
penetrated.27     Since the apostolic age,  the object of faith has been 
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present to us in its entirety.    Its essential perfection as an object of 
belief has  been realized. 28    But as Vatican I had explicitly affirmed,  this 
divine deposit is the starting point for a progressive process of 
subjective  understanding. 29        This process, however, adds nothing to 
the revela tion as it was originally constituted. 30      Revelation as 
constitutive is not the product of philosophical elaboration; neither is it 
subject to the indefinite progress of human reason. 
In Lamentablll the Church affirmed her conviction that Christ 
did not simply "begin a religious movement adapted to,  or to be adapted 
to different times and places," but rather,   "taught a definite body of 
doctrine applicable to all times and to all men."32      Christian doctrine did 
not go through a successive evolution from Judaic to Pauline to  
Johannine to Hellenic and universal forms; 33    rather,  "the principle 
articles of the Apostle's Creed have the same meaning for the Christian 
of the earliest times as they have for the Christian of our times."34 
Behind these condemnations stands the condemnation of Tyrrell's basic 
thesis that: 
the dogmas,  the sacraments,  the hierarchy,  as far as  it pertains 
both to the notion and to the reality,  are nothing but 
interpretations and the evolution of the Christian intelligence,  
which have increased and perfected the little germ latent in the 
Gospel.35 
and that: 
it can be said without paradox that no chapter of Scripture, 
from the first of Genesis to the last of Apocalypse,   contains 
doctrine entirely identical with that which the Church hands 
down on the same subject,  and so no chapter of Scripture has 
the same sense for the critic as for the theologian.36 
Here again it is necessary to observe that the Church had no 
intention of denying the real progress which has occurred in the 
assimilation of revealed truths .    There is real change in the manner in 
which the Church over the centuries has expressed these truths; 
nevertheless, it is always the same truth that i expressed and 
assimilated.    The mode of expression and the degree of explication may 
vary from one generation or place to another, but the object of these 
various expressions and explications remains the same throughout. 
2.    Pascendi 
More clearly than the decree Lamentabili,   the encyclical 
Pascendi, September 8,   1907,   set out the Church's objection to the 
modernist's teaching by exposing the roots of that teaching In a 
systematic fashion.    The encyclical distinguishes two philosophical 
sources of modernism.    The first is agnosticism.    By restricting the 
object of human understanding to pure phenomena,  things as they appear 
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to the senses,  the modernists held that the mind "cannot raise itself to 
God nor recognize his existence,  even through the things that are 
seen." Consequently God cannot be the object of either science or 
history. Natural theology,  therefore,  together with the motives of 
credibility and external  revela tion are al l  re l ics  of  an outmoded 
inte l lectual ism.3 7  
Balancing this  principle is  the principle of  vital  immanence.  
Since religion cannot be explained by anything outside of man,   It must, 
according to the modernists,   f ind some explanation within man himself .  
As a form of  l ife "it  is  to be found ent irely within the l ife of  man."38 
Like every vital operation,   i ts "f irst actuation Is to be sought In a 
certain need or impulse   in a kind of motion of the heart,  which is 
called a sense."    This sense,  which the modernists  identify with faith, 
l ies within the realm of  the subconscious,   but  it  is awakened to con-
sciousness when the human mind in  I ts  sc ient if ic  or  his tor ical  ref lec-
tion confronts the unknowable "whether this be outside man and beyond 
the perceptible world of nature,   or lies concealed within the 
subconsciousness." 39    In the presence of the unknowable 
the need of the divine in a soul prone to religion,    with no 
judgment of the mind anticipating,   excites a certain peculiar  
sense;  this  sense has the divine reali ty i t self ,   not  only as I ts  
object ,   but  also as I ts Intr insic cause Implicated within Itself ,  
and somehow unites man with God.40 
According to the modernist  position,   the encyclical goes on: 
the unknowable,   of which they speak,   does not present itself to 
faith as  something simple or alone,  but on the contrary 
adhering closely to some phenomenon,  which,  al though i t  
pertains to the f ields of science and history,    yet in some way 
passes beyond them   41 
This connection of the unknowable with phenomena enables faith to suf-
fuse the phenomena with its own vital awareness of the divine.    In this 
way the phenomena are both transf igured and disf igured,   for  fai th at-
tr ibutes to the phenomena what the phenomena of  themselves are 
incapable of containing. 42 
The encyclical  makes much over the fact  that  in this  process the 
modernis ts  a t t r ibute  no role  to  the  inte l lect  or  to  any proper ly cogni-
t ive faculty.  .  The sense of which they speak is  not  a cognit ive but an 
appetitive faculty.     The action of the cognitive faculties is secondary 
and posterior to this  sense.     The encyclical  expresses their  posit ion as 
follows: 
in that sense,   they say,    since it is sense not knowledge, God 
presents himself  to man,  but  so confusedly and disorderly that 
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he is distinguished with difficulty,   or not at all,   by the subject  
believer.     It  is  necessary,   therefore,  that  this sense be 
illuminated by some light,   so that God may completely stand out 
and be separated from it .     Now this pertains to the intel lect,   
whose function is to ponder and to institute analysis,  by which 
man f irst  brings to  l ight  the vital  phenomena aris ing within him,  
and then makes them known in words.43 
The mind works on the phenomena suffused with the religious 
sense much as a painter works over a picture,  brightening up the faded 
outlines to bring out the image more clearly.    This process proceeds in 
two stages: 
first by a natural and spontaneous act it presents the matter in a 
simple and popular judgment; but then after reflection and deeper 
consideration,   or as they say,   by elaborating the thought,   it 
speaks forth its thoughts in secondary judgments,  derived to be 
sure from the simple first,  but more precise and distinct. These 
secondary judgments,   if they are fully sanctioned by the supreme 
magisterium of the Church will constitute dogma.44 
From-the fact that the original experience was in itself non-
cognitive,   it follows that the formulations which result through the 
reflection of the intellect are only symbolic and instrumental.    They do 
not contain truth absolutely,  but they serve as symbols for representing 
the practical truth of the religious sense and as instruments forevoking 
it. 45    In order effectively to'perform this function,   the formulae must be 
enlivened with the religious sense; "they must be accepted by the heart 
and sanctioned by it."    Otherwise they remain mere intellectual 
speculations empty of religious value. 46 
If,   therefore,   the formulas of faith do not contain truth 
absolutely,   but only relative to the rel igious sense of the believer,    they 
have no value whatsoever unless they correspond to the believer ' s  
mentality.    When,  through the vicissitudes of cultural evolution,  that 
correspondence is  broken,   the  formulae of  past  ages  simply cease  to  
have any value.    They must be jetisoned,  therefore,   in favor of new 
formulae bet ter  able to  evoke the exper ience of  the  hear t .  47 
I t  should be clear f rom this  br ief  survey that  what  the Church 
objected to in the modernist  teaching was the  assert ion that  the  
re l igious experience of which i t  spoke was without any cognitive value.  
God remains completely unknown for the modernists;  the so-called 
truths of  revelation,   dogma, and theology become,  as a result ,   mere 
projections into consciousness of  a purely affective motion of the 
appetitive powers of man.    This affective motion in itself  is without an 
object ;  for  i t  i s  not  a  response to  someone or  something which was 
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f i rs t  known.    Welling up dynamically from within the person,  this 
emotion objectif ies i tself  by represent ing an object  in imaginative and 
intel lectual  terms .  
If ,  therefore,   It  can be shown that the experience which is 
communicated to the believer when he hears the objective teaching of 
revelation with assent is a cognitive experience,  and not merely an 
affective one,  there is no reason to fear the charge of modernism.    In 
relation to a cognitive experience,  the conceptualization of revelation in 
biblical,  dogmatic and theological formulae preserves  its objective 
character.    The formulae are not merely evocative symbols appealing 
to the emotions; they are,  rather, the proper expression of the experi-
ential moment of knowledge . 
3.    The Oath against Modernism 
If Lamentabili and Pascendi set the negative boundaries for a 
theology of the relation between experience and conception in the 
knowledge of faith, the Oath against Modernism  sets out the positive 
principles which must be observed by any theory about the matter.    
Issued in the motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum of September 1,   1910, 
the oath summarizes the positive belief of the Church in the matter. 
The oath affirms that God is not hidden from man's cognitive 
powers:   he "can be certainly known and thus can also be demonstrated 
by the natural light of reason 'by the things that are made' (Rom.  1:20),  
that is,  by the visible works of creation,  as the cause by the effects." 48  
Likewise,  "through the divine facts of miracles and prophecy,   as 
through very certain signs, man can know the divine origin of the 
Christian religion." 49        Already in these two statements one can detect 
an implicit acknowledgment of one experiential element underlying the 
knowledge of faith.    God is not seen directly,  neither is his existence 
and nature known by deductive reasoning from a pure  idea.    Sense ex-
perience must present the visible works of creation and the divine facts 
of miracles and prophecy.    God is known by reason through sense 
representations of his effects. 
The oath goes on to state that faith is not a blind religious 
feeling but a "true assent of the intellect to the truth received 
extrinsically ex auditu,  whereby we believe that what has been said,  
attested,  and revealed by the personal God,  our Creator and Lord,  to 
be true on account of the authority of God the highest truth." 50        The 
object of faith is"a divine deposit,   given over to the spouse of Christ to 
be faithfully guarded by her."    It is not "a philosophical invention" or "a 
creation of the human consciousness found gradually by the efforts of men 
and   perfected by indefinite progress  "51     This deposit is 
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"transmitted from the apostles through the orthodox fathers,  always in 
the same sense and interpretation,   even to us."    Consequently dogmas do 
not evolve by "passing from one meaning to another different  from that  
which the Church f irst  had."  52 
I t  i s  unfortunate  that  the  Church did  not elaborate more c lear ly 
her positive conception of the obvious growth in understanding and 
explication of the deposit of faith.    Nevertheless,   even in what is said 
here,    i t  is  possible to detect  another  implici t  af f irmation of  some sort  
of global intellectual apprehension of the object of faith.    By faith we 
give universal  in te l lectual  assent to every revealed truth  which is  found 
in the oral teaching that  we hear.    By the very fact that we make this 
global  assent to the words  in which it  is expressed,  the full  object  of  
the revela ' tion becomes present to our cognitive powers and is  known by 
the intellect  to be true.     At fi rst  there may be l i t t le  real understanding 
of the formulae.    The assent, however,   extends to the ful l  meaning the  
statements were  meant  to have and not  merely to  our own limited 
understanding of that meaning.    Slowly the believer individually,   and 
the Church generally,   takes explicit  possession of that  fullness of  
meaning.    What results  in this  process of explication is not  an objective 
growth of meaning,  but only an objective growth of expression.    
Through that objective growth of expression, however,   there occurs a 
subjective growth of explicated meaning.    To affirm that the knowledge 
of faith is transmitted in the Church "always in the same sense and 
interpretation" does not mean that its potential meaning is equally 
explicated at every point in the Church's history.    Nevertheless, that 
potential meaning must somehow have been present in the Church's 
consciousness for the growth in explication to take place without any 
new revelation., 
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CHAPTER III  
PRESUPPOSITIONS TO A THEORY 
Before embarking on the analysis of the psychological structure 
of human cognitive processes,   I would like to set out certain general 
observations which must be kept in mind throughout the analysis. 
A.    PRE-REFLECTIVE AND REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
A little reflection upon the manner in which we know things re-
veals that prior to and at the root of our explicit,  thematic awareness 
of many things,  there exists an implicit,  non-thematic consciousness of 
the reality subsequently brought into explicit awareness.    Recognition of 
this phenomenon is nothing new.    St. Augustine had long ago observed 
and noted it when he remarked that he knew what time was unti1 
somebody asked him to explain it.1      Recently, however,   existential 
phenomenology has focused attention on this distinction and has 
attempted to give an account of the relation between these two forms of 
knowing. 
William Luipen,2     following Jean Paul Sartre,3     suggests the 
following analysis.    Suppose I count the cigarettes  in a pack:   "1, 2,  3, 
 1 2 .     There are a dozen," I say to myself.    If someone asks me what I 
am doing I reply,   "I am counting my Cigarettes ."    In the first moment 
of counting,  the explicit theme of my consciousness  is the number of 
cigarettes; I am not explicitly conscious of my act of counting.    Yet,  
somehow,  my act of counting must also have been present in my 
consciousness,  for in the next moment I could refer to it explicitly and 
make it the theme of another act. 
A verbal trick makes it possible to represent these two modes of 
knowledge.    We can use the form "consciousness-of-an-object" to 
designate the explicit,  thematic consciousness.    Thus  in my act of 
counting there was an explicit,  thematic "consciousness-of-twelve-
cigarettes"; when I reflected upon what I had been doing,   there was an 
explicit,   thematic "consciousness-of-counting."    On the other hand,   in 
the act of counting there was an implicit,   non-thematic "counting-con-
sciousness," and in the act of reflecting there is an implicit,   non-the-
matic "reflecting-consciousness." 
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In ordinary human activities we are not directly and explicitly 
conscious of our own acts or even of ourselves acting.    I enjoy a meal; 
I like my friends; I know their faces; but in doing these things I am not 
directly conscious of my enjoyment,  my affection or my knowledge. 
"Originally," therefore,   "there is no consciousness of the self,  but, 
with the cons c ious nes s - of- s ome thing, self - cons c louscness s is fused 
together."4      This implicit "self-consciousness" lacks the explicitness  
indicated by the preposition "of."   I become "conscious-of-myself" 
only by explicitly returning to my iImplicit "self-consciousness." 
Through my consciousness I am originally present to myself, but 
through reflection I place myself in my presence,   so that what I 
first omitted -- my love,  my enjoyment,  my knowledge -- 
becomes the theme of my consciousness.5 
These two modes of consciousness are called in modern philo-
sophical thought "pre-reflective consciousness" and "reflective-
consciousness,"    "Consciousness is called reflective when I pass from 
being in the presence to placing myself in the presence..    This 
transition 
means the thematization of what was non-thematic,  the explicitation of 
what was implicit." 6 
The distinction between pre-reflective and reflective conscious-
ness, however,   is not found only in the area of self-consciousness. Just 
as there can be an Implicit,  non-thematic self-consciousness in the act 
of knowing or loving something,   there can also be an implicit, non-
thematic consciousness of certain parts or specific aspects of an object 
accompanying an explicit thematic consciousness of the object according 
to a particular salient feature. 
The distinction between these two forms of consciousness with 
respect to any object can be illustrated in the phenomenon of perception.    
Human perception is so constituted that it never places more than one 
facet of its object in explicit consciousness at a time. 7      If I gaze out my 
window,  I take in the whole landscape it opens out onto, but I focus my 
sight on only one of the objects contained in that landscape:   at one 
moment I focus on the building off to the right; at another moment I 
focus on the lone poplar trees that stand in the middle ground.    As my 
focus shifts from one part of the scene to another,  the whole is in some 
way present in consciousness,  but only one or another feature of that 
landscape is explicitly present to my consciousness.    In one sense I 
know the whole,  and in another sense I do not know it.    At any one 
moment I perceive the whole implicitly,  but I perceive only one feature 
explicitly. 
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B.    PROFILE AND HORIZON IN KNOWLEDGE 
The distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge,  
between non-reflective and reflective knowledge is closely connected 
with another distinction emphasized in modern phenomenology, 
namely,  the distinction between profile and horizon.    Referring again 
to the phenomenon of perception,  we can see that the view we take of 
any object is always determined by the standpoint from which we view 
it.   As I sit before my typewriter looking at it,  my typewriter presents 
to me only its front profile.    To the wall behind it,   the typewriter 
presents a different profile; to the table under it,   it presents still 
another profile. The fact is that "reality gives itself only by means of 
profiles (Abschattungen) which are correlated with a determined 
standpoint of the perceiving subject," 8 
Any particular standpoint, however,   refers intrinsically to 
other possible standpoints .    If I were to get in back of my typewriter,  
I could see it as the wall "sees" it; if I were to get under it,  I could 
see it as the typing table "sees" it.    Of course,   if I were to get in 
back of It or underneath it,  I would no longer perceive my typewriter 
according to the front profile it now presents to me.    The intrinsic 
connection between the possible viewpoints of an object is an 
indication of the intrinsic connection that also links the various profiles 
of the object.    All the possible profiles remain profiles of the same 
typewriter.    So close is the connection between the various profiles 
that 
the anticipation,  the pre-grasping of other possible profiles 
pertaining to the object of perception is an essential and 
constituent aspect of perception as perception occurs .    
Accordingly, perception is not perception if it does not contain 
these anticipations as possibilities.    Likewise,  and this 
amounts to the same,  the object of perception simply is not a 
real object of perception if a determined profile does not refer 
to other possible profiles.9 
It is not enough, however,  to take account of the various 
profiles of a single object in perception: 
It is not merely the totality of the object of perception that has 
to be stressed,  but also the unity of this totality within the 
entire field of perception.    Every object appears as a definite 
figure against a background; it appears against a background of 
meanings.10 
The typewriter which I perceive as a unified whole through an endless 
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series of profiles virtually contained in my present perception of it 
appears as a real typewriter only against the background of the table,  
the corner of the room,  etc. ,   wherein it is f ound.    Apart from such a 
background it would not be real but only a figment of my imagination.     
Similarly,   the scene outside my window reveals itself to me only 
within the background or horizon of my total gaze which includes the 
window frame and the surrounding wall outlining the scene.     The 
horizon against which the object of explicit perception appears is 
constituted not only by the viewpoint of the perceiving subject but also 
by the location of the explicitly perceived object.     The background or 
horizon is as much a part of perception as is the salient figure. 
Corresponding to each of the various profiles of any object is 
a distinct background.    And these distinct backgrounds are part of the 
totality of perception just as the distinct profiles of the salient figure 
are. It is possible also to focus on different salient figures each with 
their own profiles and horizons.    In any one moment of perception 
only one profile of one salient figure can be the focus of attention,   but 
all the other possible profiles and figures are present implicitly in 
that perception-     The fact that they are present actually though not 
explicitly is what guarantees the identity of the object throughout a 
process of exploration.     The horizon is Irthe correlative of the 
impending power which my gaze retains over the objects which it has 
just surveyed,   and which it already has over the fresh details which 
it is about to discover.11  "  It may be that these other background 
features and profiles may be explicitated only by memory,   conjecture,   
or a new perception conjoined with the old by memory.    But it is not 
merely memory and conjecture that unify the various perspectives and 
features of the totality.    It is perception itself. 
To look at an object is to inhabit it,  and from this habitation to 
grasp all things  in terms of the aspect which they present to it. 
But insofar as I see those things too,  they remain abodes open 
to my gaze,  and,   being potentially lodged in them,   I already 
perceive from various angles the central object of my present 
vision,,    12 
C.    IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN KNOWLEDGE 
If we turn now to a more psychological than phenomenological 
analysis of knowledge, another pair of characteristics comes to light. 
The experience we have of perceiving any object reveals to us a 
multitude of interior activities adding to and perfecting our personal 
being.    Thus when I regard this typewriter before me,  I see it with my 
eyes,  feel it with my hands, hear the sound of its action with my ears, 
I remember what it was like when it was new; I recognize It as a useful 
Instrument in my work.    I understand its construction and its function. 
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Within the total perception I can reflectively distinguish the action of 
my vision,  my hearing,  my touch,  my memory,  my estimative 
faculties,  my understanding.    In itself each of these actions  is distinct,  
not only from the other perceptive actions but also from my own 
substance. If I close my eyes I no longer see the typewriter,   if I 
withdraw my hands I no longer feel it,   etc.,  yet I remain and so do 
my other perceptive acts.    The actions,  therefore,  are accidents of 
my substance. 13 
As accidental entities,   the actions of perception and of 
knowledge generally must be seen in relation to the substance in which 
they inhere.    That substance is a living,  personal being,  and the 
activities which constitute knowing are vital activities.    Thus knowing 
activities partake of the interiority,  actuality and self-constructing 
character common to all vital activity.    "Vital activity," as Louis 
Regis remarks,  "is a gift that a living being gives  itself from its own 
wealth. This wealth is the actuality of the soul itself,  and of its powers." 
14         Of its very nature,  vital activity involves a certain degree of 
transcendence over matter.    Unlike physical action which arises by 
reason of the passive potentiality of material objects,  vital activity 
arises from a dynamic capability of a living being able,  unlike 
ordinary material beings to move itself into act. 15.        At the source,  
therefore,  of every vital activity is a certain transcendence over 
matter which is the principle of  exteriority,  imperfection and 
transformation.16 
This transcendence of the limitations matter imposes has very 
important consequences for the understanding of the process of human 
knowingo    Because of the way our understanding depends upon sensible 
models in conceiving non-sensible realities,  we tend to conceive 
everything after the manner of the hard,  extended corporeal objects 
our senses reveal to us.    Thus we imagine the manifold of cognitive 
activities as a cast of 
separate entities,   subsisting beside each other like the players in 
an encyclopedic drama, whose entrances and exits are carefully 
calculated,  whose actions and speeches never coincide, and who 
must leave the stage as soon as they have spoken their lines.17 
Nothing could be further from the truth.    What is true of all proper 
accidents is true pre-eminently of the vital properties which are the 
powers and activities of a living being.    They come into being not by 
any transformation of one thing into the other but by a kind of welling 
up from within.   And they exist together not like billiard balls packed 
within a frame,  each one completely outside the other,  but within 
each other as the perfection of the perfected -- according to a 
hierarchy of receptivity and actuality.18         Thus the body is present to 
the soul,  and the soul is present to each and every one of its powers .   
And the powers are present to each other,  the higher directing and 
governing the lower, the lower preparing the activity of the higher. 19 
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This presence of vital activities one to another is not of itself 
cognitive,  but the principle is true in the cognitive order as well as in 
the purely vital order.    Thus: 
 all the acts of the external senses are immanent to the 
activity of the sensus communis,   or sensible awareness.    The 
activity of the latter is immanent to that of the imagination,  
which is itself present to the activity of the memory.    All 
these sensory riches are immanent to the sensus cogitativus,  
which enlists them in the service of the intellect and will.    
Finally this whole ensemble of sensible operations is 
immanent or present to the intellect acting upon the phantasm 
20 
The same law of immanence extends through the activities of the intel-
lect: 
... analysis of the activities of our intellect,  with its three 
categories of acts -- apprehension, judgment,  and reasoning --
shows that apprehension is present to judgment,  since it pro-
vides the matter for its act,  and that judgment completes it by 
giving it truth.    Judgment is both the principle and the end 
ofreasoning,   for it is in judgment that reasoning begins and 
towards judgment that it is directed and finds  its term.21 
Supernatural activities are no exception to this law of 
immanence.    Grace and the supernatural gifts do not replace but 
modify the human person, his powers,  and his activities.    The 
supernatural life is not some kind of second story built above the 
natural life but having no connection with it.    The life of grace exists  
in and modifies the natural operations of man elevating them to new 
objects and strengthening their mode of operation.    Thus sacred 
theology and Infused wisdom reflect back upon the revealed realities 
made present to the mind of the believer through the assent of faith. 22    
In doing so theological and mystical contemplation do not extend the 
knowledge of faith to new objects; instead they enable the believer to 
penetrate more deeply the same object presented globally in the initial 
assent of faith.23     Similarly,  they reflect upon the natural experience 
and understanding of the world which the believer has acquired from 
his cultural tradition and his personal discoveries.   As a result of 
this reflection,  the mind penetrates more deeply into this presentation 
of the world without,  however,   replacing it or getting outside it. 24 
The converse of the immanence of cognitive activity is  its 
transcendence.    The consciousness which our manifold knowing 
activities give us is not,  despite their immanence,   something closed 
in upon itself.    In human knowledge the term of the act is always 
something posited outside the act itself.    There is an irreducible 
otherness involved in all human cognition.    In knowledge,   something 
outside the knowing subject becomes present to that subject.    The 
manifold of interior cognitive activities is evoked, directed and 
determined by a world of objects exterior to the consciousness.   
Human consciousness,  as Husserl saw,  is essentially "orientation-to, 
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"openness -for ."   "Perceiving consciousness is always a being-with-
reality which is not consciousness itself, a being-open-for and 
directed-to-reality." 25 In fact, human consciousness, as we have 
already seen in speaking of reflective and non-reflective 
consciousness,  discovers itself only in and by the presence of this 
stranger who has invaded it and taken possession of  it.26 
The stranger who invades the person in the activity of knowing is 
called the "object."   In Thomistic usage,  the term "object" always 
has a relational meaning.    "The object is not a thing taken as an 
absolute, nor the soul taken as another absolute,  but a habitudo 
between things and the soul and vice versa." 27    The object is the 
exterior thing known precisely as it comes to exist in the knowing 
subject. 
We have already noted, however,  that the integral act of 
knowing anything comprises a manifold of distinct activities 
proceeding from distinct powers.    It is necessary,  therefore,  to 
distinguish between what is formal and what is material in the object.    
I see this typewriter with my eyes as an extended colored body.    I 
hear it with my ears as operating noisily.   Always it is the thing itself 
which becomes present as the term both of the integral and of the 
constituent activities .    The thing itself is the material object.    But 
the material object is attained by the distinct constituent acts under 
distinct formalities.    These distinct formalities are the formal quo 
objects of the various powers from which the activities emmanate.    
The thing precisely under one or another of these formalities is the 
formal quod object of the related power. 
Between the material and the formal objects there is no one-
for-one correspondence.    The formality of the object is determined by 
a proportion between the object and the action of the cognitive power 
with which it is known.    Sometimes the operation of the soul divides 
things which are unified in reality.    Thus in my cognitive activity the 
typewriter which I perceive is divided according to its color,  the 
sound of its operation,  the feel of its action,  the nature of its 
construction,   etc. Similarly,  the action of the soul sometimes unifies 
many distinct things under a single proper formality.    Thus In the 
perception of my typewriter standing on a typing table in the corner of 
my room,  I unite the 
typewriter,  the table and the room under the single formality of 
being.28 
Here too,   it is necessary to caution against too material a 
notion of the presence of the object according to its various 
formalities . We spontaneously tend to imagine these distinct 
formalities after the fashion of the distinct colored particles which 
combine to form a pattern on the screen of a kaleidascope,  or like the 
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colored bits of tile and glass that make up a mosaic.    But the truth is 
something else again. Except for the distinct formalities which are the 
objects of the external senses,  and which are combined only in the 
sensus communis,  the distinct formal quo objects exist one within the 
other just like the acts to which they are related.    Just as the activity 
of the lower power is present to the activity of the higher power,   so 
also the object of the lower power is present to the object of the higher 
power. 
The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality 
of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power 
is,  the greater the number of things to which it extends.    
Therefore,  many things are combined in the one formality of 
the object considered by the higher power,   though they differ 
in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves     
Thus it is that various objects belong to divers lower powers 
but are subjected to a single higher power.29 
Thus, just as the manifold activities of consciousness combine 
into one integral act of knowing,   so also do the various aspects under 
which these divers activities apprehend a material object coalesce in 
such a way that the material object itself is integrally presented to the 
subject.    Although it is possible for the mind to reflect back upon and 
to analyze the components of an integral perception or judgment,  what 
is given directly in perception and judgment is the presence of the 
whole thing as it is in itself and not simply the various atomized 
aspects.    I can reflectively attend to the color,  noise,  shape,   
structure and function of my typewriter, and to the diverse activities 
by which I perceive it,  but what I perceive and know directly and 
immediately is this tan, noisy,  undersized, and badly constructed 
typewriter. 
D.    INTENTIONALITY AS THE MODE 
OF HUMAN COGNITION 
The considerations which have preceded prepare the way for 
onelast prenote to the analysis of  the knowledge of faith,  the 
intentional character of human cognition,,     Intentionality is the 
peculiar form in which immanence and transcendence are united in the 
human mode of knowing. 
The notion of intentionali ty as i t  has arisen in modern 
phenomenology runs  direct ly contrary to  the assumption of  ideal ism and 
empiricism that  consciousness  is  f i rs t  const i tuted in  i tsel f  and only 
secondarily opened to a reality al ien to i tself.     On the contrary,   
phenomenology has shown that perceiving consciousness is  always a being-
together-with-real i ty;  there is  no bridge to  be bui l t  between  consciousness  
and real i ty because consciousness never ex ists wrapped up in i tsel f.     The 
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quest ion  of  whether  or  not  perceiving consciousness  seizes  rea l i t y cannot  
even be raised,   for  consciousness  of  i ts  very nature is  an intent ion  toward 
real i t y.  30 
Scholastic philosophy,   at  least  in i ts  Thomist  form,  acknowledged 
this characterist ic of  knowledge in i ts  famous dictum:   sensus in ac tu es t  
sensibi le  in  actu ;  in tel lectus  in  actu es t  in tel l ig ibi le  in  actu .3 1    In the act 
of knowing,  the knower becomes the object known.32 The ideal  of knowledge 
would be a perfect  ontological  identity of knower, knowing power,  
knowable likeness and object known.    This ideal is realized only in God.    
There is no ontological.distinction between God as knowing,  the divine 
essence as known,   the divine intellect,   or the divine act of knowing. 33   
Even the Word in which God expresses his knowledge of himself is  one in 
being with the divine substance,    the divine intellection,   the divine 
intellect  and the divine essence.34 
In God this absolute identity is possible because there is no 
admixture of potential i ty.  God's being is  not  merely potential ly 
intel l igible ,  potential ly understood and potentia l ly unders tanding;  i t  i s  
always and perfect ly actually intell igible,   actually understood and 
actually     ' understanding.35    In creatures, however,  this fullness of actual 
being is not to be found,  for there is  always some admixture of  
potential i ty.  In knowledge,   therefore,   perfect  identi ty is  not possible,   yet  
i t  remains a goal toward which cognition tends.    Intentionality is the form 
which marks the human mode of  t ranscending the l imitat ions  imposed by 
the act-potency relat ionship-36    By a process of progressive actuation,  
what is  not  immediately given in act  is  progressively brought to actual i ty.  
Because cognit ion in man is a  process,   we can dist inguish various 
phases  ranging f rom pure potent ia l i ty,   through remote and proximate 
stages  of first  act ,   to the full  achievement of knowledge in second act .     
What dist inguishes animals  and men from al l  other corporeal  beings is  
their  capacity to  be-with other  things,   to  receive the actual i ty of  other  
corporeal  things without  ceasing to  be what  they are  in  themselves .     
This  potent ial i ty i tsel f  represents  a radical  t ranscendence over  material  
potent ial i ty.     Material  beings are potent ial ly al l  o ther  things only in the 
sense that they can be changed into other  things at  the cost  of  los ing what  
they were formerly;  they are l imited to  their  own form only.     Cognitive 
beings,  however,  escape this limitat ion.    They are able to  become all  other  
things without  ceasing to be what  they are.370 
The goal of knowledge is to achieve this being-with other things in second act,  but 
to achieve that goal the knower must first become the object  known In first  act .     
Before the knower can come to-be-with the object known cognitively it must come 
to-be-wlth it entitatlvely; It must enti tatively be impressed with a likeness of the 
thing to be known.    The potentiality of the knower is so constituted that the physical 
activity educes f rom i t  not  merely a  speci f ic  l ikeness  l ike the heat  induced 
in  a  lump of coal by a hot fire,  but a dist inct individual likeness.     It  is  
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ableto receive not just another form,  but the form of another thing.    
The actuality that the knower receives from the object is not 
assimilated as itsown actuality, but remains distinct as the actuality of 
another even as it actualizes the cognitive potentiality of the knower.38 
This distinct, individual likeness of the object is called the "impressed 
species," It informs the cognitive power both entitatively and 
cognitively. Entitatively it actuates the potency specifying its 
indeterminacy.    Cognitively it makes the object itself present both in 
proximate first act and in second act.    It gives the object a new mode 
of being,  a psychic existence,39   in the knowing subject,  and it makes 
the subject one with the object.40   This impressed species is not itself that 
which is known; it is a pure means or principle,  of knowing.    Its 
function is to specify the cognitive  action of the knower.41 
Although it makes the thing known,  the impressed species is 
not the thing itself but only a likeness of the thing known.    It is an accurate 
likeness of the thing as far as it goes,  but it may be more or less ade-
quate insofar as it is more or less distinct.    The species impressed 
on my. visual powers as I look out at the distant hills is an accurate 
likeness of the hills,  but the details of 'their configuration remain 
confused and indistinct.   Here we must remember,  however,  what 
was said earlier in the section on profile and horizon in knowledge.    
What is known indistinctly is still iIn some sense known.    Indistinct 
knowledge is neither purely potential nor completely actual; rather,   it 
stands midway between potentiality and act.42   The effect of repeated 
experience of the object from different viewpoints is not to give a 
completely new impression,  but to clarify the content of previous 
impressions retained by the knower. 43    This intentional species is a 
true formal similitude by reason of its correspondence to the object in 
intentional or representative existence.    It is,   in fact,  the "identical 
quiddity of the object in as much as everything that is found in the 
object in reality is communica ted to the representative species.".44 
The impressed species inaugurates the act of knowledge as a true formal principle, 
for it specifies the immanent action of the cogni tive power,45  but it is not the term of the 
act.    "It is that by which  (quo) the object (quod) is known."46    That the action of 
cognition be completed,   it must attain the object as a term.    The external senses attain 
their object as a term In the immediate,  physical contact they have with the object.    But 
experience teaches that we can know things which are not immediately present by 
physical contact.47          By reason of the impressed species the object known comes to 
exist psychically in the knower,  and the action of the knower is oriented to 
it.    But the impressed species of a lower order cannot function as a 
medium in which the object is represented as the term of the acts of 
higher order knowledge.    Consequently,  the higher order cognitive 
powers form within themselves a representation of the object as known.    
The representation,   called the "expressed species"  is a "likeness of the 
thing known, which is produced in the process of knowing and in which the 
knower contemplates the object known."48    More particularly,  as 
produced in the process of higher order sense knowledge,  the 
expressed species is  called the "phantasm."49    As produced in the process 
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of intellectual knowledge it is called the "concept" or "mental word," or 
"intentio in-tellecta." 
The expressed species,  like the impressed species,   is a 
likeness of the object.    But unlike the impressed species,  the 
expressed species is the term,  not the principle,   of the cognitive act.    
Whereas the impressed species specifies and actuates the potentiality 
of the knower,  putting it in proximate first act with respect to 
cognition; the expressed species,   on the contrary,   is produced by the 
actualized cog nitive power as a representation of the term of the 
cognitive act. 50  The impressed species makes the object present as 
knowable; In the expressed species it becomes present as actually 
known. 51         The impressed species persists in all the higher 
cognitive powers,   for it continues to inform the potency entitatively, 
preserving the potency in remote first act. 52    The expressed species, 
however,  comes into being as a virtual product in the act of cognition 
(second act) and exists only so long as actual cognition endures,  for it 
represents the object as actu ally and determlnately known. 53 
As a product of the act of higher order knowing,  the expressed 
species is distinct from the act of knowing.    Consequently,  a 
distinction can be made In the act between its virtual role of producing 
the expressed species and its formal role of knowing the object 
represented in the species expressed. 54   In intellectual knowledge,  the 
act is designated "intellection" or "understanding" insofar as formally 
it attains the object; it is designated "diction" or "conceptualization" 
insofar as virtually it produces the expressed species. 55    There is no 
corresponding pair of terms to designate the two aspects of internal 
sense knowledge, though the verbal "imagining"  is frequently used to 
refer to the production of a phantasm or image of the object. 
Like the impressed species,  the expressed species can be 
considered both entitatively and formally.    Entitatively I t is a quality 
mod ifying and determining the faculty in act. 56    Formally, however,  it 
is a representation,   a  l ikeness,  a  vital  image in which the knower 
at tains the object  represented to i t .     Formally,   therefore,   the 
expressed species too is intentional,,    In it the object comes to have 
intentional and immaterial  being.     The expressed species  is  not  a 
mere  pic ture  or  replica of the object;  i t  is not  something which only 
secondarily bears a resemblance to something else.    It  is the very 
form of the object i tself ,  existing now in a new mode of being.    It 
functions as an interior medium  in which the object is known,  without 
itself being directly known. 57    Not in i ts entitative being but only in 
its intentional  reference is the expressed species the term of  the 
action.     As St .   Thomas observed:  
something is known inasmuch as it  is represented in the 
knower,  not inasmuch as it  exists in the knower.    The likeness 
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exist ing in the cognitive faculty is not a means of knowing the 
object according to'  the existence it  has in the cognitive faculty,  
but according to the reference that it  has to the thing known.58 
This distinction between the entitative being of the expressed 
species and i ts  intentional  reference accounts for a certa in ambigui ty 
in scholast ic expression, ,     Sometimes the expressed species is  
spoken of as that  "by which" or "in which" the object  is  known; at 
other t imes i t  is   said to be "that which"  is known. 59         Both of these 
usages can be found in the following passages: 
what is understood per se is not the thing of which the intellect 
has knowledge, for sometimes the thing itself is understood 
only potentially and exists outside the knower .    Such is the 
case when man knows material things like a stone or an animal 
etc. Understanding, however,  demands that what is understood 
exist in the knower and that it be one with the knower. 
By the same token,  what is understood per se cannot be 
the thing's likeness informing the intellect for the sake of 
understanding.   This likeness is related to understanding as a 
principle    . not as a term of understanding. 
Therefore,  what is primarily and per se understood is 
that which the intellect conceives  in itself of the thing 
understood,  whether this be a definition or a statement.   What 
is thus conceived is called the "interior word."60 
The conception of the intellect is intermediate between the 
intellect and the thing understood,  for through its mediation 
the intellect attains the thing.    Therefore,  the intellectual 
conception is both that which is understood and that by which 
the thing is understood o    Thus what is understood can be said 
to be both the thing itself and the conception of the  intellect; 
likewise, what is spoken can be said to be both the thing which 
is expressed by the word and the word itself . . . . 61 
If these texts are taken literally to mean that the concept as 
such is what is first known,  we are locked in conceptualism and it is 
impossible to sustain the thesis of an intuitive,  non-conceptual 
moment in any kind of human knowledge.    For the activity of the 
intellect would simply consist in reflection on and manipulation of 
concepts     However, there is another interpretation possible.    It is 
not the concept as such that is known in the act of knowing,  at least 
not primarily,  but the thing itself as represented in the concept.    It is 
in this latter sense that Cajetan and John of St.  Thomas understood the 
matter.    John of St, Thomas wrote: 
when at times St» Thomas teaches that the word or concept is 
not only a medium of knowledge as a quo,  but also is known as 
a quod,  he speaks of what is represented in it,   inasmuch as  in 
the concept the knower has the object rendered intellective and 
de-materialized,   i » e . ,    stripped of material conditions.    Thus 
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what is known is not the concept itself as a quod,   inasmuch as 
it is a certain quality informing the intellect; rather the thing 
thought out and formed through the concept is known as a quod.    
Thus compared to the thing outside it can assume the 
character of idea.62 
To prove that this is the correct interpretation would take us too far  
afield.    The proof can be found elsewhere. 63        To these two ways of 
speaking of concepts,  the commentators introduced the terms 
"formal  concept" and'"objective concept." 64    Formally the concept is 
the subjective image which the intellect forms in its act of 
understanding, but because the nature of the concept is to represent 
something other than itself,  that which it represents, precisely as 
represented can be called a concept by analogy of attribution. 
Perhaps this long excursus seems a bit over-drawn,   but the 
point has been to make clear the intentional character of the 
expressed species,  whether phantasm,   concept,   or conceptual 
proposition and discourse.    Every expressed species contains more 
than it formally expresses.    The phantasm expresses the sensible 
object according to its surface qualities and external relationships,  
but the objective reference of the thing thus represented includes 
virtually the internal intelligible structure of the object.    Similarly,  
the concept of man as a substance expresses the substantiality of man 
formally but Includes an objective reference to the other essential 
attributes of man.    This objective reference is implicit,  not explicit. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCEPTUAL AND NON-CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS 
IN ORDINARY HUMAN COGNITION 
A.    INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION 
      In the light of the preceding general observations, we 
are ready to begin the direct analysis of the role of conceptual 
and non-conceptual moments in human cognition.    Building on 
the analysis to be conducted in this present chapter, we shall go 
on in the following chapter to see how this natural process of 
human cognition Is modified and utilized when taken up into 
the knowledge of faith. 
    The goal of this present chapter will be to describe and 
explain the Interaction of conceptual and non-conceptual 
elements in the form of knowledge which most closely 
corresponds to the supernatural knowledge of faith,  namely, 
knowledge through communication.    In fact,  most of our 
knowledge derives not from direct experience and personal 
Interpretation but from vicarious experience and learned 
interpretation.    We depend on teachers to broaden our 
experience and to help us to clarify our interpretation.    The 
influence of such vicarious experience and learned 
interpretation permeates the whole of human knowledge.    
Human knowledge is essentially a social phenomenon.    
Personal experience and interpretation take place only within a 
context of received experience and meaning.    The child 
cannot come to consciousness or to any distinct understanding 
except in the world created for it by other human beings who 
give him language as a means of intellectual expression,  who 
guide his experience of the world and introduce him to things 
he cannot directly experience,  and who interpret to him the 
meaning of his experience.1 
Nevertheless,  for the purpose of analysis it is easier to begin 
with the process of learning by personal experience and 
discovery, even though this involves abstracting this mode of 
learning from its living context.    Such abstraction, however, 
has a real foundation; personal discovery and creative 
interpretation are realities.    By means of them not only the 
individual but the society as a whole expands its cultural 
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horizon of explicated meaning.    Provided,  therefore, we do 
not lose sight of the context of this learning process we need 
not fear being led astray  
B.  THE DIRECT PROCESS OF LEARNING 
1.    Concept and Image in Perception and Apprehension 
In the genetic process by which we come to know a 
corporeal thing directly,   that body acts by physical causality 
upon the external senses.    We have already noted that in this 
process,  by reason of the peculiar character of the sense 
potencies,  the effect of this action is not a mere specifically 
similar form transforming the sense organ, but,  rather,  a 
reproduction of the object's own individual sensible form 
precisely as it refers intentionally to the object itself.    The 
physical causality of the body on the external sense triggers a 
psychic reaction of the sense so that specified by the 
impressed species received from the object,  the knower comes 
to know the object itself in second act. 
This act of knowledge-presence is not strictly speaking 
conscious in the external sense.2      It becomes conscious only 
in the operation of the sensus communis reflecting upon the 
operation of the external sense.    This sensus communis or 
"sensible awareness" takes possession of the distinct 
impressions of the object which have been received by the 
various external senses; it compares and distinguishes them; 
and thus,   it knows distinctly the object and the various 
sensations of it.3      Moreover,   since sensible awareness is able 
to call upon the data of past perceptions stored in the 
imagination,   it is able to grasp  the object and its activity as 
extended in time and located in space.4   With the aid of 
imagination we are able to grasp the objects of the physical 
world in a temporal and spatial permanence  independent now 
of continued actual physical presence. 
It is very important to note that the imagination is not 
a capricious falsifier of perception.   As the treasurer of past 
perceptions its primary function is to contribute to the 
synthesis of the integral perception,  data regarding the spatio-
temporal extension of the object. Since the perceptions which 
it retains are the very impressions received from the external 
senses and integrated by the sense awareness, the imagination 
of itself shares the same objectivity as these senses. Although 
this objectivity is most surely guaranteed when the object is 
directly present to the external senses and can thus serve as a 
control, this objectivity extends proportionately to imaginative 
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representations of the sensible object synthesized in the 
absence of direct sense perception.      This ability of 
imagination to represent an object truly,  even in the absence of 
direct physical contact,   is the foundation for the objectivity of 
indirect knowledge. 
Because the imagination knows objects or at least 
aspects of objects which are not here and now present to the 
external senses,   it must represent these objects in an 
expressed species,  the so-called phantasm,.   Into this 
phantasm are integrated the elements of immediate sense 
perception,   so that the phantasm represents the object in all 
its  sensible aspects. 6 
Besides the concrete and quantified sensible qualities of 
the object,  we perceive with our senses certain concrete 
relationships.    The perception of these relationships is the 
work of the cogitative sense, which like the common sense has 
annexed to it a retentive faculty,  the 
memory, from which it is able to recall relationships 
perceived in  past experience.7      In animals the corresponding 
sense,  the estimative sense,   is limited to grasping objects 
only as related to a physical interaction situation; thus a sheep 
knows a lamb only as the lamb seeks from it milk or 
protection,  etc.    Man's cogitative sense, however,  by reason 
of its continuity with his intellectual operations,   is able to 
transcend the interaction situation and to know objects in their 
concrete being.    Thus by his cogitative sense, man is able to 
know a man as this man,  a piece of wood as this piece of 
wood,  a sheep as this sheep.8   Similarly,  under the direction 
of intellect,  the cogitative sense has the ability to organize 
perceptual matter so as to represent more clearly  or to 
symbolize objects of consideration9    and to focus attention 
upon  what the image presents to intellectual consciousness.10    
By grasping the data of imagination as related to the concrete 
object experienced, the cogitative sense is able to insure the 
conformity of the imaginative representation to the object as 
directly perceived. 
The result of the activity of the internal senses is a 
representation of the object known in its concrete reality.    In 
this representation we know the object as a distinct,  concrete,  
existent substance endowed with all its accidents, proper and 
adventitious,  and located spatio-temporally in the horizon of 
material being.    The objectivity of this representation is 
guaranteed by the direct line of formal causality which the 
exterior object exercises on the sense faculties.    Distortion,  
of course,   is possible by reason of indisposition of the 
physical organs or the interference of the higher faculties,  but 
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such distortion can be controlled by the cogitative sense,    
Because the data of perception are retained in the imagination 
and memory through the retention of their impressed species,   
it is possible to reproduce an accurate representation of the 
concrete existent object even in the absence of direct physical 
contact.11     This kind of reproduction occurs even in direct 
perception insofar as the object directly perceived is located 
in space and time. But it is of absolutely critical importance in 
knowledge of past events. 
Besides his senses,  man is endowed with an 
intellectual power. The human intellect has as its proper object 
the being and natures,   substantial and accidental,  of the 
material things presented in sense knowedge.12    Although in 
sense knowledge we grasp the material object concretely as 
existing apart from ourselves and as having a distinct nature 
and distinct modifications,  we do not by sense know these 
aspects formally.    To know them formally is the prerogative 
of Intellect which is  able to abstract the essence from its 
concrete embodiment.13 
Of itself,  the intellect is a tabula rasa; It has no a 
priori forms  by which it can know the essences of things.14        
The sensible content of the concrete perception, however,   is 
not of itself actually intelligible, for a thing is actually 
intelligible only insofar as it exists without matter.    For the 
same reason the forms of the concrete bodily object in its 
physical existence are in themselves not actually intelligible.    
Both in their physical existence and in their sensible psychic 
existence,  the being and natures of corporeal objects are only 
potentially intelligible.15      Consequently,   they cannot directly 
specify the action of the intellect. Moreover,  as material they 
are incapable of acting upon the immaterial potentiality of the 
intellect to educe an impressed species.    Thus the direct 
formal and efficient causality of the exterior object in 
specifying the activity of man's knowing powers by producing 
an impressed species comes to an end at this point.    The 
concrete singular existent itself,  as the term of intellectual 
cognition can penetrate no deeper into  the knowing powers of 
man, for its forms can exist only in matter.16 
To bridge the gulf separating intellectual from sense 
cognition, man is endowed with an active intellective power,   
the agent intellect, which has as its function the rendering of 
material forms actually intelligible and,  therefore,   of 
impressing their intelligible species  in the intellectual power 
properly so-called,  the possible intellect.17    To designate this 
activity,  St. Thomas uses the terms "abstraction" and 
"illumination."18        This activity should not be understood as 
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simply uncovering what is hidden in the phantasm,  despite 
the use of the term abstraction.    Rather, in accordance with 
the general Thomistic understanding of how a potency is 
actualized,   it should be seen as the result  of the agent 
intellect's communication to it of its own actuality.19   This 
actualization gives to the material form a new mode of being 
in the possible intellect where it comes to have entitative 
existence as an  impressed species actually intelligible.20    
Since matter, however,  is the principle of Individuatlon,   in 
being thus elevated to actual intelligbility,  the form impressed 
is abstracted not only from its material  mode of existence but 
also from its singular mode of existence.21 
By the impressed intelligible species,  the possible 
intellect is specified to know not this or that man,  this or that 
animal,  this or that white object,  but man as such, animal as 
such,  whiteness as such, etc.    The intellect,  therefore,  
apprehends its object not only irrespective of its physical 
presence or absence,  but also according to a different mode 
of being than it has in nature,  for it understands the nature of 
the thing as separated from the material individualizing 
conditions with-out which it cannot exist in nature.    There is,  
therefore,  a double reason for the possible intellect to 
represent its object in an expressed species,  the concept.    
The first reason,  the indifference to physical presence or 
absence of the object,  it shares with the internal senses. The 
second,   is altogether proper to the intellect which apprehends 
the object according to a different mode of being and,   
therefore,  a different mode of ontological truth than it has in 
itself.22   The object as known formally and directly in the 
concept is  a  form which exists in reality but not the form as it  
exists in reality,   for in the concept i t  is immater ia l  and 
universal ;  In  real i ty i t  i s  mater ia l  and s ingular . 23 
The fact that  the object  as represented in the concept 
is  only specif ically a likeness of the object  (for the concept 
represents the object in one or another of its universal 
intelligible aspects),    is the foundation of  the necessity for the 
intel lect 's  conversio ad phantasmata,   a   theme frequently 
stressed by St. Thomas.24     In intellectual cognition the 
phantasm functions not only in the actualization of the possible 
intellect,  but aalso in the actual contemplation of the object by 
the intellect.  The following text is very illuminative.  
 the possible intellect,  like every substance,   
operates in a manner consonant with its nature.    Now 
it is by its nature the form of  the body,  hence i t  does 
indeed understand immaterial  things,  but it  sees 
them in something material .    An indication of this  is  
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that  in teaching universal  notions par t icular  
examples  are employed,   so that  the universals  may 
be viewed in them.  Hence,  the possible intellect,   
before possessing the intel ligible species,   is  related 
in one way to the phantasms which it  needs, and in 
another way after receiving that species; before,   i t  
needs that  phantasm in  order  to  receive f rom it  the 
inte l l ig ible  species ,   and thus the phantasm stands in 
relat ion to the possible in te l lect  as  the object  
moving the la t ter ;  but  af ter the species  has been 
received into the possible Inte l lect ,   the lat ter  needs 
the phantasm as the instrument or foundation of  i ts  
species,   so that  the possible Intel lect  Is  then 
related to the phantasm as eff icient  cause.     For  by 
the Intel lect 's  command there is  formed in the 
imagination a phantasm corresponding to such and 
such an intelligible species,  the latter being mirrored 
in this phantasm as an exemplar in the thing 
exemplified or in the image.25 
The universal concept as it exists in the mind is a being of 
reason,  not a real being; it is able to make known real beings 
only when reflected back upon the phantasm.    For the aim of 
all knowledge is to know the thing as it is in reality, not as it is 
in the mind.   As St0 Thomas observes: 
 the proper object of the human intellect,  which is 
united to a body,   is a quiddity or nature existing in 
corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible 
things.it rises to a certain knowledge of things 
invisible.    Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in 
an individual,  and this cannot be apart from corporeal 
matter.    For instance,  it belongs to the nature of a 
stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of 
a horse to be in an individual horse,  and so forth.    
Consequently,  the nature of a stone or any material 
thing cannot be known completely and truly,  except 
insofar as it is known as existing in the individual. 
Now we apprehend the individual through the senses 
and the imagination.   And therefore, for the intellect 
to understand its proper object actually,   it must 
necessarily turn to the phantasms in order to 
perceive the universal nature existing in the 
individual.2 6  
Indeed Aquinas goes so far as to say that the proper operation 
of human intelligence is "to understand intelligible aspects in 
the phantasms." 27 
This return to the phantasm constitutes a most 
important non-conceptual moment in human knowledge.    The 
nature of human ideas are such that they can never of 
themselves perfectly represent the concrete,   corporeal 
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existent in its individual mode of being.    In this respect human 
ideas are altogether different from divine or angelic ideas.    
In order to know reality as it is, man requires both ideas and 
sense images,   for by the former he possesses only the 
universal intelligible aspects and by the latter he possesses 
only the particular corporeal aspects. 28   Sense knowledge is 
not simply an occasional epiphenomenon accompanying 
intellectual apprehension of reality,  nor is it merely a 
praepadeutic to be left behind once the intellect has been 
impressed with the intelligible forms of corporeal things.    
Man does not know objective reality by his intellect alone but 
only in the conjunction of the operations of intellect and sense. 
Not only is the intellect dependent upon the phantasm 
in the apprehension of the singular,  concrete existent,   it is also 
dependent upon the phantasm in its discursive clarification of 
the content of its conceptions.    The human intellect does not 
apprehend the essence of material things by a simple intuition 
that immediately grasps the essence in all of its 
distinctiveness, 29    rather,   it must pass through a series of 
zones of progressive clarif ication by attending to the 
differentiating factors,    the character ist ic accidents,   which 
are represented in well-  organized phantasms.30   This discursive 
apprehension of the distinct essences of things results  in 
clearer and more dist inct  concepts,  but  i t  does not proceed by 
any sort of direct intuition of the virtual content of the concept;  
only in reference to the dist inguishing characterist ics 
represented in  the phantasms can the  inte l lect  clar ify i ts  
concep tions.31 
We should note here, however,   that in the act of  
reflecting its concepts back upon the phantasms present in 
sense knowledge,   the intellect must possess a kind of indirect 
intuition of the virtual content of  the concept.    Were the 
intel lect  unable to grasp the fact that  i ts  conceptions are 
incomplete,  though fundamentally accurate in their  positive 
content,   it would have no reason to seek further clarification.    
Implici t  in the return to the phantasm must be an intuit ive 
intel lectual  grasping of  the concrete real i ty precisely as  
exceeding the  expressed content of  its conceptual 
representations.    Now the object exceeds the expressed 
conception fundamentally in its very being,   so that this  
implicit,   intuitive,  non-conceptual moment in intellectual 
knowledge is f irst  and foremost a consciousness of  being.32 
In itself this immediate grasp of the concrete reality of 
the object is indistinct and implicit for it takes place only in 
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and with the distinct and explicit grasp of an intelligible aspect 
of the object and is its inverse correlate.     Nevertheless it 
plays a critical role in intellectual knowledge,   for it is the 
thread which leads out from the abstract concept back to 
concrete reality,   the center toward which all the abstract 
conceptual expressions of the reality converge,   and the 
fundamental awareness in which we grasp the insufficiency of 
every conceptual expression and thus the possibilities of 
further explication. 33Above all,it is the foundation of the act 
of judgment by which the intellect formallytakes possession of 
its knowledge of reality,   knowing it not only truly but also as 
true. 34 
2.     Concept and Image in Judgment 
By apprehension,   the outward real comes to cognitive 
existence in us dispersed into a multitude of abstract concepts,   
each of which is a specific likeness of one or another aspect of 
the outward real.     Thus reality comes to exist whole and 
entire within our intellects but not in the mode of existing it 
has in reality nor in its full degree of explication.     We have 
seen how,   in the return of the conceptual apprehension upon 
phantasms,  there is given an implicit intuitive grasp of the 
concrete reality which the concepts correctly but imperfectly 
express. This implicit awareness links the diverse concepts 
together and relates them to the reality known,  but only 
implicitly.    For this reason,  human intellection is not 
perfected in immediate apprehension but must be 
complemented by another act by which we explicitly 
"reconstruct the original unity of the thing by regrouping its 
different aspects according  to its mode of existing outside the 
soul." 35        This act is the act of judgment. 
Judgment completes apprehension,   it does not replace 
it.    On the other hand,   it does not consist in some sort of 
higher order apprehension which grasps an aspect of the thing 
that had escaped previous apprehension.    Judgment does not 
make anything new known,  but merely makes the content of 
previous apprehension to be known in a new way,  namely,  as 
explicitly unified and related to reality as it outwardly  exists. 36     
By means of judgment,  the implicit intuitive awareness of the 
concrete being of the object is brought to explicit 
consciousness, In the words of D.  M. De Petter: 
human judgment,  therefore,  is the act by which the knowing 
subject formally becomes aware of the implicit intuitive being-
content of  its  abstract conceptual content,  and on this basis 
brings the abstract  conceptual  content back to i ts  concrete and 
real existence in a positive manner.37  
 46
The reason why the human intel lect  must  resort  to 
judgment in order to complete i ts  apprehensions is  that  man's  
agent intel lect  is  too weak to actualize at once an intel l igible 
species perfectly explicating everything which belongs to the 
reality known.    The intelligible species which resul t  f rom our 
abstract ive apprehension represent one thing in   such a way as 
not to represent another. 38        But the illuminating activity of 
the agent intellect does not stop with the production of the 
intelligible species; as we have seen,   i t  continues to 
illuminate the phantasm as the possible in te l lect  ref lects  i t s  
concepts  back upon the phantasm representing the reality 
known.    This illuminative activity is not only the source of the 
knowability of its object but also of the actual vigor of the  
intellect in its act of understanding. 39    Its continued action,  
therefore, enables the possible intellect to perfect its 
knowledge of reality by combining its distinct apprehensions 
into a unified representation of the reality as it exists in 
nature. 
From the point of view of the immanent product,  and in 
the order of exercise, judgment gives rise to a unification of 
concepts in a statement or proposition.    In the statement,   
concepts representative of the quiddity of things,   i . e . ,    concept 
nouns,  are composed with concepts representative of particular 
accidents related to substance,   i . e . ,  concept predicates or 
verbs,   in such a way as to express a single  predicated 
meaning. 40         It is impossible to think simultaneously two 
distinct intelligibilities.    I can think of man and I can think of 
running as two absolutes,   but I can think them simultaneously 
only by relating them to one another so that they merge into one 
intelligibility,   one predicated meaning:   e .g . ,   "man is 
capable of running"; "this man is actually running"; etc.    This 
is done by subordinating the meaning of one to the meaning of 
the other:   the total intelligibility of the subject is subordinated 
to the explicit intelligibility of the predicate in such a way that 
the subject is understood in terms of the predicate.    In the 
statements "man is capable of running," "this man is actually 
running," the focus of intellectual attention is not the intrinsic 
nature of man or the concrete existence of this man,  but the 
meaning of "capable of running" or "actually running." 41 
What is formal in knowledge, however,   is not the 
immanent product and the order of exercise,  but the objective 
term and the order of specification.    In the act of intellectual 
cognition concepts are produced and combined in statements 
and discourses,   but it is not the. concepts,   statements and 
discourses that are directly known.    What is made known in the 
statement is the very being of the thing according to its proper 
mode of existence,    St0 Thomas writes: 
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the operation of the intellect is twofold:   one,   called 
"apprehension of indivisibles," by which it knows the 
quiddity of something; the other,  by which the intellect 
combines or separates, forming an affirmative or a 
negative statement.    These two operations correspond to 
two real aspects of things.    The first operation has to do 
with the nature of the thing known; according to this aspect 
the thing known,   whether it be something complete and 
whole or something incomplete like a part or an accident, 
holds a certain place in the order of being.    The second 
operation has to do with the very being of the thing 
(ipsum esse rei); this results from the combination of 
intrinsic principles in composite beings or coincides with 
the very nature of uncom-posed beings.42 
This ipsum esse rei which is the objective  term of 
judgment is not to be understood as the formal act of esse as 
distinct from the essential aspects of the thing known.    
Rather,   it refers to the object's mode of existence according to 
the meaning predicated.    Thus,   in the statements "the earth 
exists," or "a man named Socrates once existed," the 
judgment attains explicitly the substantial mode of existence of 
the subject.    In statements like "the earth is a body," or 
"Socrates was a man," the intellect takes explicit possession 
of the essential identity of the subject with one of its 
intelligible aspects.    It is also possible for the judgment to 
bear upon an accidental mode of existence,  as in the 
statements "the earth is illumined by the sun" or "Socrates 
lived in  Athens." 43 
Judgment is not an apprehensive but a projective act.44   
Its product,   the statement,   is measured by the reality 
revealed in the phantasm but it is not caused by it -- not 
even in the way that the ap prehension of an intelligible 
species is caused by the phantasm. 45   The statement's 
function is to give expression to the intuitive awareness of 
the predicate's mode of being,  an awareness which was 
implicit in the apprehensive reflection of the abstract 
concept back upon the phantasm. Formally,  therefore,  
judgment does not unite two concepts but rather unites 
explicitly the conceptual moment and the intuitive moments 
of intellectual cognition. 46    Insofar as this end is 
adequately or inadequately achieved,   the judgment is true 
or false.    Thus it is only when expressed in a statement 
that knowledge comes to have the property of truth and 
falsity.    Truth and falsity can be found in sense and 
apprehensive knowledge, but it is not known as such until 
it is affirmed or  denied in a judgment. 41 
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Just as the phantasm Ls the basis of conceptual 
insight,   so also it is the basis of judgmental knowledge; 
thus judgment,  like every human cognitive act,   is one 
integral operation to which many powers contribute.   
Psychologically,  judgment consists  in the process whereby 
the intellect,  working in virtue of the agent intellect back 
through its formal determination or intelligible species,   
reflects to the phantasm,  the enduring foundation of the 
meaning actually understood,  and through the phantasm 
and sense powers knows that what it understands  is 
realized concretely in a singular material existent.48 
At this point we should take note of those immediate and 
universal judgments which are called "first principles," 
namely,  the  principles of non-contradiction,   identity,   
causality and finality. 49   St. Thomas describes the knowledge 
of these principles as naturally possessed and innate, 50   and 
attributes the knowledge of them in a special  way to the 
operation of the agent intellect. 51   As immediate effects of the 
operation of the agent intellect,  these first principles are the 
intellectual light which makes the world of sense experience 
intelligible to man.    They are the "seeds of wisdom and 
science" implanted in man's mind by the special action of God 
who is Truth itself.52   Regis observes: 
Natural judgments  . have all the stability of natural acts 
because they are doubly bound to the infallible activity of 
the Creator,  by the Intermediation of the agent intellect,   
immanent participation in the divine light itself,  and by 
the habit of understanding that is spontaneously generated 
from the meeting of primary notions and the illumination 
of the agent intellect.53 
D. M. De Petter in his essay on the origin of our 
knowledge of being54, has shown that the being which we grasp 
in these first principles is not the potential and, therefore, 
unintelligible being which material things have in themselves 
apart from.our knowledge,   but rather  the being of material 
things as actualized and "lighted up"55      by the operation of the 
agent intellect in the phantasm.    For5  as we have seen,  the 
agent intellect does not abstract the intelligible aspects of 
material beings by somehow uncovering an intelligibility 
already actual but hidden.  Rather, it makes the forms of the 
sensible object intelligible,  that is,   it communicates its own 
being to them in such a way that they stand out from their own 
potential (and,  therefore,  actually unintelligible but potentially 
intelligible) mode of being. 56 
In order to state the object of-these first principles we 
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must distinguish between two different ways in which we know 
them.    Initially we know them only as particularized and 
determined by some sensible content presented in perception,  
for the spontaneous form of our knowledge of being is not a 
knowledge of being as such but of this or that being. 57    
Determined in this way by the sensible content of our 
perceptions,  the first principles are found actually but 
implicitly in all our perceptual judgments as well as our more 
abstract, metaphysical judg meats in which they are 
universalized.    In fact,  as J. Isaac58  has shown,  we know them 
formally and explicitly as universal only by way of an induction 
from many perceptual judgments . 
However,   in themselves,  no matter how implicit our 
awareness of their universality,  they are universal and 
permeate all our knowledge of reality as the firm foundation 
upon which our particular knowledge stands.    It is in this 
sense that they are the seeds of science and wisdom,   the light 
by which we know everything that falls within the horizon of our 
intelligence.   All our detailed knowledge is simply a 
contraction and determination of them. 
This does not mean,  of course,  that psychologically we 
know things specifically and particularly by somehow looking 
directly into these first principles .   We have already seen that 
we have no direct knowledge of the virtual content of our 
concepts .    The specification and particularization of 
conceptual-knowledge is completely dependent upon the 
presentation of sense experience in the phantasm.    In like 
manner, the particularization of the first principles is due to 
the material ob jective causality of our phantasms. 59        
Nevertheless,   it is because the particularization is resolvable 
to these principles precisely in their universality that we know 
the validity of all our particularized knowledge of concrete 
reality. 60 
Keeping this distinction between the particular and the 
universal modes of the first principles, we can state their 
proper object in this way.    Heidegger,  uses the term "Being" 
(Sein) to designate "the lighting process by which beings [ i . e , ,   
the concrete existents which we experience,  together with their 
properties,  accidents,  and relationships] are illumined as 
beings," 61        If we may be permitted to appropriate this term 
to designate the operation of the agent intellect in making the 
potential being of material forms to be actually intelligible and,  
therefore, actually to be,  we may thus distinguish: 
a) From the point of view of the universality of the first 
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principles -- the act of being known in them per se primo is the 
Being which lights up beings,   i . e . ,   the intelligible being 
which material things have in themselves only in'potency but 
which they come to have actually through the illumination of the 
agent intellect which communicates its own actuality to them.    
Per se secundo,  though nonetheless immediately,  the proper 
object of the first principles is the imperfect and potential 
being which physical things have in themselves,  precisely as 
this being is manifested through the lighting process of Being. 
b) From the point of view of actual thematic 
consciousness in particular perceptual or scientific judgments,  
the per se object of the first principles is the being which the 
physical object or objects have in themselves,  though this is 
manifested only in the lighting process of being.    The explicit 
thematic consciousness of the lighting process itself comes 
only in phenomenological reflection and metaphysical 
explanation,  and therefore,  with respect to particular 
perceptual and scientific judgments involving the first 
principles  is only a per accidens object. 
This perforce brief account of a highly complex topic 
is required for any proper understanding of the process of 
human cognition. But in addition it is required here for an 
understanding of the illuminative operation of the virtue of 
faith.    For St. Thomas compares the illumination of faith to 
the role of the first principles as they depend upon the agent 
intellect. 
3    Language,   Concepts and Images in Direct Knowledge 
So far we have considered the process of cognition 
without any reference to the phenomenon of linguistic 
expression,,    There is a certain basis for this abstraction.    
Long before the human person learns to give verbal expression 
to his perceptions,  the intellect has been at work in 
apprehension and judgment.    Daily life is full of unverbalized  
"thinking-in-action." 62        Nursing an invalid,  driving a car,  
playing tennis,  painting a picture,  are not simply animal 
activities.    They involve a wealth of intelligent perception, 
judgment and creativity; yet this is rarely or at best only 
imperfectly verbalized.    Unverbalized understanding-in-
action plays a very important role in daily life.    It is what 
makes it possible for us spontaneously "to conduct ourselves 
as human beings,  to behave properly when we dine with others,  
when  we visit strangers.   It enables us to cross a street or to 
work. 63" 
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Nevertheless,  the fact remains that thought and 
language are intimately related.    Language both conceals and 
reveals beings.    The ability to express his understanding 
linguistically enables man to explicate the content of his 
perceptual judgments and to elaborate philosophy and the 
sciences.    But it can also conceal reality from man,  as 
happens when inappropriate linguistic conceptualization leads 
men to deny-explicitly those natural and immediate judgments 
that are essential to every meaningful activity. 
Language,  like thought and knowledge generally,   is 
primarily a social phenomenon; nevertheless,  it also enters  
into the process of personal learning and thinking, and so we 
must consider it here.    The functions of language are many 
and various; in general, however, three basic functions can be 
distinguished. 64    They are:   (1) "statement, " (2) "expression," 
and (3) "address."   As "statement" language states facts,  
describes things,  situation and events,  narrates sequences of 
events,  defines Intelligible natures,  gives reasons,  explains 
relationships.    As "expression" it reveals the personal 
attitudes of the speaker, his feelings, moral or esthetic 
judgments,  ways of viewing and interpreting the objects of his 
experience.    As "address" language evokes a response from 
the one to whom it is directed; it enlightens or confuses him,  
persuades or dissuades him,   commands or forbids him. Of 
course,  these functions never exist in an absolutely pure state; 
to some extent every statement exercises all three functions 
despite a tendency for one or another function to predominate.    
Likewise all  three can be found not only In dialogue but also in 
monologue. 65   I can objectify my knowledge in language to 
"inform" myself and to pass judgment on it,     I can express my 
feelings and opinions to myself in order to reflect on them.    
Similarly,   I can address myself in order to persuade myself to 
take a certain course of action or to make a certain judgment. 
Spontaneously we tend to think of language principally in terms 
of its informative function,   though statistically this function is 
probably the least important of the three.    Linguistic usage 
abounds in things like questions,   requests,   exclamations,   
interjections,   performative declarations (i. e..   formulas like "I 
pronounce you man and wife"), oaths,   promises,   "small talk, " 
etc. ,   in which the informative function is minimal,  whereas 
the expressive and appellative functions are paramount.         
In this thesis,  however,   it is principally the informative 
function that concerns us, since we are concerned with the 
psychology of cognition. Moreover, even the expressive and the 
appellative functions in order to accomplish their effect suppose 
that the listener understand the attitudes they express or the 
appeal which they make to him. They must, therefore, be 
perceived and interpreted, and in this way they have a peculiar 
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informative function of their own. 
Linguistic expression is not identical with the inner 
word, whether that be the concept,  the statement,   or a mental 
discourse. Rather language belongs to the order of corporeal 
expression; it consists in the verbal signs we formulate in our 
imagination and speak or write physically. 67   The words that 
we use in thinking are really symbolic phantasms (words in 
imagination) or symbolic physical realities (spoken or written 
words).    In fact,   the notion of language can be extended to 
include all forms of thoughtful expression,   even though these 
be not verbal.     Bodily gestures,  looks,   artifacts,   etc. ,   are all 
forms of language.    Such forms of expression play a very 
important role in supplementing verbal expression,  as is 
obvious in the case of demonstrative gestures like pointing out 
objects or directions. 68 
When we say that linguistic expression is distinct from 
the inner word we must be careful of falling into the naive 
notion that meaning somehow preexists its expression and that 
linguistic expression, therefore,   is a purely secondary 
phenomenon required to communicate the content of this pre-
existent meaning but adding nothing to the meaning itself.    It 
is true that the meaning that we express in words often,   if not 
normally,   exists in some other form of meaningful expression 
before it is given full linguistic expression.    Nevertheless,   
until it finds linguistic expression, its explicit content is 
minimal and,   for all practical purposes,   pre-conscious. 69
 By being spoken, meaning receives a new mode of being in 
us,   and this new mode of being,   though it is measured to some 
degree by the meaning which existed previously in some non-
verbal form of expression,   profoundly influences the direction 
of our further effort to appropriate and explicitate its content. 
Thus,   for example,   social conflicts and tensions existed in 
capitalistic society long before Karl Marx interpreted them in 
speech and writing. But the way in which he wrote about them 
sharpened and focused them and profoundly influenced all 
subsequent efforts to understand and to modify them.    Nearly 
every meaning can exist at least in a primitive fashion within 
one or another non-verbal form of expression,   i. e.  as a "lived" 
meaning,   but in some form or other every meaning knowable 
by man can be brought into the new mode of being which 
linguistic expression created.    As R.   Kwant notes: 
By being embodied in speech and especially by being 
expressed in a scientific way,  meaning is objectivized.     
This term indicates that a meaning which was originally 
only "lived, " which surrounded us as a kind of climate 
or sphere in such a way that our existence fused with 
it,  now becomes the object of our consideration.    We 
continued to live in that meaning,   but at the same time 
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we place ourselves at a distance from it.     This ob-
jectivation is a powerful means to help us seize that 
meaning,   to manipulate it.70  
We have already noted how the inner word,  be it a 
simple concept or a full statement or discourse,   necessarily 
falls short of expressing directly the full content of the 
intellect's grasp of reality and consequently must be 
complemented by an intuitive grasp of the unexpressed.     
With even greater reason does this condition hold for linguistic 
expression.    Not all forms of meaning are equally expressible 
in spoken language.    Anyone who has ever attempted to 
describe a remarkable experience that he has had should be 
aware of the ineffability of meaning.    In fact,   the more 
experiential a meaning is,   the more difficult it is to put it into 
words.    Therefore,  it is only in relation to the "lived" 
meaning that the spoken meaning has value.    When we forget 
the ultimate ineffability of meaning and regard the spoken 
meaning as the absolute norm of all meaning,  we distort our 
knowledge of reali ty -- often with disastrous consequences. 71   
For instance,   the Marxist attempt to force all of reality into 
the categories of dialectical materialism led to the absurd 
theories of Lysenko in biology. 
Language does not simply express conceptual 
meaning; it expresses the content of phantasms as well.    
Indeed,   concerning any statement it could almost be said that 
the subject term stands principally for the content of the 
phantasm.    In contrast the predicate term stands mainly for the 
content of the reflected concept, and the copula expresses the 
intuitive grasp of the being of the thing according to its proper 
mode of existence,,     Thus,  both the conceptual and the 
intuitive moments of intellectual knowledge find a common 
reference to the  phantasm. 72          At times,   in fact,   the 
principle role of linguistic expression can be to express 
phantasms.    Descriptive and poetic language is meant 
principally to express an experience,   not some abstract 
intel l igibility.     This is evident from the way in which,   when 
we read or hear a description or certain types of poetry,   we 
call up visual,   auditory and tacti le images of  the concrete 
reali ty described; the only intel l igibili ty directly expressed in 
such verbal  presentations is  the immediate  perceptual  
intel ligibil ity of the concrete data in question.73 
Since linguistic signs are physical conventional signs,   
they exist in the imagination in the form of  phantasms subject  
to controlled association.     Thus,   verbal phantasms can 
function in the cognitive process as shorthand symbols for 
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complex perceptual  realist ic phantasms.    In the sentence "my 
tr ip through Kentucky was a wonderful  experience," the  words  
"my t r ip through Kentucky" serve as  a vicar for the complex 
of remembered experiences that justify my evaluative judgment.     
Much as the abstract  symbols  of  algebra and calculus enable 
the mind to perform highly complex calculations which would 
be impossible in terms of numerical counting operations,   so 
also verbal phantasms enable the mind to deal with highly 
complex experiences and to bring to light further depths of 
meaning. 
Because linguistic expression symbolizes imaginative 
as well as conceptual elements in knowledge, it possesses a 
peculiar flexibility. The beginning physics student who 
formulates the judgment that "energy can be understood as the 
ability to do work" on the basis of a few kinetic experiments,   
possesses a true understanding of this principle.     But twenty 
years later,   when he expresses it as a mature scientist who 
has seen the principle verified in innumerable experiments,  he 
will possess a much richer understanding of the same linguistic 
statement.     The predicated conceptual meaning has not 
changed in itself; both statements focus upon the same 
intelligible aspect of energy,   its ability to do work.     But the 
mature scientist has seen the phenomenon of energy in many 
different forms and under many different aspects.     Over the 
years the phantasms built up to represent energy have become 
increasingly rich in actualized potential meaning,   whereas the 
phantasms in the novice were much more restricted in the 
extent to which their potential meaning had been actualized.    
Thus,   the phenomenon of profile and horizon noted earlier is 
found verified in the linguistic expression of predicated 
meaning.    Although only one intelligible aspect is here and 
now known explicitly,   the other aspects form a virtual back-
ground against which the salient intelligibility takes on new 
depth of meaning.     So true is this that although a true 
judgment always remains true, 
sensory and physiological conditions being equal,   a person who 
is continually broadening his experience in the realms of reality 
and knowledge and thus increasing the depth of potential 
meaning represented in phantasms never makes exactly the 
same judgment twice.74 
Linguistic expression can both fall short of and go 
beyond the actual state of our knowledge,,    Because meaning 
can pre-exist linguistic expression at least in an implicit and 
rudimentary manner,   we can become aware of the inadequacy 
of our expressions.     Thus,   the writer continually works over 
his manuscript until he is satisfied that he cannot make his 
point any more clearly.     Frequently,   however,   we say more 
than we actually know explicitly.    "The words we use,   the 
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language we speak and the structures we utilize,   contain 
latent forms of visions which do not entirely escape us but 
none the less are not wholly  understood. "75        Not 
infrequently later thinkers are able to know more about a 
particular philosopher than he knew about himself.    Aquinas 
certainly understood the import of  Aristotle's philosophy more 
deeply than did Aristotle himself .  
It  is  essential to note that although verbal phantasms 
can stand in place of the complex realistic phantasms,   they 
can never supplant the latter as the ult imate ground to which 
the conceptual moment of knowledge must be referred.    The 
concrete reality with its  proper mode or existence is  directly 
represented only in  a realist ic phantasm based upon 
perception.     The verbal phantasm is no more than a 
conventionally associated,   symbolic vicar.     Of itself it 
contains neither the intelligible aspects of the object  nor its 
proper modes of being. Ultimately,   therefore,  all conceptual 
and judgmental knowledge intrinsically demands a  return to 
some sort  of  real is t ic phantasm in  which  ei ther the object  
i tself  or  one of  i ts  effects is  directly expressed.  76 
4.     Conceptual and Intuitive Moments in Discursive Knowledge 
We have already noted that the perfection of human 
knowing is found in judgment,   for in judgment the conceptual 
and the intuitive moments of knowledge are so united that the 
statement represents the intelligible aspects of an object in 
their  proper mode of being in relation to that object     It  is in 
judgment that the intellect formally possesses truth.     We have 
seen that the reason for the act of judgment is that our 
intellectual light is t 'oo weak to know at once by a simple 
explicit intuition the substantial nature of the objects of  its 
perception and to grasp  a l l  at  once al l  that  is  at tr ibutable  to 
things as they exis t  in reali ty.77   To remedy this deficiency,   
the human intellect is obliged to proceed discursively,    using 
the truths already formally possessed to bring others to light.  
 
Reasoning is of its nature an incomplete act.78 designed 
to termi nate in an explicit  insight into an essence or a 
judgment of existence. 79    With respect to the principles from 
which it  proceeds,    namely the f irst immediate judgments both 
universal and perceptual ,    reasoning is the complementary and 
perfective activity of judgment,  for by means of reasoning the 
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indeterminate,   vague and virtual  truth of  the f irst  principles is  
gradually made determinate,    dist inct and actual in expressed  
insights and judgments. 80 
Although in the order of exercise judgment consists  in 
the l inking of statements in the form of  a syllogist ic or 
inductive argument,  neither the argument as a whole nor the 
conclusion arrived at constitute the objective term of the 
discourse.    Above all we must be wary of conceiving 
reasoning,   especially deductive reasoning,   as a way of cir-
cumventing immediate perception or as proceeding according 
to a purely intellectual inspection of the virtual content of 
abstract concepts.81   One must not identify the structure of 
logical relations in the syllogism with the psychological structure 
of the act of thinking discursively. As Edward Schillebeeckx 
aptly observes: 
  psychologically discursive thought is nothing else 
than the totality of experimental knowledge itself,  that 
is,   experience constantly growing but dominated by the 
total object which from the beginning was implicitly 
also part of the consciousness.    In the process of 
explicit proof,   one sees the original data in the light of 
implications which have been discovered both by 
reflection and by experimental knowledge.     These 
implications may appear as consequences,  but they had 
been present,   unnoticed, in the consciousness from the 
start     Thus development is always a passage from 
implicit to explicit consciousness,  but not the passage 
from a recognized principle to a fully new truth, 
deduced by a purely logical process and in no way 
present in the consciousness at the beginning.82 
Like judgment,   reasoning does not give new knowledge 
but a new mode of knowledge.    Its function is to make explicit 
the whole field of real relations that exist between real 
things, relations of cause and effect,   of concomitance 
and succession, of law and fact,   of harmony between 
parts of a whole,  between means and end,   finally of 
everything which,   added to the absolute unity of the 
real,    involves the thing in a plurality of relations or 
orders.83  
Just  as judgment has its foundation in the implici t 
awareness of the real mode of being of  the object represented 
in the phantasm upon which the intellect reflects its concepts,   
so also reasoning has its basis in the same implici t awareness.    
Out of this  awareness of the dist inction of the expressed and 
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the unexpressed emerges the question:   why, how is it  so or 
not so?   The aim of the reasoning process is not to "discover" 
the conclusion,  for  the conclusion pre-exists in the properly 
formulated question.    Rather,   the aim of reasoning is to 
discover a causal connection between the subject and predicate 
of the conclusion, to discover the middle term.    That is to say,   
the principal function of reasoning is explanation,  not 
revelation or even certification,   though  these may be by-
products.  84 
At this point i t  is necessary to introduce the notion of 
certitude. All judgmental  knowledge is either true or false,   
for  truth and falsi ty are properties of the statement.    In 
judgment,   therefore,  we come to know truth formally.    
Nevertheless,   our knowledge of truth in direct judgments 
remains to be completed by a reflex act by which we come to 
know the truth value of our direct judgments.     The name of 
this- reflex act  of  judgment  is  "assent" or  "dissent" and i t  has  
as  i ts  object  term the truth of a previous direct judgment,    
Regis observes:  
the role  of  the act  of  assent is  therefore to  regis ter  the  
inte l lect 's  approval  of  the truths presented to i t ,   
absolute or rela tive approval depending upon whether 
the truth in question is presented to i t  with guarantees 
of infallibi lity or with possibilities of bankruptcy.    
Also the function of dissent is to reveal the intel lect 's  
disapproval  in face of  error,   absolute  or relat ive 
disapproval depending upon whether the error is 
presented as identical with-the absurd or may possibly 
be changed into truth by means of modifications in the 
real that measures it.85  
Assent and dissent are two diametrically opposed judgments of 
the possible intellect. Since the intellect of itself is not determined to 
either the one or the other it must be determined by something outside 
itself .  Now there are only two agents which can determine the 
intellect; these are its proper object and the will. The following 
conditions therefore can arise: 
1. Sometimes the intellect tends neither to the one nor to the 
other,   either because of a lack of evidence,   e. g. ,   in those 
problems for which we have no reasons,   or because of an 
apparent equality of the reasons inclining to both sides.     
This is the state of one doubting, .who flutters between two 
contradictory positions. 
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2. Sometimes the intellect inclines more to one than to the 
other position,  but this inclination is not sufficient to 
determine it  totally to one of the positions.    Consequently it 
accepts the one position but continues to have doubts about 
its opposite. This is the state of one holding an opinion; he 
holds one of the contradictory positions but fears the other.  
3.   Sometimes the possible intellect is so determined that it 
adheres totally to one of the positions,    Sometimes this is 
due to the intelligible object sometimes to the will.  
a) To the intelligible object it is sometimes due 
mediately   at other times immediately.  
It is due immediately,  when the truth of the intelligible 
propositions appears immediately f rom the intell igible ob-
jects themselves.    This is the state of one understanding 
pr inciples  which are  known as  soon as their  terms are  
known.. . 
It is due mediately when, knowing the definitions of the 
terms, the intellect is determined to one of the positions by 
reason of first principles. This is the state of one knowing 
scientifically. 
b) Sometimes,  however,   the intellect cannot be 
determined to one or the other part either by the definitions 
of the terms,   as in the case of principles,   or  by reason of 
f irst principles.    Nevertheless it is determined by the will.     
The will  chooses to assent to one posit ion determinately and 
precisely because of something which is sufficient to move 
the will but not the intellect,  namely,  that it  seems good or 
useful to assent to this position.    And this is the state of 
one believing,   as in the case of one who believes the words 
of another man because it  seems proper or useful.  86  
To this l is t must  be added the special case of  experiential  assent given   
to direct  perceptual  judgments in the very act  of  perception.  87 
Taken formally,   certitude consists in the repose of the intellect 
in the possession of its good,   the truth as necessarily and self-
evidently true.     In all of the above mentioned states except the first,   
the intellect can possess the truth,   but only in the cases of 
understanding and scientific knowing and direct perception does the 
intellect possess the truth necessarily and self-evidently,   so that its 
natural desire for perfection is completely satisfied.    In belief,  
however,   there is a participated form of certitude,   namely conviction,   
which consists in the practical satisfaction that the commanded assent 
brings into action; it is a voluntary not an intellectual satisfaction. 88 
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The reason for introducing this excursus on certitude as a 
property of reflex judgment is to caution against an unconscious 
reduction of cognition to scientifically certain knowledge.   Certitude 
belongs to the perfection of knowledge but not to its essence.   The truth 
of opinion and faith is by no means compromised by the fact that it 
does not possess the perfection of certitude.   Likewise,  sensation and 
intellectual insight are real forms of knowledge,   even though they do 
not possess the perfection of formal truth which judgment would give 
them. By the same token discursive knowledge is not limited to 
scientific reasoning.  Our knowledge of reality is thoroughly permeated 
by discursive processes long before we engage in technical,   scientific 
and controlled reasoning.     Thus as Newman observed,   there is a 
natural, spontaneous,   non-technical,   implicit reasoning which underlies,  
often unconsciously,   the deliberate,   technical,   explicit reasoning 
which is used in conscious attempts to articulate one's position. 89 
Technical,  scientific reasoning is necessarily abstractive.   It 
attains certitude only by ignoring the contingent and particular aspects 
of beings in order to concentrate on universal and necessary truths. 
There is no "science" of the particular and the contingent,   only of the  
universal and necessary. 90   Even the phantasms which scientific 
reasoning makes use of take on a certain schematic character. 91   Also 
verbal phantasms play a very important role in scientific discourse, 
symbolizing,   as we have already noted,   the complex realistic 
phantasms which serve as the basis of the scientist's inductions and 
demonstrations.     Another kind of symbolic phantasm which plays an 
important role in scientific thinking is. the model phantasm.   Aspects 
and elements which cannot be directly perceived are represented in 
some sensible model bearing an analogous character.   Thus,  the 
composition of the atom is visualized as a planetary system or a wave 
model; light is conceived according to a corpuscular or wave model.     
Technical literature abounds in such models and analogies,   without 
which advancement to higher viewpoints would be virtually impossible. 92   
Nevertheless,   useful as such symbolization is in scientific cognition,   
it cannot,   as we have already noted,   replace the realistic phantasms by 
which we make contact perceptually with the concrete corporeal 
realities which are the proper object of human cognition in this life.     
The goal of scientific knowledge is always knowledge of an intelligible 
aspect precisely as it exists extramentally in the concrete existent 
singular.    In the words of St. Thomas cited earlier,   "the nature of any 
material thing cannot be known completely and truly except insofar as 
it is known as existing in the individual." 93 
5.     Concept and Image in the Knowledge of Immaterial Beings 
Discursive reasoning brings us to explicit awareness of a 
sphere of being which transcends the limitations of the material mode 
of existence,  for it comes to realize that material forms of being do 
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not find sufficient explanation in the causality of other material beings. 
By a negative judgment of separation the mind recognizes that being is 
not restricted to the material mode which is the proper object of 
human cognition. 94 
It is impossible in this life to form a positive quidditative 
conception of an immaterial being,  for the human mind naturally 
possesses no intelligible species except those derived from the 
material things represented in phantasms,,    And no matter how much 
one abstracts from materialized notes from material being,  it is 
impossible to arrive at a conception of immaterial being,    Aquinas' 
answer to Averroes1 theory that the notion of immaterial being could 
be abstracted from material being was that: 
this opinion would be true,  if,  as the Platonists supposed,   
immaterial substances were the forms and species of these 
material things.     But supposing on the contrary that immaterial 
substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material 
things,' it follows that,   however much our intellect abstract the 
quiddity of   material things from matter,   it could never arrive 
at anything akin to immaterial substance.95 
Moreover,   in this life even were such a quidditative species to be 
supernaturally impressed in the intellect,   the recipient could (without 
rapture) make cognitive use of it only by reflecting it in some sensible  
phantasm. 96   Consequently,  according to its present state of existence, 
the human intellect can know the existence and nature of immaterial 
beings only as a function of their perceptible effects.  Even its own 
immaterial being and operation is known by the intellect only as a 
function of an act by which it knows some material things in a 
phantasm.97 
Because the understanding of a material being is a perceptible 
effect which is fully proportionate to the power of his soul,   man can 
comprehend the immaterial nature and power of his own soul.     The 
perceptible effect of other immaterial beings, however,   is not 
adequately proportioned to their nature and power.98   Consequently,  man 
cannot form an adequate positive conception of immaterial beings even 
by the discursive process through which he becomes aware of their 
existence.     The fact is that we can know immaterial beings only by a 
simultaneous affirmation of their causal relationships to their sensible 
effects and a judgmental separation of their proper reality from the 
materialistic conceptions we form of them based upon their sensible 
effects.   The reason for this separative judgment is that 
 there is not a sufficient proportion between material and 
immaterial beings,   and as Dionysius says (Cael. hier. ,  ii) the 
likenesses drawn from material things for the sake of gathering 
some understanding of immaterial things are more unlike than 
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like.99 
Although true of all cognition of immaterial beings,   the soul and 
its powers and acts alone excepted,   this condition applies pre-
eminently to knowledge of divine things.     Created immaterial beings do 
not share the same natural mode of being as material things,   but they 
at least belong to the same logical category,   the category of substance, 
and according to this common aspect something positive can be known 
about them through comparison to material things.     God,   however, 
does not even belong to the same logical category as material beings; 
he transcends all categorization.   Consequently,   nothing positive can be  
known about his nature through material likenesses. 100 
In the Thomistic tradition after Scotus it has become common to 
speak of transcendental concepts as being derived from material things 
by abstraction but being predicable proportionately of both created 
and uncreated being.101  The abstraction by which they are obtained is 
not a perfect one such as would yield a univocal concept of immaterial 
being,  but an imperfect one.   The concept which results contains 
confusedly,   imprecisely,   and potentially the distinction between the 
two modes of be 
ing.102   It is,  therefore,  no longer formally a concept of a created being 
but only proportionately,  just as it is proportionately a concept of 
uncreated being.  In and by such transcendental concepts we know God 
directly though not perfectly.103 
In the post-modernist period,  however,  this thesis has come 
under heavy attack even from within the Thomistic school,  Space does 
not permit me to enter into the details of this discussion.   However,  in 
my opinion,  the best account of the way in which the concepts we derive 
from material things bear upon the divine is that given by Edward 
Schillebeeckx.104   According to Schillebeeckx1 interpretation of St. 
Thomas,   even the so-called transcendental concepts do not as such 
contain God even proportionately,   though they objectively signify him 
in being predicated of him    In themselves they remain created 
concepts; that is,  they represent a perfection as it is realized in its 
created mode.   But because this perfection is a participation of the 
perfection found really and essentially in God,  the creaturely content 
directly expressed implies the divine perfection; that is,  it objectively 
points in the direction of the divine realization.   In knowing God 
discursively as the cause of these perfections in creatures,   we know 
the divine perfection positively as lying in the direction indicated by 
the creaturely concept predicated. 
In other words,   the res significata exceeds the ratio 
concepti.105  God's own being is not contained in our concepts even 
proportionately,  but the content of our concepts is measured by the 
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divine mode of being.   This measure is not reciprocal:  creatures are 
like God,   but God is not like his creatures; 106  the proportion between God 
and the creature is not measurable,   for the difference between God and 
the. creature is infinite.107  Consequently, our notions can properly signify 
God, but not definitively or circumscriptively. "108   We do not possess 
any ratio corresponding to the divine perfection,   any proper concept of 
God."109 Thus, 
the act of signifying extends beyond the ratio nominis [ the 
a s pect of conceptual representation] ,  but it passes beyond 
this ratio in the direction which the conceptual content 
indicates,   in such a way that the reality is really seen,  but 
is not conceptually grasped.110 
As Schillebeeckx explains,  the creaturely content of the 
transcendental perfections,   objectively and of itself,   indicates only the 
direction in which God is to be seen.    God is outside our categories,   
but he is not "super-transcendental. " 
It is a question here of a positive content of cognition which 
objectively orients us toward the properly divine mode.     Our 
"concepts of God" actually delineate an intelligibility which 
nevertheless opens out onto the mystery.   The noetic value 
characteristic of our knowledge of God consists therefore in a 
projective act in which we tend toward God,  not comprehending 
him,  but knowing that he is located in the direction in which we 
tend. That is to say,   our knowledge of God is not a kind of blind 
shot into space.  God really lies in the perspective of the 
intelligible content of the "transcendentals," which thus point us 
positively toward God, even though we cannot positively locate 
him with any more precision within this defined perspective.I l l  
If Schillebeeckx' theory be correct,   it is clear that the 
knowledge of faith,  since it is concerned principally with divine things 
will be thoroughly permeated by this unique non-conceptual character.     
However,   in this thesis we are principally concerned with the relation 
of concepts to phantasms.    The special point about the knowledge of 
spiritual reality is that it must ultimately be rooted not in the model 
phantasms used to symbolize the intelligible content,   whether this be 
directly conceptual or not,   but in the realistic phantasms which 
represent the sensible effects of spiritual reality. 112   St. Thomas 
observes: 
The phantasm is a principle of our knowledge,   as that from 
which our intellectual operation takes its  start,   not as 
something passing away,  but rather as something persisting as 
a kind of foundation of intellectual operation    For phantasms 
are related to .the intellect as the objects in which the intellect 
views everything it sees,   either according to perfect 
representation or according to negation,   Manifestly we cannot 
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know God to be the cause of corporeal things or to exceed all 
corporeal things or to be without corporeity unless we imagine 
bodies  113 
It is true that knowledge of immaterial things does not terminate in the 
senses or the imagination as the physical and mathematical sciences 
do.     Phantasms are the source,   not the term of knowledge of 
immaterial beings.  The judgment is not formed according to the 
sensible representation,   but passes beyond it by way of causality or 
separation.114 
Thus,  St0 Thomas explains Boethius' statement that we come to 
know the divine form by the removal of all phantasms in the following 
manner.    Noting that we do have some sort of knowledge of the divine 
nature -- were this not true we could not know God's existence - - h e  
insists that this is not even the sort of indistinct quidditative knowledge 
we have of material things through recognizing their genus and 
differentiating them from other objects by their congeries of accidents. 
Instead,   in place of generic knowledge,  we know immaterial 
substances through negative judgments,   for instance when we 
see that these substances are immaterial,   incorporeal,  having 
no figure,   etc.    And the more negations we know concerning 
them,   for by subsequent negations earlier negations are 
contracted and determined,  much as a remote genus by 
differences   And in place of accidents,  we have,  in regard to 
immaterial substances,  their relations to sensible substances, 
either according to a comparison of cause to effect or according 
to a comparison of excess.115 
6.   Affective Experience and the Learning Process 
So far we have spoken only of the presence of the object in 
sense phantasms.    However,  there is another form of contact we have 
with reality,   namely,   affective contact.     In itself,   the affective order is 
distinct from the cognitive,   but by reason of the reflective ability of 
sensible awareness,   the cogitative sense,   and the intellect,   contact in 
affection can be virtually cognitive.116. 
Affective contact begets an experience of a very special sort. In 
cognition the object is drawn into the knower and acquires a new mode 
of being in the knower.    When the object of knowledge of itself exists in 
a lower mode of being than that of the knower,   it comes to exist more 
perfectly in the knower than it did in itself.     Thus,  material things 
receive an immaterial mode of being in sensible and especially 
intellectual cognition.    But when the object of itself exists in a higher 
mode of being than-the knower's,   its cognitive presence through the 
new mode of being it acquires in the knower is an impoverished one.     
That is,   as we have seen,   it simply is not contained in the impressed 
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likeness or concept by which it is known.     The opposite relationship 
marks the affective order.   In appetitive activity the subject is drawn 
out toward the object,   Thus,  if the object is of a lower order than the 
subject,   the subject's being is proportionately diminished.   But if the 
object is more noble,   the subject's being is expanded in being thrust 
out toward the object.   This phenomenon is empirically manifest.   Men 
who set high goals for themselves,  provided they be realistic goals,  
live a 
fuller life than those who settle into a routine dominated by a gross 
pursuit of food, drink and sex.117 
Since appetition too is a vital activity,  it too partakes of the 
interiority,   actuality and self-constructing character we already 
noticed with respect to cognition.    It too is a perfection of the being of 
the subject; it proceeds contrary to the law of entropy in the direction 
of ever-increasing actuality; and it makes the subject come to be in 
the presence of the object.    Since it is an inclination existing in the 
subject according to the subject's own mode of being,  it is capable of 
functioning as a medium of knowledge.    St. Thomas observes: 
now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode 
of existence.    Hence a natural inclination resides in a thing 
naturally,   and the inclination which is sensible appetite exists 
sensibly in the sensitive being.    Similarly,   the intelligible 
inclination,   which is the act of the will is in the intelligent 
subject intelligibly 118 
Now in appetitive activity,   just as in interior cognitive 
activity, there is produced a term,   a medium in quo for the thrust 
outward toward the object.     This term is not,   like the expressed 
species,   a likeness of the object; rather it is a thrust outward of 
the subject,   an impulsion,   a movement,  an aspiration. 119    We find 
a sensible manifestation of this term in the kinematic sensations 
we experience when we are emotionally stimulated,   e, g. ,  the 
impulse to attack something that angers one, to throw oneself into 
the arms of someone we deeply love,   etc. These physiological 
reactions are the language of appetite.  Through them we 
communicate with reality and with other persons quite as much as 
we do through cognition.  In the thrust outward toward the object,   
the object is presented though not represented,   and contact is  
made or strengthened. 120 
Of itself,  this process is dynamic not cognitive.121   But 
because of the presence of internal acts one to another,   it passes 
into cognition.  Because of the reflective ability of the internal 
sense and the intellect we become aware of our emotions.  But 
these movements lead out toward the object,   so that in becoming 
aware of the emotion we become aware of the object itself in a new 
and altogether unique way. 122   We experience it concretely,   
singularly and uniquely as good or evil.  The appetite moves out to 
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the object as good,  and the cognitive powers experience in this 
movement the goodness of the thing as truth and thus know it 
intimately in its being. 
The term of the affective knowledge begotten by this 
reflection is a value judgment, 123   The affective movement and its 
intrinsic term do not themselves terminate the act of affective 
knowledge,   rather they determine the judgment as a formal ratio,   
that is,   in the manner of a middle term in demonstration.    The 
internal term of affective knowledge is the evaluative judgment; 
the affection is its determining cause.   The object is known "in the 
light of being loved. "124 
The process of affective knowledge seems to be something 
of this sort.   The intellect together with the sensitive powers 
abstractively grasps a potential suitability of the object to fulfill 
and perfect the knower's being.    Drawn by this abstract likeness 
of the object as it is presented in speculative knowledge,  the will 
elicits an act of love. Thus,   the potential suitability of the object 
is actualized in the thrust of the person toward the object.    As the 
appetite reaches out toward the object in its real existence,   it 
establishes an active proportion between the person and the object 
of his love. 
Carried along by the dynamism of the will the intellect 
attains a new appreciation of the goodness of the object    
Instead of an abstract recognition,   there is now an actual 
esteem for it,  a savoring of the good in its concrete being.    
There is no new formality of the object revealed to the 
intellect,  but the formality previously known is now 
perceived with a greater realism and a deeper intimacy. 125 
The reason for this deepening of experience through 
affectivity lies in the fact that although the good of everything is 
constituted in its own being as caused by God,  this goodness consists 
formally in a relation to appetite,   so that an object is good formally and 
actually only insofar as it is the object of an actual appetitive inclination.     
Consequently,   the goodness of an object is revealed to man in its 
perfection only insofar as the thing is the object of actual appetition. 
It can only be known fully and formally as good if it is loved and 
precisely as it is loved.    Knowing is having the form of another 
as of the other,  and the goodness of an object is possessed 
formally by the knower only in the union of love.    Therefore 
only through love as a medium of knowledge can there be a real 
perception,   a savoring of the goodness of the object.126 
Affective knowledge is both experiential and non-conceptual.    It 
is very like the experiential knowledge of the external senses,   which 
.are in immediate physical contact with their object.    The presence 
 66
effected in affectivity is not an immediate physical presence,  for it is 
mediated by the affective union of the lover and the beloved,   but the 
presence of the beloved in this affective union,  as the act of love 
reaches out toward the object of  love in its  real existence and seeks 
immediate physical  possession of the object,   bears a strong likeness to 
immediate sense experience.  For the proper object of  affective 
knowledge is the thing loved precisely in i ts real  existence and 
concrete individuality.127  Affective knowledge,   therefore,  is even more 
truly non-conceptual than speculative judgmental knowledge.    Since the 
goodness of the object is intelligibly present to the intellect in the 
affective union of love,   there is no need for a representative likeness.    
And,   in fact, no representative l ikeness or concept can adequately 
express i ts  content.     This does not mean that concepts and phantasms 
play no role in affective knowledge; without them there would be no 
affection for the object,   for love follows knowledge.    But the new 
intimacy grasped in affective knowledge is not itself  expressed in the 
concept,  any more than the real mode of existence grasped in 
speculative knowledge is directly expressed in the concepts used.    It  is 
grasped in the concomitant and compenetrating affectivity which in the 
act of judgment the intellect explicitly unites with the conceptual 
moments of its knowledge.128 
Affective knowledge does not of itself yield any more than a 
more intimate and penetrating realization of the goodness and reality 
of the object known.    However,  by focusing the attention of the 
cognitive powers upon the object,   affective knowledge can incidentally 
give rise to a deeper speculative penetration of the object according to 
the usual mode of cognitive penetration.    This can happen especially 
with respect to the goodness of the object.129   Such penetration,  however,   
is no longer simply a matter of affective knowledge. 
Of course,  the intervention of affection into the cognitive order 
can have other effects too.    Since its effect is to intensify speculative 
value judgments and to render them more realistic,  the affective 
reaction can reinforce and intensify false as well as true judgments:   it 
can make false judgments seem so real that we become blinded to 
contrary evidence.    For this reason the sciences seek for objectivity 
and emotional detachment     Objectivity,  however,  has its own 
peculiar blindness.    Emotional detachment can be purchased only at 
the cost of replacing realistic by symbolic phantasms,   for the sense 
appetites react spontaneously to realistic phantasms.     Thus,   
detachment and abstraction go hand in hand.    In seeking complete 
objectivity one can lose not only the special sense of reality that the 
affective reaction gives,  but also,  the absolutely basic cognitive 
contact with the concrete reality as presented in realistic phantasms.    
The true goal of knowledge is not pure detachment but the penetration 
of true speculative judgment by affective evaluation. 
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7.   Provisional Summation and Orientation 
In the preceding sections we have attempted to inventory the 
various conceptual and experiential elements and moments which enter 
into the integral operation of human cognition.   We have seen how even 
in apprehension the conceptual grasp of particular intelligible aspects 
of material things is complemented by an implicit,   non-conceptual 
intuition of their concrete mode of being and of their unexplicated 
intelligible aspects,   the basis for this intellectual intuition being the 
return of the intellect upon the phantasm in which the object is 
represented. Next we saw how in judgment the intelligence of man 
explicitly unites these two moments of apprehensive knowledge so that 
it explicitly knows the object in its proper mode of being.    At that point 
we noted the role of language in thinking:   how it expresses both 
conceptual and perceptual content,  and how as a symbolic 
representation it must always be referred to perceptual experience of 
reality in realistic phantasms.    Then after noticing the relation of 
conceptual and intuitive moments in discursive knowledge defined 
principally by its explanatory function,   we considered the special 
relationships which exist between conceptual and non-conceptual 
moments in discursive knowledge of immaterial beings,   especially 
God.    Finally we noted how this structure can be permeated and 
intensified by the special effects which affectivity brings to cognition.    
Now it is time to relocate this structure within the context of socialized 
learning and to note how these elements and moments are modified 
when utilized by vicarious experience and taught interpretation. 
C. LEARNING THROUGH COMMUNICATION 
1.   Symbolic Communication of Meaning 
Most of our learning takes place through instruction rather than 
personal discovery.     From infancy the child is forever surrounded by 
teachers who endeavor to form his behavior and influence his thought 
Man is a communicative creature,  he creates meaning and 
communicates it with his fellow men.    Even animals have means of 
communication which they rely on extensively.    Studies in animal 
psychology have shown the important role learning plays in the 
acquisition of the necessary behavioral patterns among the higher 
animals.    Among men there are almost no innate behavioral patterns; 
everything must be acquired through social communication. 
There are many devices for teaching.    Physical skills are 
usually learned through being put through the motions.    A mother 
teaches her infant to eat with a spoon by putting the spoon in the child's 
hand, grasping the child's hand in her own and then guiding the child's 
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hand as it goes through the motions of picking up the food and carrying 
it to the mouth.    Similarly,   the golfing instructor shows the novice how 
to hold the club by forming the learner's hands around the handle so 
that he "gets the feel of it."   Showing is another important device.     
Before she puts the child through the motions with the spoon,   the 
mother has probably demonstrated the motion by performing the action 
herself and letting the child "see how it is done. ft   "Showing" is the 
primary means of teaching whenever it is a question of learning 
something other than a skill.     Parents "show" their child how soft the 
rabbit is by putting the rabbit in their child's arms so the child can feel 
it.    They point out the rainbow in the sky,   etc. 
Many things,  however,   cannot be learned by the simple proces-
ses of being put through the motions or being shown.    Whenever the 
operation to be learned is internal rather than external,   it is 
impossible to teach it by putting the learner through the motions 
directly.    It is impossible to put someone through the motions of 
thinking unless it be a question of the external expressions of thinking,   
e. g. ,  the procedures of counting.   Similarly,  one would not attempt to 
"show" a child how hot the stove is by burning his hand on it.    To 
surmount this obstacle,  we have recourse to symbolic forms of 
communication.    It is through symbolic communication that most 
teaching is done.    We describe and explain things and procedures in 
words,  pantomimes and diagrams. 
Symbolic devices for communication belong to that general class 
of objects we call signs.    Signs are relational realities.     They have as 
their function the manifestation of something other than their own 
ontological reality.     Symbols are distinguished from signals within the 
general class of signs.    Signals communicate only in the sense that 
they announce the existence of what they signify.    Smoke announces 
fire; a shout indicates danger; dark clouds announce an impending storm.     
The proper response to signals is action not thought,   whether 
imaginative or intellectual.    We stop at a red light; we take cover when 
dark clouds swirl overhead; we look out for our safety when we hear a 
shout,   Symbols,   on the other hand,   communicate meaning in a more 
proper sense; they stimulate thought not action.    If someone were to 
yell "Fire!" at this moment I would run for my life.    "Fire!" is a 
signal to act.     But in other contexts that sound is a symbol.    It evokes 
in my imagination a picture of the fires I have seen and calls to mind 
the understanding I have of the process of combustion.130 
Before going further,  we should note the existence of two kinds 
of symbolic communication and consequently of symbolic phantasms:  
representational or "iconic" and non-representational. 131   Diagrams, 
photographs,   onomatopoetic words,   etc. ,  belong to the category of 
representational symbols.    A diagram of itself is simply a series of 
marks on paper,  but those marks have been systematically arranged to 
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correspond to a schematic realistic phantasm of the thing represented. 
So too,  a photograph is of itself only a varicolored piece of paper; but 
through the mediation of optical and chemical agencies,   it bears a 
likeness in figure, shading and color to the object it represents.    A 
word like "buzz" is a schematic imitation of the sound it designates.     
On the other hand,   the vast majority of symbols especially verbal 
symbols are .non-representational.    Most flags,   for instance,  are 
non-representational,  their color-schemes and patterns being quite 
arbitrary.    Even words like "bumblebee" which may have originally 
been onomatopoetic have for the most part lost their representational 
character,  and the vast majority of spoken words seem never to have 
had any representational character.    Needless to say,   written words,  
at least in languages using the Roman and Greek alphabets,   are in no 
way representational. 
Representational symbols and their phantasms are in 
themselves actually meaningful to the extent that they actually 
represent the object signified.    Non-representational symbols,   on the 
contrary,  are actually significant only on the basis of association with 
representational realistic phantasms.    We learn the meaning of words 
by associating them with experiences of objects or with known symbols 
which have been associated with objective perceptions.    Thus,   the 
child learns the meaning of the spoken word "bread" by being taught to 
associate it with the reality he sees on the table and eats.    Later he 
learns the meaning of the written word "bread" by associating its 
visual appearance with the spoken word.132 
Recalling what we said earlier about the role of symbolization 
.in intellectual activity,  it should be clear that once I have learned the 
meaning of non-representational symbols through association of phan-
tasms,  the symbol itself is potentially intelligible.    When I see the flag 
of the United States,   I need not picture America,   or the Capitol or 
something of that sort; the flag itself is meaningful.    When I hear the 
word "fire, " I need not call up actually the complex of realistic 
phantasms associated with it.    In the verbal phantasm itself,  made 
actually intelligible by the illuminating action of the agent intellect,   I 
can understand the process of violent oxidization accompanied by 
release of energy in the form of heat and light.    The verbal phantasm 
here stands as a vicar for the complex of realistic phantasms which are 
the existential basis for my intellectual understanding. 133   For the 
perfection of my understanding,  however,  it will be necessary at some 
point to return upon the associated realistic phantasms in order to take 
explicit cognizance of that existential basis. 
2.   Verbal Symbols and their Interpretation 
Language is our principal means of communication,   even 
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though gesture,   facial expression,  visual aids,   etc.  do much to 
supplement and clarify the meaning carried by our words.    Of 
course words have many other functions besides symbolizing and 
communicating information.    We ask questions,  issue commands,   
give vent to feelings,   take oaths,   perform rituals,   engage in empty 
talk,   etc. ,   and in all of these activities we use words,   yet none of 
these communications are strictly speaking informative.134   Our 
concern at the moment,  however,   is with the informative function of 
words. 
At the outset we should note that the basic unit of linguistic 
communication is not the isolated word or sentence but the total 
"verbal image that is expressed in more or less complex sentences,   
sometimes reduced to a single word,  but always corresponding to the 
total expression or meaning.135..This complex whole is uttered and 
perceived over a period of time, however.  It is thus by nature discursive.  
In living dialogue it will be punctuated by questions and interjections,  
replies and repetitions. Despite this successive character of the 
elements of the verbal image, however,   its meaning is known by a 
single integral act which is gradually perfected as the perception of the 
words and the assimilation of theirrneaning progresses.  
The way verbal symbols are interpreted varies with the 
meaning they carry.  In general,  we can distinguish three kinds of 
verbal meaning:  descriptive,  explanatory,  and aphoristic. 136 
a.   Description 
When the meaning conveyed by the total verbal image is 
descriptive or narrative,   we spontaneously tend to convert the 
verbalized meaning into a more or less vivid picture of what is related.   
This is  the case whenever words merely symbolize concrete 
singulars.137   This conversion is the result of the spontaneous operation 
of both the intellect and the internal senses. 
The only thing that passes into my mind as I read a description 
of the Great Fire of London in 1666 is the visual appearance of the 
words used.    Nevertheless,  associated habitually in my imagination 
with those words are certain patterns of realistic phantasms,   
phantasms representing objects I have either experienced directly or 
have learned about through the descriptions of others.    At the same 
time the words themselves have an intelligible content for me.    Under 
the direction of the intellect which is guided by the intelligible content 
of the verbal signs,   the internal senses synthesize out of the 
associated realistic phantasms a more or less perfect representation of 
the events described. 
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This synthesis is not a random associative process.  It is 
directed by the intellect which relies on the intelligible content of 
the verbal phantasms as a rule for directing the associative 
process.   Thus, as the description continues,  the phantasm is 
gradually perfected:   mistaken constructions are corrected and new 
details are explicated. 138   Of course,   the resulting phantasm never 
perfectly reproduces the event exactly as it was perceived by the 
narrator.    It is simply beyond the powe.r of words to express 
everything that one actually knows. 
The effect of description or narration is very much like the 
experience of direct perception.    Of course, it never attains the full 
reality of a direct or a remembered direct perception.   But in the 
phantasm evoked,   the concrete datum is known in its existence in 
much the same way as the concrete object is known in a direct 
perceptual experience.     Thus,  the intellect can grasp particular 
intelligible aspects in this concrete representation and thematize them 
for itself.   The phantasms evoked by such descriptions can,  like the 
phantasms produced by direct perception,  be used as a basis for the 
abstraction of new intelligible aspects.   They can be integrated into 
perceptual experience to fill out the horizon of perception.    However,' 
the only intelligibility directly expressed is the immediate intelligibility 
of the concrete facts in question.   Reflecting on the reality phantasms 
the intellect understands "it is true that" or "it is probable that" or "it 
is possible that" the event occurred in this way. 139 
b.   Explanation 
When the meaning communicated is not concerned with concrete 
singulars but with abstract conceptual definitions and explanations,   
even if these should be concerned with particular things,  the synthesis 
of realistic phantasms is not so spontaneous.    Although in the direct 
process of knowing we discover such truths by seeing them revealed in 
highly complex realistic phantasms illuminated by the agent intellect, 
we have already seen how we tend to use symbolic phantasms,   whether 
words or model phantasms,   to think about them.   Thus,  the man who has 
learned the meaning of the definition "man is a rational animal" 
through the complex philosophical induction that manifests it,   grasps 
its full intelligible content in the verbal phantasm itself. 
We may ask,  however,  what kind of meaning such statements 
Iconvey to one who has never grasped the stated truth in the requisite 
realistic phantasms.    Several levels of meaning are possible.     The 
listener may grasp only the fact that the unknown meaning signified by 
the words is true.    He may learn to parrot the statement but it has no 
more than nominal meaning for him.    His knowledge is purely verbal.140   
A somewhat higher form of verbal learning occurs when the symbolic 
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meaning of the words is vaguely grasped.    Suppose someone ignorant of 
history were to hear the statement "Napoleon's downfall began when he 
invaded Russia. "   If this is all the person has ever heard of Napoleon,  
his history,   or Russia,   this statement will mean little more than:   
"Napoleon (an historical personage of some sort) invaded Russia 
(something apparently difficult to do),  and this (for some reason or 
other) led to a downfall (of some sort or other)." 141  Here too, there could 
be an intellectual assent to the statement,  but little or no real meaning 
understood,  for the listener has no reality phantasms to turn to.     Such 
purely nominal learning is very common,   especially when it is a 
question of learning abstract facts,   explanations and definitions;     The 
definition "man is a rational animal" is the result of a highly complex 
discursive philosophical investigation of the cause of characteristically 
human phenomena.    Yet,  it is known generally among philosophically 
unsophisticated people who probably understand .by it little more than 
that man has a body with legs,  arms and hair, and that in the most 
ordinary sort of way he can "think.".    This is a kind of pseudo-
learning,  for the listener thinks he understands the meaning of the 
statement whereas in fact he does not.   Here too, there can be real 
assent given to the truth of the proposition with little or no assimilation 
of meaning, because of the lack of the requisite realistic phantasms. 
Quite contrary to these forms of verbal learning is the learning 
that takes place when the listener either already possesses or is able 
to synthesize and organize the realistic phantasms required to 
understand the real meaning of the communication.    Thus,   the historian 
who over the years has read many accounts of Napoleon's career,   who 
has walked over the battlefields,   or seen them in pictures,  who has 
come to understand the complex causes that led to the invasion and the 
subsequent downfall is able to grasp the real import of the statement 
that Napoleon's downfall began when he invaded Russia.    Not only does 
he assent to the truth of the proposition but he understands the 
significance of the statement     But even a novice historian,   who has not 
yet come to understand the causalities involved,  but who has read 
enough to picture the terrible events of the invasion and the retreat, 
has an imperfect real understanding of the significance of the terms.   
Such is the case whenever it is a question of simple descriptive 
knowledge.   In the realistic phantasms evoked by the words, the 
intellect apprehends concretely the intelligible natures and the being of 
the objects represented without proceeding to any generalization or 
explanation.143. 
Between these various levels of assimilation of meaning there is 
a certain continuity.   The unintelligible definition becomes nominally 
intelligible for me as I begin to find real referents for its terms.   As I 
continue to reflect on it in the light of the context I gradually form a 
realistic image of the subject of discussion and begin to grasp the 
intrinsic intelligibility of this object; thus,  the sentence begins to take 
on meaning for me.   As I continue to reflect I penetrate ever more 
deeply into the meaning of the statement,  uniting more and more 
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phenomena in the complex phantasm which serves as the instrument of 
my understanding.   The interpretation of philosophical texts offers 
striking examples of this gradual penetration of the meaning of a 
statement. Martin Heidegger,  for instance,  tells how time and again he 
worked his way through Franz Brentano's dissertation On the Manifold 
Sense of Being in Aristotle which opens with a cryptic quotation from 
Aristotle: tò òn légetai pollach~os , translated by Heidegger as "A being 
.becomes manifest (sc.   with regard to its Being) in many ways."   In 
that cryptic phrase he was to find the determining direction of his 
thought.144 But this process of gradual assimilation of the meaning of a 
verbal communication is by no means confined to philosophy.    It 
permeates all communication situations, for, as we have already noted, 
it is impossible to express directly and explicitly in a single sentence the 
full meaning one intends to communicate. 
It is important to note two differences between the 
processes of learning through descriptive and through explanatory 
verbal presentations. 
The first difference concerns the process of imaginative 
representation.    In descriptive communication,  the text itself,   as we 
have seen,   guides the synthesis of. the appropriate realistic phantasms 
which represent the concrete object under discussion.    In explanatory 
exposition,  however,  the text itself does not guide the synthesis of 
realistic phantasms.    Rather,   it supposes that the listener is already 
sufficiently familiar with the object under discussion, either through 
personal experience or through the assimilation of descriptions of the 
object.  If the listener does not already possess this experiential 
knowledge,  no .amount of repetition or conceptual clarification of the 
purely abstract, explanatory message will avail to communicate the 
meaning.   This is why it is essential for the teacher who would 
communicate a conceptual interpretation of some phenomenon or 
procedure to supplement his exposition by pointing out concrete 
examples in the experience of the listener and by describing objects 
with which the listener would not otherwise be familiar.     By doing so 
the teacher guides his listener to synthesize or recall the appropriate 
realistic phantasms in which the student himself comes to see the 
intelligible meaning emerge.    This is why visual aids are so important 
in any conceptual communication.    Whenever it is a question of 
imparting a conceptual interpretation of some phenomenon,  the aim of 
the teacher must always be to so organize the realistic phantasms of the 
student that under the illumination of the student's own agent intellect,  
the student himself sees the intelligible meaning of the phenomenon 
represented and gives his own conceptual expression to it.145 
"     That brings us to the second difference between the kinds of 
learning that take place through descriptive and expository verbal 
presentations. 
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When it is a question of learning through descriptive 
presentations,   we express our understanding immediately in the 
realistic image into which we convert the verbal image.    Although it is 
natural for us to communicate our knowledge of concrete,   individual 
objects in words, we do not spontaneously think about them in words.    
Although the words we use may serve as highly symbolic vicars of 
complex representative phantasms rich in potential meaning,  for 
example,  the word "man" to a psychologist or anthropologist,  when 
they are used in strict factual description,  they point to the concrete 
object in question and not to the complete complex of phantasms which 
grounds the full intelligible meaning they are capable of representing.    
When the psychologist says that the man next-door is intelligent,  he 
signifies directly the concrete man who lives next-door and not the full 
complex of phantasms representing the many men whose observed 
activities form the basis of his scientific inductions about the nature of 
man.     The meaning grasped in this concrete image is analogous to that 
found in direct perception in which we know sensible objects 
immediately present to us,  i. e. ,   "we remain directly aware of the 
object,   even though an idea of it is conceived in the composite sensory-
intellectual act of perception (usually judgmental)." 146 
On the other hand,  when it is a question of learning abstracted 
.intelligible meanings by assimilating expository verbal presentations, 
we not only actually or virtually elaborate realistic phantasms in which 
the intelligible content is apprehended and judged,  but we reexpress 
our intellectual understanding by stating it again in our own words and 
models.   The process here is the same as the one which takes place 
when we give linguistic and symbolic expression to insights acquired by-
personal discovery,,   This re-statement enables us to take reflective 
possession of the intelligible content of the message as we have 
understood it and,   therefore,   to check our understanding with the 
source. Thus,   the student enters into dialogue with the teacher.    This 
dialogue by which we check the accuracy of our understanding of the 
message is most clearly evidenced when it is a question of two living 
persons present to each other and conversing with one another,  whether 
inside or outside the classroom.    But it is found analogously even when 
it is a matter of reading a written communication from someone who is 
not present and available for questioning. 
'     Without this re-statement of one's understanding of an 
expository communication,  learning remains implicit and imperfect.    
It is not enough simply to parrot back the words of the teacher,  as an 
extreme dogmatism demands.   On the contrary,  the assimilation of 
intelligible .content demands that the listener interpret the 
communication in terms of his own vocabulary and conceptual system.   
Only in this way can he take reflective possession of the message.   
Likewise,   it is only in this way that the teacher can judge whether the 
student has actually grasped the meaning he intended to communicate. 
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c.   Aphoristic or value statements 
We have seen that verbal description corresponds roughly to 
perception in the direct process of learning and that verbal exposition 
corresponds to conceptual understanding in the direct process.   The 
third type of statement we have to consider corresponds generally to 
the evaluations of affective knowledge.    Consider,  for instance,   the 
statement "democracy is the government of free people. "   In the 
context of a textbook on political science,  this statement might have 
mere expository value,   serving as a definition of a certain form of 
political organization.    In that case its understanding would suppose 
that the listener had sufficient experience of the various forms of 
political system denominated by the word "democracy" to see that the 
statement offers at least a reasonably accurate definition.    As used, 
however,   in a newspaper editorial or a political speech,   it is loaded 
with affective connotations.    In the vocabularies of both communist 
and capitalist systems of economic and social organization,   the words 
"democracy" and' "government of free people" are value terms 
expressive of an attitude of intense approval,  but concrete referents 
and intelligible content of these terms in the two systems stand poles 
apart. 
The meaning communicated through aphoristic statements is 
principally the attitude of the speaker.   Thus, in aphoristic discourse 
the words used may be cut off completely from their conventional 
denotation.   The word "science," for instance,   generally denotes some 
kind of disciplined body of knowledge.    By reason,  however,   of its use 
in the controversies between humanists and believers,  it has come to 
symbolize for some humanists true knowledge as opposed to religious 
myth, whereas for some believers it means a false form of knowledge 
which challenges religious belief.147   Any area of communication which 
touches man's basic concerns,   e. g.,   religion,  politics,   ethics,   etc. ,   is 
bound to be full of such aphoristic expression.    The recent history of 
the Church's encounters with the modern world is full of such 
aphoristic usage,   for example,   the usage of terms like "modern," 
"science," "freedom, " "aggiornamento, " 
The interpretation of such aphoristic statements demands that 
the listener grasp not so much the meaning directly denoted by the 
words themselves,  but rather the emotional attitude of the speaker and 
the realistic phantasms together with their intelligibility that the 
speaker himself has in mind.     Just as in abstract exposition,  the terms 
used offer no effective guide to the synthesis of appropriate realistic 
phantasms,   so also in aphoristic discourse the words used offer little 
help in grasping the real object of the speaker's evaluation.   This must 
be obtained from the context of the aphoristic statement, e. g.,  the 
occasion which provoked it,  the habitual attitudes of the speaker. 
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3.   Signification and Attestation in Verbal Communication 
As we have seen,  it is possible in assimilating the meaning of a 
verbal communication to penetrate to depths of meaning that the speaker 
himself either did not grasp or did not mean to communicate.    
Illustrations of this phenomenon are numerous.    A patient tells the 
doctor her symptoms,   the doctor realizes that she has cancer.    A 
brilliant disciple understands the words of his teacher better than the 
teacher himself does.     These are examples primarily of deeper 
intellectual insight. But it is possible for there to be a richer phantasm 
content too.    A reporter gathering the testimony of many 
eyewitnesses forms a richer imaginative representation of the event 
than any of the individual witnesses possess,   though their particular 
impressions will be more vivid.    Hence,  when he listens to the 
testimony of other witnesses,  he truly sees more than they do.    We may 
ask,  therefore,  what relation this deeper meaning has to the act of 
communication. 
Edward Dhanis148  suggests that we must distinguish two aspects of 
communication:   signification and attestation,    So far,  we have been 
concerned principally with signification.  When they are externally 
expressed in speech or writing,  words take on a kind of objective 
character.     They become public property.    They become detached to 
some degree at least from the situational and verbal contexts and the 
field of private meaning.149   They cease to be dominated by the speaker.  
As uttered by the speaker they gave expression to a meaning which was 
larger than what the words immediately denominate.   That larger 
meaning may or may not be grasped by the listener.     On the other 
hand,- the same words as-understood by the listener may contain more 
meaning than the speaker himself grasped.   The meaning that the words 
have for the speaker and the listener is their signification. 
Signification may be either direct or indirect,   expressed or 
implicit.    If I should say "Bernard has written a fine poem today, " I 
directly or expressly signify only that a certain person named Bernard 
has composed a literary piece of a certain type and quality.   But to me, 
Bernard is not some indeterminate person; he is a friend.    I have read 
his poem,   I know its theme and the way it develops; I know the 
experience that inspired it,  and I know the reaction it evoked from me.    
I know the talent and the work that went into its composition.    All this 
is part of the indirect or implicit signification,  part of its connotation.   
To another mutual friend,  most of this implicit signification is 
immediately accessible,   being supplied in the phantasms evoked by my 
words in context    Even a stranger,  however,   can understand more 
than the direct signification.    He can surmise that Bernard is a man,  
that he is an acquaintance of mine,  that he has a certain amount of 
intelligence and literary talent.     From the point of view of the listener,   
therefore,  we can distinguish two forms of indirect or implicit 
signification.     One is immediate,   known by an immediate perception 
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in the phantasms called up by the statement.     The other is mediate or 
virtual,  it supposes the intervention of discursive reasoning based upon 
intelligible relationships,   e. g. ,   that "Bernard" is a masculine name,   
that the composition of poetry demands talent and intelligence,   etc.    
Note that in the example .given,   the mutual friend knows the same 
things as the stranger; but the mode of knowing differs in the two cases.    
The implicit signification of the statement is known by the mutual friend 
in an immediate,   experiential mode; it is known by the stranger in a 
mediate,  discursive mode. 
As used here,   signification is defined by the meaning potentially 
understandable in the words taken in context,   it refers to the meaning 
the recipient of the communication is able to perceive in the statement. 
Attestation,   on the contrary,   is defined by the speaker's intention to 
communicate.     The phenomenon of attestation is most clearly evident in 
legal proceedings,   where a witness is called to guarantee the truth of 
his declarations,   but it is common in all human communication. 
Attestation may be formal or virtual.   One formally attests to 
what he intends to communicate,  what he asks his hearers to 
understand and accept    In saying that "Bernard wrote a fine poem, " I 
formally attest at least to what is directly denominated by my 
statement. But what of the connotations,  the truths immediately or 
mediately implied in my statement?   Do I mean to communicate them,   
to attest to them?   I may or I may not.    If I intend to communicate the 
implicit as well as the explicit content of my statement,  then this 
implicit content is part of my formal attestation.    To take another 
example -- suppose I say to an acquaintance that I think saturation 
bombing of cities is manifestly unjust and cannot be justified    Seeing 
the implications of my statement,   he replies,   "Do you mean to say that 
we should not have bombed the German cities in World War II?"   
"That's exactly what I mean, " I reply.     My reaffirmation of the content 
of my first statement adds nothing to it.    In my first statement I had 
already formally intended to communicate the conclusion implicit in my 
statement. 
Virtual attestation is strictly speaking not attestation at all,   for 
it does not fall within the perimeter of meaning intended to be 
communicated,    Nevertheless,   insofar as it is truly and certainly 
implied in what is objectively said,   it participates in the attestation of 
the original statement.     Legal practice recognizes the reality of virtual 
attestation by excusing a defendant from answering questions which,   by 
their implications,  might tend to incriminate him.    Virtual attestation 
need not be against the intention of the speaker as in the case of self-
incrimination.    It is sufficient that it fall outside the speaker's real 
intention,   even though he may not be unwilling that the truth be known. 
The case can even occur in which the speaker is happy the truth is 
known, though he did not will that it should be revealed through his 
statement. Thus,   someone bound to secrecy might quite innocently state 
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some fact which in the light of other known facts reveals the identity of 
a criminal to the authorities.    Insofar as his statement is responsible 
for the deduction of the identity of the criminal,  the speaker has 
virtually-testified to it.    But since it was not his intention to reveal the 
secret, even indirectly.,  his testimony is not formal. 
Since formal attestation is determined by the speaker's intention 
to communicate,  the manner in which the hearer grasps the meaning 
intended makes no difference.    Thus,  formal attestation can attach 
indifferently both to explicitly and to implicitly signified meanings and, 
among the latter,   both to immediately and mediately implicit meanings. 
All that is required for the inclusion of implicitly signified meaning is 
some evident manifestation of the intention to attest to it.    Usually such 
evidence is given by the context,   gesture,  tone of voice,   etc.    Thus,   in 
the example cited,   the fact that I placed great stress on the unjust 
character of saturation bombing of cities,  indicating my attitude by my 
gestures,   facial expression and tone of voice,   would reasonably be 
construed as an indication that I formally intended my listeners to 
conclude that I thought we should not have bombed the German cities. 
A little reflection will reveal how common formal attestation of 
implicitly, signified meaning really is in daily life.150   The husband 
whocomes home from work and tells his wife that he has just had a 
terrible day at the office formally intends that she draw certain 
conclusions about how she should treat him that evening.     The 
unfinished sentences that play so large a role in informal conversation 
-- sentences left unfinished because the listener has obviously gotten 
the point -~ are a very common form of such attestation,  likewise,  the 
impatient "you know what I mean", with which we bring to an abrupt end 
those involved explanations that we cannot otherwise bring to a 
satisfactory conclusion. 
4.   Belief,   Understanding and Assent 
The reception of any verbal communication has two phases,  a 
phase of interpretation and a phase of judgment    The interpretive 
phase has as its goal simply the grasping of the meaning of what was 
said.     The interpretive phase itself is composed of apprehensive and 
judgmental moments.    The listener forms phantasms and concepts to 
grasp the meaning of the terms; as the communication develops he 
checks these against the new data being presented.    Thus,  the complex 
of phantasms and concepts is gradually corrected and refined through 
judgments determining their conformity to the symbolic meaning 
expressed in the verbal phantasms and illuminated by the agent 
intellect. The aim of such judgments,  however,   is simply to determine 
whether or not the listener has grasped the intended meaning of the 
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communication. Hence,   these judgments remain within the interpretive 
phase. 
In the judgmental phase proper,  what is in question is no longer 
the relation of the assimilated meaning to the intended meaning but of 
the intended and assimilated meaning to reality.    Of course,  these 
phases are not ordinarily temporally successive.    Because of the need 
to make use of realistic phantasms in the interpretive phase,   
comparison of the assimilated meaning with the intelligible content of 
the phantasms comes spontaneously.    In the course of assimilating any 
communication,   we tend,  therefore,  to make spontaneous but 
provisional value judgments of the truth or error of the communicated 
meaning.     These judgments are the same sort of reflex judgments 
that perfect the judgments we make in direct learning,  namely,  the 
reflex judgments of assent, opinion, belief, suspicion or doubt {in reality 
the withholding of judgment). 
We have already noted how these reflex judgments enter into 
direct learning; now we must consider them as they are involved in 
communicated meaning.  Sometimes when we have understood a verbal 
communication, its truth or falsity is so evident in the phantasms and 
conceptions that we have elaborated that we give immediate 
intellectual assent or dissent to it,  just as we would to the same truth 
acquired by personal discovery.     Such is the case when we listen to 
statements of primary universal principles like "the whole is greater 
than the part, " etc. ,or follow with real understanding the course of a 
scientific argument, e. g., the proof of a mathematical theorem. 
Most communicated meanings,  however,  are not so evident. 
Where the intrinsic evidence is not sufficient to manifest the truth of 
the statement,   that is,   when the realistic phantasms evoked are not 
clear enough to reflect the conceptual meaning of the verbal phantasms, 
or when the accuracy of the realistic phantasms cannot be guaranteed 
by direct perceptual experience, either present or recalled,   it remains 
possible to assent to the truth contained in the statement on the basis of 
the authority and credibility of the speaker.    Such is the case in belief. 
The object of belief is the intended meaning of the statement,  not the 
meaning here and now apprehended. 
It may happen that meaning actually apprehended may be no more 
than that the statement means something (whatever that something may 
be) and,  that the statement as such is true because it is attested by the 
authority of the speaker.  Thus, the beginning philosophy student who 
learns the distinction,  "Conceptus formalis est productum mentale seu 
idea prout consideratur ut quaedam entitas quae in mente et a mente 
producitur,    Conceptus autem objectivus est producti mentalis 
contentum seu significatum,  i. e. ,   idea prout consideratur ut 
repraesentatio vel imago alicuius rei, " may have not the slightest 
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notion of even the nominal meaning of the statement.    Nevertheless,   to 
the extent that he has learned the formula,  believing it to be true,  he has 
implicitly appropriated its objective meaning. 
Later, in the silence of his room he turns over the unfamiliar 
words in his mind.    Painstakingly he traces their grammatical 
connections'until he finally begins to realize at least the nominal value 
of the statement.  Driven on by his conviction that the statement is 
meaningful and true,  he uses this nominal meaning to discover, in the 
fund of his experience, the phenomenological foundations of the 
distinction,  He is thus now .on his way to real understanding.  Organized 
and refined progressively by the intellect's understanding of the nominal 
meaning of the formula, the phantasms representing this experiential 
basis for the distinction gradually become luminous by the proportionate 
illumination of the agent intellect.  Through them the student begins to 
see, i.e. understand, the distinction.    At first his knowledge is vague and 
indistinct,  and it may even be mingled with deceptive representations,  
as,   for instance,  when the student using physical models to express his 
dawning insight begins to imagine the formal and objective concept as 
two separate,   quasi-physical entities.    Provided,  however,  he does not 
settle upon such an imperfect understanding in a judgment - - a  judgment 
which would be erroneous,   and continues to be guided by his belief in the 
objective meaning of the statement and not simply his partial 
understanding,  he remains in possession of truth,  albeit an imperfect 
possession through belief. 
Finally,   if he continues the process of thinking long enough and 
is intelligent enough,  the student finally acquires sufficiently refined 
phantasms to enable him to judge the truth of the statement upon intrin-
sic evidence.     Thus,  his belief finally gives way to full assent     The 
words of his teacher have finally become his own.    If he should cite 
them in an article he writes or a talk he gives,  his reference to his 
source will no longer be an appeal to extrinsic authority as it would 
have been earlier; instead,   it would be a simple expression of indebted-
ness for an appropriate expression. 
This analysis suggests that we should distinguish two very dif-
ferent forms of the appropriation of truth through belief.    In one form -- 
we might call it "pure faith" -- there is no understanding,   only belief.    
Hearing the statement,   the listener believes it to be true,  but knows 
only that it means something; what that something is he does not know.    
In the other form -- we might call it "faith-understanding"  --the listener 
believes the statement to be true and understands to some extent what it 
means,  but his understanding is not clear enough to reveal its intrinsic 
truth.    We shall now examine more closely how the believer 
appropriates the truth in these two different forms of belief. 
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a.   Pure faith 
In this case the believer does not know what the statement means, 
but he does know that, whatever it should mean, as a statement it is true.  
Consequently,  he knows implicitly and intuitively:   (1) that if this 
statement is true, nothing irreconcilably contradictory to it can be true 
and,   (2) that in striving to penetrate the truth of the statement he will 
come to true knowledge of the reality under discussion.    In this 
intuition there is real knowledge,   but it is a practical knowledge 
referring to the mind's desire for true knowledge and the dynamism of 
the activity by which it pursues such knowledge.151   Such practical 
intuition,   expressed in the dynamism of the pursuit of truth plays a 
very important role in knowledge through belief.    It is the spur and the 
guide to the progressive assimilation of truth.    Formally, however,  this 
intuition does not refer to the truth of the meaning the believer seeks 
to grasp; rather,  it refers to the truth of the activity by which the 
believer seeks to grasp it. 152 
b. Faith-understanding 
The basis of real understanding,  we have already noted,  lies  in 
the ability to correlate the meaning verbally expressed with the 
phantasms which embody the reality about which the words speak.    
This correlation will often be a gradual process.    In this process the 
practical intuitions regarding the dynamism of the believer's search for 
meaning continue to operate,  but something more is added.    As the 
believer begins to elaborate appropriate realistic phantasms and to see 
the conceptual meaning of the statement as emerging from these 
phantasms and reflected in them,  the believer comes to an implicit 
intuition of the real meaning of the statement.  This intuition is very 
similar to that found in the non-conceptual moment of knowledge of 
immaterial and divine realities through their imperfect material 
representations.     The believer knows that the truth of the statement 
lies along the line of vision opened up by his imperfect imaginative and 
conceptual representations,   though,   in fact,  he does not see exactly 
what that truth is or why it is true. 
The difference between these two forms of appropriation can, 
therefore, be stated in this fashion.   In pure belief,  the appropriation of 
truth is really not cognitive in the strict sense; it consists formally in 
the dynamism of the process by which the believer seeks the truth.    It 
is cognitive only in a secondary and practical sense, i. e., the believer 
knows that, by pursuing this activity, he is approaching the truth.  On the 
contrary, in faith-understanding,  the appropriation of truth is truly 
cognitive.  It consists in a real implicit intuition of the objective 
meaning of the statement in and through phantasms and conceptions 
that only very imperfectly represent that meaning. 
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5.   The Scientific Elaboration of Understanding in Belief 
Human cognition is thoroughly permeated by belief.  Belief is 
the foundation of the historical sciences.153   Much,   of course,   can be 
gleaned by discursive reasoning from archeological evidence,  but 
documentary evidence remains the principal source for historical 
knowledge.154   Even in the empirical sciences,  however,  belief plays 
its part.    Scientists do not personally verify every discovery or 
theory of their colleagues.    Unless they have reason to call a point 
into question, they rely on the work done by other reputable 
scientists.    So it is in all the professions:   doctors rely on the work 
of biochemists and pharmacologists; engineers rely on the work of 
theoretical physicists; etc. 
The dynamism which results from the man's innate appetite for 
true and evident understanding gives rise in the believer to a process of 
thinking within belief.    The believer wants to see what he believes,   to 
see why it is true and to see its implications; so he thinks about what he 
believes in an effort to approach these goals.    St.   Augustine actually 
defined believing as "thinking with assent.ft 155   Approving this traditional 
definition, Aquinas explained that "thinking" (cogitare) properly refers 
to the kind of investigative consideration which the mind engages in 
before it has attained to the full perfection of understanding in the 
certitude of vision.156   What distinguishes belief from other forms of 
thinking is that the mind firmly adheres to the truth about which it 
thinks, eve-n though it lacks the certitude that vision or demonstration 
would give it.157 
The thinking and reflection which belief stimulates is 
spontaneous and often quite non-reflexive.   But it can also be 
undertaken in a methodical and reflexive way.   In this way it is possible 
to develop a "science" of belief.   One can make use of critical methods 
to evaluate the authority of the various witnesses,  to investigate the 
influence of their personal convictions on their testimony,  to interpret 
and to correlate their various testimonies into an integrated picture.   
One can also turn these critical methods on the object presented in 
their testimony.   The historical sciences,  for instance,   study both the 
testimony of the various witnesses and the culture and history they 
present.   On the basis of belief in the authenticity and authority of the 
various witnesses and their depositions,  the historian traces the 
various influences at work in the culture,  the effects of critical events 
on subsequent historical and cultural developments, etc. 
The products of this thinking within belief,   whether it be 
spontaneous or methodical,   can be related to the basic state of 
belief in a variety of ways.    Sometimes it is simply a matter of 
understanding the meaning expressly stated.    Thus,  the thinking that 
the beginning philosophy student engages in as he attempts to 
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penetrate the meaning of the statement of the relationship between 
formal and objective concepts was designed to enable him to 
appropriate the express meaning of the statement.   Often,  however,  
whether intentionally or not,   this thinking in faith leads to an 
explication of what was only implied in one way or another in the 
original statement. 
In the light of what we noted earlier about attestation,   the 
express meaning of the statement clearly falls within the order of 
formal attestation and, therefore, the assent given to the explication 
of this meaning is the same as that given to the statement itself.  A 
meaning implicit in the statement, however, may or may not be 
formally attested.  If it is formally attested,  it belongs formally to 
the belief that the listener gives to the speaker's statement.  Thus, in 
the example used earlier of someone concluding from my assertion 
on the morality of saturation bombing that we should not have 
bombed Dresden and  Hamburg,   the man who drew this conclusion 
would (assuming he did not fully understand the truth of the 
principle) hold the conclusion on my authority and it would be part 
of his formal belief in my statement. On the other hand,  if the 
conclusions the listener draws do not fall within the ambit of the 
formal attestation,  they are known in virtue of  the l istener 's  belief  
in the statement,  but  are not formally part  of  his belief.  Thus, were 
my auditor to conclude from my statement that the political and 
military leaders responsible for the bombing of Dresden and 
Hamburg should have been prosecuted as war criminals,  he would 
know this conclusion only in virtue of his belief in my principle, but 
his conclusion does not formally belong to this belief,   since it was 
not my intention to communicate it. 158 
Note that we have spoken here in logical terms,  but we must 
recall what was said earlier about the difference between a logical and a 
psychological approach to discursive reasoning.  The analysis indicated 
above would apply quite as much to aspects of the reality which were 
not directly expressed in the words themselves but became evident in 
the phantasms synthesized in the imagination in the process of 
interpreting a description.    When someone tells me that Chicago is 
buried in three and a half feet of snow,  I don't  have to go through a 
process of formal verbal reasoning to see how the snow is piled up in 
the backyard of my parent 's home and how it covers the flowerbeds and 
the fence.   Reflexively,  I may later check my perception by resorting to 
formal reasoning or by checking my imagination with someone who has 
actually seen the snow in the backyard,  but that belongs to another step 
in the process of knowledge.    Again,  we must remember that knowledge 
must not be reduced to infallibly certain truth. 
As long as the truth communicated through the statement of the 
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speaker and accepted on the authority of the speaker, either formally or 
virtually, does not become so clear that it intrinsically compels assent 
properly so-called,   it remains within the area of belief rather than 
vision.    All "science" of past events not directly experienced by the 
historian is of this type;i.e. it possesses neither the certitude of 
immediate perception nor the certitude of absolutely or hypothetically 
necessary universal truths.    Yet, it is possible for the historian to have 
real causal (and therefore "scientific") knowledge of historical events.  
On the hypothesis that the events really occurred as described by the 
witnesses and as grasped by the historian in his phantasms and 
conceptions,   the historian can have true and "necessary" 
understanding of their causal relationships. In itself, his knowledge of 
the events and their connection is only more or less probable,  his 
certitude about both the facts and their causal explanation comes from 
the belief that he gives to the witnesses.159   My knowledge that 
Champoleon's deciphering of the Rosetta stone made possible the rapid 
flowering of the science of egyptology,  is based on the accuracy and 
authenticity of the historical sources.    Yet it is both true -- as far as I 
can tell -- and "necessary" in the sense that, supposing the rapid 
flowering of egyptology in the nineteenth century to have been caused 
at least in part by Champoleon's work,   it is such "necessarily. " 
6.   Summary 
Our task of elaborating the natural analogue to the knowledge of 
faith is now complete.  It remains for us to summarize and correlate 
the various elements we have uncovered.   Rather than attempt any 
restatement of what has gone before,  I propose to illustrate the theory 
outlined by applying it to a concrete example.    The following passage 
from Plato's Apology will serve as the basis of the illustration. 
The setting is Socrates trial in spring or early summer of 399 
B.C.    At least five hundred jurors are present,  as well as Socrates 
accusers and friends.    Socrates is speaking after he has been 
sentenced to death; he says: 
with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to 
converse about this which has happened,  while the 
authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I 
must die.    Wait with me so long,  my friends; for nothing 
prevents our chatting with each other while there is time.    I 
feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the 
meaning of this which has now happened to me.     For,  
judges -- and in calling you judges I give you your right 
name - - a  wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto 
the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very 
frequently and opposed me even in very small matters,  if I 
was going to do anything I should not; but now, as you 
yourselves see,  this thing which might be thought,  and is 
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generally considered,   the greatest of evils has come upon 
me; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left 
my home in the morning,   or when I came here to the court,   
or at any point of my speech,  when I was going to say 
anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many 
points in the midst of a speech; but now,   in this affair,  it 
has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying.    
What then do I suppose is the reason?   I will tell you.    This 
which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing,  and 
those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken.    A 
convincing proof of this has been given me; for the 
accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not 
been going to meet with something good.160 
Reading this text,  I accept it as a credible report of an eyewit-
nessi  substantially at least reporting the actual words of Socrates.   By 
that act of belief, I take in globally the whole meaning of the passage. To 
the reading I bring my memory of Greek history and culture,  my 
understanding of human psychology,  my system of values.  As I read the 
account I imaginatively represent the event to myself,   drawing upon 
pictures I have seen of Socrates,   Plato,  descriptions I have read of 
them,'  etc.  On.this imaginative representation,   I bring to bear my 
intellectual and conceptual understanding of human psychology so that I 
can understand what Socrates means when he speaks of the prophetic 
monitor whose apparent approval of his action is the basis of an 
argument for the basic goodness of what is about to happen to him. 
In the event narrated there is potentially a great deal of 
intelligibility.  In the quasi-perceptual, intellectual judgment of belief by 
which I affirm the reality of the event as represented in my 
imagination,  there is an implicit,  non-conceptual intuitive grasp of that 
fullness of meaning,  a fullness which includes all the meaning that Plato 
intended to communicate in presenting the narrative,  but more as well. 
In this implicit,  non-conceptual moment of affirming the existence of 
the reality represented in the phantasm is to be found an initial global 
experience of the "event related.    Simply as represented in the 
phantasms, the wealth of intelligible meaning remains implicit and 
potential. To actualize it, it is necessary that the phantasms be 
organized,  clarified and illuminated by the agent intellect and the 
cogitative sense.   Only then will these realistic phantasms be able to 
reflect the conceptual meaning that I derive from the verbal phantasms 
and to provide a basis for the discovery and conceptualization of new 
intelligible aspects.  As I continue to reflect upon this passage, new 
aspects attract my attention, so that gradually in the course of my 
reflections I explicate the meaning given implicitly in my initial 
representation and assent.  To give expression to my deepening insight,  
I might write a brief essay putting into words the aspects which strike 
me as most significant.    As I write,   I am conscious that the meaning I 
have grasped is greater than the meaning I have explicated in words,  I 
expand and refine my essay seeking to give expression to a meaning 
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which always extends beyond the reach of my expression.    It is the 
implicit and indirect,  non-conceptual intuition of this fact that spurs me 
on to perfect my explication, Always,  however,  the point,of reference is 
the text itself whose meaning is given to me in a global way despite the 
incompleteness of its conceptual and verbal explication. 
 87
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND NON-CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS IN 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH 
A.    INTRODUCTION 
As outlined in the first chapter,  the intention of this thesis is to 
seek in the ordinary process of human cognition a natural analogue to 
the kind of implicit global experience which contemporary theologians of 
revelation and the development of dogma have found necessary to 
postulate in order to explain the known properties of the knowledge of 
faith.     In the last chapter we sketched such an analogue. 
If the preceding analyses of the process of cognition is 
substantially correct,   the foundation of this natural analogue is to be 
found in the essential imperfection of man's conceptual knowledge.  By 
reason of the abstractive character of all of human conceptions,   our 
cognition is not purely intellectual; rather,  it is an integral operation 
of sense and intellect.  This operation is perfected in the act of judgment 
in which,   reflecting its conceptual understanding upon a perceptual or 
imaginative experience,   the intellect knows:   (1) the concrete reality 
sensibly represented; (2) according to the real mode of being of; (3) the 
intelligible aspect conceptually represented.   Thus, in the intellectual act 
of judgment,  the conceptual moment is fused with the non-conceptual 
experiential moment; and the concrete reality is known. 
Insofar as it develops out of the phantasms representative 
of the initial perception of the object,  all subsequent conceptual 
penetration of the intelligible aspects of the object constitutes 
nothing more than a gradual making explicit of what was already 
grasped implicitly and non-thematically in the initial perception.    
This explication takes place not by a process of analyzing the 
concepts in which the initial perceptual judgment was expressed,  
but rather,  in an analysis of the concrete reality presented in the 
phantasm. 
The knowledge of faith,  however,  is not an immediate 
vision. It is true that we daily experience directly the sensible 
effects of God's saving action,  for our existential experience of our 
own being and activity'is an experience of a being which de facto 
either is divinized by grace or is marred by the loss thereof.1  
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Likewise, the Church that we experience is of its very nature a 
supernatural community united to God in Christ by the power of the 
Holy Spirit     The Bible,   the sacraments, and the preaching of the 
Church are. not merely natural realities but the instruments of 
salvation.  Nevertheless,  despite the de facto extension of our 
experience to supernatural realities,  neither are our natural 
cognitive lights penetrating enough to discern the supernatural 
depths of these experiences,  nor do we receive an immediate 
revelation from God indicating that depth of meaning.2  Consequently,   
we depend upon the historical word of God,   communicated to us,  
principally at least,  in the Bible, whose meaning is lived^nd 
preached in the Church.    For this reason the proximate analogue to 
the knowledge of faith is not direct experience and personal 
interpretation but,   rather,  vicarious experience and interpretation 
communicated through words. 
It was for this reason that we prolonged the investigation of 
the process of cognition to see how the assimilation of vicarious 
experience and interpretation takes place.    Here we made two 
discoveries. First,   we noted that the assimilation of a verbally 
expressed message is not a purely intellectual and conceptual 
process. A proper understanding of the conceptual content of the 
message demands that the listener either be in direct perceptual 
contact with the object under discussion,   or else,  be able to 
synthesize a quasi-perception of that object in phantasms of the 
internal senses.    For this purpose verbal or model phantasms alone 
will not suffice.  Useful as they are in more intricate operations of 
intelligence,  words and models are potentially meaningful only to 
the extent that they actually stand in place of the complex realistic 
phantasms which alone directly represent the object to the knower.  
We saw that this condition obtains even when it is a case of an 
immaterial object of cognition,  or in order to be knowable by an 
intelligence whose proper object is the quiddity of material beings,   
such objects must first be presented to the knower through their 
sensible effects. 
For this reason there is no direct conceptual communication 
through words.   Words convey new conceptions to the listener only by 
organizing the phantasms of the listener in such a way that,  under the 
illumination of the listener's own intellectual light,  the corresponding 
intelligible aspect comes to light in the mind of the listener.    
Perceptual or qua si-perceptual experience,  therefore,  plays 
proportionately the same role in learning through instruction as it does 
in learning through personal discovery.    So true is this fact,  that the 
listener gifted with a more penetrating intellectual light and the ability 
to reproduce a rich enough phantasm,  may actually see deeper into the 
objective meaning of a statement than did the original speaker. 
Secondly,  we noted that when a listener gives the assent of 
belief to a statement, he makes his own the full objective meaning of the 
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statement even though here and now he has little or no actual 
understanding of what the statement means,  knowing only that, whatever 
it does in fact mean, it is true.     This projective appropriation of 
meaning in itself is not cognitive (except practically) but dynamic; that is 
to say,   it consists not in any actual appropriation of the content of the 
statement, but only inthe dynamism of the cognitive actions by which the 
listener seeks to penetrate the communique's significance.    When linked,  
however, with even the most rudimentary grasp of real meaning through 
the development of realistic phantasms and the reflection upon these 
phantasms of some conceptually grasped intelligibility, this dynamism 
makes possible a truly cognitive anticipatory appropriation of the full 
meaning of the statement,  insofar as the listener realizes that the 
reality lies in the direction of his rudimentary but real grasp of the 
statement's meaning.    It is the dynamism of belief, coupled with the 
intuitive realization of the direction of research through the imperfect 
understanding actually achieved,   that keeps the listener attentive to the 
pursuit of the true meaning and prevents him from deviating from his 
pursuit of true and perfect understanding or settling down with an im-
perfect grasp of the meaning. 
On the basis of these discoveries,  we are now ready to attempt 
an explanation of the experiential moments in the knowledge of faith and 
of its relation to the conceptual moment. 
B.     THE MEASURE OF REVEALED KNOWLEDGE OF  
DIVINE THINGS 
Despite its deeper penetration,  the knowledge we have through 
the light of faith remains bound by the rule of the senses:   we know God 
in this life only through his sensible manifestations.  Aquinas observes: 
. . .    in our present life we can in no way know the quiddity of 
the immaterial substances -- neither by way of natural 
cognition nor even by way of revelation,   for,  as Dionysius 
says,  the ray of divine revelation comes to us according to our 
own measure.     Consequently,   although we are lifted up by 
revelation to know something which otherwise would remain 
unknown to us, we are not so elevated as to know in any other 
way than through ' sensibles.3 
Outside of the unique vision of Christ and the possible 
extraordinary raptures of Moses and Paul,4   even the direct recipients of 
divine revelation by way of intelligible species, had to reflect upon 
phantasms in order actually to know the object of the revelation,5  
Likewise, someone who had been granted the extraordinary privilege of 
seeing God immediately and essentially in this life,  would after the 
rapture have to make use of phantasms in order to recall the memory of 
what he had seen. 6,  If this be the case for the prophets and apostles who 
were the direct witnesses of revelation,  then a fortiori it must hold for 
the knowledge we acquire by believing their testimony. 
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If the knowledge brought by revelation remains within the 
limitations imposed by the phantasm-concept relationship,  what sort of 
improvement can it bring to our knowledge of divine things ?  Aquinas 
notes the possibility of a threefold progress. 
Even though the human mind does not come to know the divine 
nature but remains limited to knowing the divine existence,   it can 
progress in its knowledge of God in three ways:   (1) by more perfectly 
knowing his causality in producing things; (2) by knowing him to be the 
cause of more noble effects,  which,   insofar as they bear some 
resemblance to him,   indicate his greater pre-eminence; (3) by more 
and more knowing him to transcend everything that appears in his 
effects.7 
Thus,   Scripture,   together with the Church's preaching,   
repeatedly calls attention to the creative and providential role of God,   to 
his  special solicitude for mankind.    It describes his role in saving 
history as it culminates in the coming of Christ and the foundation of the 
Church. In promise and symbol the Word of God describes for us the 
continuing historical causality of God,   especially in the Church and in 
the believer.     It even gives us a prophetic vision of the fullness that is 
to come at the end of time.    In this way revelation gives us a much 
richer appreciation of the breadth and depth of the divine causality.    In 
fact, as we noted in the first chapter,   revelation formally consists in the 
presentation of the mystery of God's action to save and elevate mankind 
through history. 
In the picture it gives us of Jesus Christ and of the community 
of salvation in him,   the Word of God describes and interprets for us the 
most perfect of God's creatures.  Thus, it makes us see the transcendent 
perfection of God to lie far beyond what we might otherwise be able to 
imagine and conceive from the ordinary effects of the divine causality.     
The whole course of salvation history culminating in the absolutely 
unforeseeable divinization of man in Christ and the ultimate triumph of. 
God's power over sin and evil gives us to understand far more 
profoundly the depths of the wisdom,  mercy,  justice and power of God. 
Finally,  by its constant emphasis on the transcendence of God 
and the impossibility of our ever comprehending him,  the Word of God 
indicates how much the reality of God is removed from anything that we 
could conceive about him.    The revelation of mysteries like the Trinity, 
predestination,   grace,   salvation,   the incarnation,   etc. ,  not only 
indicates aspects of God which absolutely defy our understanding,  but 
also points out the inadequacy of the understanding we do have of God's 
being,  unity,   goodness,   etc. 
Thus,   the knowledge which revelation brings remains within the 
basic framework established by the dependence of the human mind on 
phantasms and concepts,  namely,  the three ways of causality, emmi-
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nence and separation.  Nevertheless,  it profoundly deepens the 
understanding which is opened to us through these three ways,  for it 
extends our knowledge of the divine causality, reveals more noble effects 
of that causality, and deepens our appreciation of how much God is 
removed from our present way of understanding him. 
Besides this extension of our knowledge, there is another way 
in which our knowledge of God through revelation surpasses the 
ordinary mode of our knowledge of divine things, namely, in its new 
perspective.    In the ordinary way of human cognition,   it is the effects 
of God that are the focal point of our attention.    Of ourselves, we 
cannot see these effects from God's point of view, because we cannot 
directly see God.     Consequently,  no matter how much God may be the 
apparent subject of our discourse, he really enters our vision only 
obliquely as the explanation, from our point of view, of the effects that 
hold the center of our attention.  In logical terms, God is not the subject 
but the middle term in the ordinary discursive way we know him. 
Properly speaking, we do not "prove" the existence of God in 
metaphysics; instead we "explain" the existence of changing, acting, 
contingent, participated and ordered beings by recognizing that they 
must derive from a being which is unchanging, perfectly actual, 
necessary, unparticipated, and intelligent.  Only when we have already 
grasped the existence of this being whose causality ultimately explains 
all things, can we turn this explanation of created phenomena into an 
apologetic proof of the existence of God. 
Of ourselves,  we can never see the effects of God's activity 
from his own point of view,  though we can and do form some conjectures 
based on an inverted projection of our own point of view.  God, however, 
sees -the effects of his activity from his own point of view and sees 
himself immediately as he produces these effects.  Moreover,  he is able 
with complete freedom to speak to us of what he sees and thus to reveal 
to us his own point of view.  This he does in revelation,   so that the 
knowledge that we acquire through revelation is properly a knowledge 
which proceeds from the divine point of view. Its focal point is not the 
effects themselves, but God as he effects them.  In logical terms, God is 
properly the syllogistic subject of revealed truth, his activity is the 
explanatory middle term,  and the created effects are the predicate. 
We might compare this difference between the revealed and the 
ordinary way of knowing God to the difference between purely archeo-
logical and properly historical knowledge.  In 1868-71,  European visitors 
first came upon the great ruins at Zimbabwe in East Africa.  Having no 
documentary or traditional evidence to guide their interpretation of 
these ruins, early archeologists conjectured that they must have been 
built by a colony of oriental merchants. In the past two decades, 
however, researchers in the area have discovered among the indigenous 
Negro-population reliable historical traditions which have come down 
from the native African culture that erected these monuments in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We know that their builders were 
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the Karahga people who under the Rozwi dynasty developed a large 
empire and a high iron-age culture which flourished in the area from 
about 1440 until about 1800 when they were overrun by invaders from 
Natal.8 Until the historical traditions were discovered,   the center of 
attention was the monuments themselves.    Their builders were known 
only in terms of the monuments,  and conjectures about the builders and 
their culture were directed to explaining the monuments. Now in the 
light of the discovered historical traditions,  it is possible to set the 
monuments into the context of the history and culture of the Karanga 
people and to begin to see the monuments as the Karanga people 
themselves saw them,    The center of interest now is not the monuments 
but the Karanga people,  and the monuments are significant only insofar 
as they shed light on this people. 
C.    THE LIGHT OF FAITH 
In order that the recipient of his revelation truly receive the divine 
message,   it was not sufficient for God simply to impress upon man's 
knowing powers the sensible or intelligible forms in which the divine 
message was embodied.9  The Pharaoh,  who according to the story of 
Joseph (Gen. 41: 1-7), had the dreams of the fat and the lean cows, the fat 
and the lean ears, had not actually received the revelation of the coming 
prosperity followed by famine,10  neither did Caiphas in his inspired 
prediction of the salvation to be wrought by Jesus' death (John 11: 51). 11  
The formal constituent of divine revelation is the bestowal of a new 
intellectual light by which the recipient of the revelation is able to 
apprehend and to affirm in judgment the meaning of the communique. 
This light is necessary because of the inadequacy of the natural light of 
the agent intellect to illuminate sufficiently the potential intelligibility of 
the phantasm and thus enable the possible intellect to grasp in judgment 
the truth of the conceptual apprehension,, Until this infused light of 
revelation gives rise to a judgment in the possible intellect of the 
recipient of the revelation there is no communication of intellectual 
meaning.12 
Corresponding to the light of revelation in the immediate 
recipient of revelation by the prophet or apostle,  there is required a 
proportionate illumination of the minds of those to whom these men 
communicate the revealed message in speech and writing.  This 
secondary illumination, called in the New Testament the "annointing of the 
Holy Spirit,13  is given by the infused light of faith.14  This light of faith 
differs from the light of revelation in that it is entirely dependent upon 
the apostolic teaching for the determination of its operation.15   This 
teaching comes to us through the Bible and the preaching of the Church; 
consequently,  "the formal object of faith is the First Truth insofar as it 
is manifested in Sacred Scripture and in the teaching of the Church," 16  
"Faith depends on hearing" (Rom.   10:16),  and not merely on illumina-
tion.     The relation between the external proclamation of revelation and 
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the internal light of faith is analogous to that between sense 
presentations and the light of the agent intellect in the discovery of first 
principies. 17 
The infused light of faith comes to us in the first place through 
the supernatural virtue of faith,   though faith's illumination is 
supplemented, especially in the more advanced stages of supernatural 
life, by the operation of the gifts of understanding, wisdom, and 
knowledge, and, when it is a case of one endowed with a special mission 
in the Church, by operation of official or extraordinary charisms. 
The principle operation of the virtue of faith would seem to be 
instinctive rather than formally illuminative. Faith operates through the 
dynamism of the will,  moving the intellect to assent to the truth 
communicated in the Scriptures and the preaching of the Church. By 
reason of this assent, however, faith is virtually illuminative, for the 
assent is directed principally to those fundamental truths which 
constitute the articles of faith.19  These articles -- generally speaking, the 
distinct truths enumerated in the Apostles' Creed20 -- are to the 
knowledge of faith what the first principles are to ordinary human 
knowledge.21  All the other truths which are known in faith or through 
faith22  depend upon these articles:   on the one hand,  they particularize 
and explicate the meaning implicit in the articles; on the other,  they 
derive their  certitude from their being reflected back to the articles 
which they explicate. 23 
It does not seem, however,  that we can deny completely a 
formally illuminative role to the virtue of faith.  To do so would mean that 
the believer either would have no real understanding of the content of 
revelation apart from the operation of the gifts of understanding, 
wisdom and science,  or else, would have at least the beginnings of a real 
understanding of the revealed meaning by the purely natural light of his 
unaided agent intellect.  The first of these alternatives is inconvenient 
because it  fails to explain how the sinner who lacks the gifts could have 
any real knowledge of supernatural truth.   The second alternative fails to 
do justice to the supernatural character of  the content of revelation, 
.reducing the supernaturality of faith simply to the mode of assent. 
It seems reasonable to conclude,  therefore,  that the virtue of 
faith itself has a properly illuminative role and that it actually modifies 
the intellect itself and not simply the intellectual act of assent.  his 
modification would consist fundamentally in a real elevation of the 
possible intellect making it capable of receiving and using ideas 
referring to supernatural realities.   Formally as illuminative,  however,   
the virtue of faith would strengthen and elevate the natural light of the 
 94
agent intellect,   enabling it to communicate its supernaturalized 
actuality to the potentially meaningful phantasms in which (through the 
text of Scripture and the preaching of the Church together with the 
immediate perceptual experience of sensible supernatural realities) 
divine truth is presented to the mind of the believer. 
Be this as it may,  whether one attribute the intellective 
illumination in faith knowledge to the unaided natural light of the agent 
intellect or to a properly illuminative role of the virtue of faith itself or 
to a special illumination through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, it is 
necessary to-have something more than the virtual illumination of the 
instinctus fi-dei_assenting to the articles of faith if there is to be any 
real intellectual knowledge through faith.  Even the perception of the 
mere possibility of the supernatural meaningfulness of the statements of 
Scripture and the teaching of the Church would involve an operation of 
the possible intellect dependant upon an illumination of the agent intellect.  
But the purpose of revelation was not simply to communicate an 
altogether unintelligible enigma,  like a book in an unknown language,   
something to be venerated as valuable and meaningful but without the 
slightest knowledge of its content. 25   Revelation is ordered to 
communicating meaning,26  and for there to be any actual communication 
of meaning there must be some intellective illumination of the phantasms 
in which the meaning is communicated. 
Nevertheless,   this participated light of faith is not so strong as 
to render the objects of faith presented in Scripture and the preaching of 
the Church evident to the judgment of the believer.27  The light of faith does 
not make the object visible in the obscure,  but nonetheless intrinsically 
certain way that the prophetic light does.    Whatever the degree of 
illumination given by the light of faith (it makes no difference whether 
we explain this illumination as the natural operation of the agent 
intellect,   a supernatural operation of the agent intellect modified by 
faith,   or a special illumination of the Holy Spirit through the gifts), the 
intellect, in.virtue of it, is not so convinced by the intrinsic evidence 
that it can fully assent either to the meaning itself or even to the 
revealed character of the assertion.    The assent which the intellect 
gives to the statement remains an assent of faith,  a voluntary assent 
given by reason of the instinct of faith.28 
The light of-faith,  therefore,  is a kind of half-light.    It really 
illumines the content of  the revealed message, but not so clearly that 
the truth becomes evident.    Shining on the phantasms in which the 
divine truth is presented,   it is like the twilight of a dawning day,   
growing progressively brighter as the believer advances "from faith to 
faith" (Rom.    1:17).  But this light falls directly and principally upon the 
effects of  the divine causali ty as represented according to their 
sensible aspects in the phantasm.  Directly, therefore, it is only the 
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terminus of the divine activity that we see more clearly,  but in doing so 
we see more clearly how much God exceeds our created representations 
of him.  Consequently,   the same light,  which is like a dawning light with 
respect to the effects of God's activity,   is like the fading light of 
evening in its revelation of God's own intimate being and the properly 
supernatural nature of his effects. As we progress "from faith to faith", 
we come to see ever more clearly how deeply,  in the shadows cast  by 
our created representations,  these supernatural  real i t ies really l ie .  As 
our perception of  God's  existence and presence increases in a clearer 
vision of his effects,   our implicit intuitive grasp of what he is becomes 
explicated more and more through an understanding of what he is not.29 
D.     THE EXPERIENTIAL REFERENCE OF THE WORD OF GOD 
By faith we give global assent to the teaching contained in the 
Word of God as that Word comes to us in Scripture and the teaching of 
the Church.30  We perceive this Word in verbal phantasms.  God speaks in 
the idiom of human language; the terms he uses are the familiar terms of 
our experience.31  We interpret God's Word, therefore, by finding its 
reference points in our experience. 
The word of God has a twofold experiential reference.32 Scripture 
especially,  but also the teaching of the Church,  has its principal 
reference point in the historical experience of those to whom the 
revelation was originally communicated,  that is, to the experience of the 
prophets, of Jesus, and of the apostolic witnesses.  Nevertheless, insofar 
as it speaks of the Church and of man redeemed by grace,   insofar as it 
instructs us in how revelation touches contemporary human life and 
how in faith we are to conduct ourselves in order to attain eternal life,   
the Word of God has a contemporary experiential reference as well. 
Contemporary preaching and teaching of the Church addresses 
itself immediately to this contemporary experience,  but the contempo-
rary teaching of the Church is not an independent revelation:   the Church 
can only apply and interpret the teaching communicated to her originally 
in the historical revelation and subsequently transmitted down through 
the centuries in the Bible and the living tradition.33  Consequently,  the 
fundamental reference point for the interpretation of the Word of God is 
always the historical experience of revelation and of its particular 
traditional interpretations.34  It is this historical experience which 
provides the context for apprehending the immediate literal sense of the 
texts to be interpreted.  Fuller senses and authentic spiritual senses exist 
only in the prolongation and explication of this immediate literal sense. 
Nevertheless, even the immediate literal sense does not always 
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directly refer to its experiential referent.  Very often,  the descriptions 
presented in Scripture and repeated or elaborated in the preaching of 
the Church are not properly representational but symbolic. They contain 
imaginative models constructed to express intelligible aspects of 
something other than themselves.    The parables of Jesus offer an 
obvious example.  In the parable of the great banquet (Matt. 22: 2-10; Luke 
14: 16-24),  for instance,  there is a self-contained narrative of an 
important man's reaction when the guests invited to his banquet refused 
the invitation. Out of the imaginative presentation of this event an 
intelligible meaning emerges.  But the meaning this parable was meant to 
have as revelation can be seen only when one reflects its intrinsic 
meaning upon the context in which it was uttered, namely, the hostility of 
the scribes and pharisees to Jesus and the receptivity of sinners and 
publicans.  But, especially in the apostolic preaching, with the beginning-of 
the mission to the gentiles,   it came to focus its meaning on another 
context,   the relation of the Jews and the gentiles to the invitation of the 
Gospel.35  Only when referred to one of these contexts does the parable 
communicate its real message.  So- it is with all such symbolic 
presentations.  Thus, we can grasp the real meaning of the Apocalypse or 
of the book of Daniel only by locating these highly symbolic visions in 
the context of the struggles of the Christian and Jewish communities to 
maintain the faith during periods of persecution. 
There is little problem with texts of an obviously symbolic 
character like the parables or the prophetic and apocalyptic visions.  
Biblical exegetes, however, have come to see that some degree of 
schema-tization and symbolization characterizes even the presumably 
historical materials of the Bible, e, g. the presentations of pre-history 
and patriarchal history,  the descriptions of the exodus,  desert 
wanderings, and invasion of the promised land,  have been idealized in 
order to more clearly present their value to subsequent generations.  So 
too, the formation of the Gospel traditions involved a selection and 
idealization of the history of Christ in order to more clearly, though 
symbolically, represent meanings valuable to the community.  Form 
criticism is a methodical attempt to distinguish the stages in this 
development and to situate the successive redactions of the material in 
their proper context of non-symbolic reference.  The demythologizing 
method and the new hermeneutic which developed out of the 
demythologizing theology of Rudolph Bultmann are attempts to find the 
ultimate referent of the Gospel narrative not in the historical experience 
of the original recipient of revelation but in an ever contemporary 
experience of the believer and the believing community as it listens to 
the divine Word, conceived as almost completely symbolic. 
Our purpose,  however,  in introducing this matter of the 
symbolic character of certain narratives was not to undertake a study of 
form-critical theory or to pass judgment upon the suppositions and 
procedures of demythologizing and the new hermeneutic.36  We merely 
.wish to indicate here the special difficulty that attends the attempt to 
identify the real referent for the interpretation of the Word of God. The 
picture of Christ painted by the Gospels is not a police-blotter 
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description.  It has been schematized and idealized in order to symbolize 
the higher significance of Jesus for the apostolic community.  
Consequently,   the picture of Christ that we conjure up for ourselves as 
we read the Gospel account of a miracle like the appearance of the risen 
Christ on the shore of the sea of Tiberias (John 21) in all probability 
should not be taken at its literal face value; instead it must be seen as a 
symbolic presentation of the abiding presence of Christ to his Church. 
Its' most probable reference is not an actual appearance of Christ but 
the realization of the apostolic community that Christ remained with 
them.     The proper realistic phantasm to which it must be referred is 
the recollection of the life and activity of Christ after the ascension. 
E.    IMAGES AND CONCEPTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH 
When the Word of God speaks to us directly of objects with 
which we are in direct perceptual contact and in words that clearly 
point to this perception of the object,  the light of faith shines upon 
the phantasm of our direct perception and the intellect apprehends 
the conceptual meaning of the words in the perception thus 
illuminated.37    Thus, in the Mass, when the celebrant holding the 
sacred host turns to the congregation before communion and says,  
"Behold the Lamb of God; behold him who takes away the sins of the 
world, " the faithful who witness this proclamation of the word of 
God see its meaning directly in the host they sensibly perceive.  In 
this concretization of their belief in the mystery of the Eucharist,  
they know this host to be the Body of Christ by a perceptual 
judgment which is not evident in itself,  but which is made in virtue 
of faith.38 
Most of our knowledge of faith,  however,  does not consist in 
such immediate perceptual judgments made in virtue of faith, for the 
immediate referent of  the statement does not here and now fall within 
the actual horizon of direct perception.  When alone in my room without 
any external sign of my affiliation to the Catholic Church I affirm the 
article of the Creed,  "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church."   I have no 
direct perceptual contact with the reality of the Church.    Were it  not for 
the previous experience I have had of the sensible appearances of the 
Church,   the words "Holy Catholic Church" would have no real point of 
reference for me.    The words have come to be significant for me only 
because I have had some realistic experience of the living reality of the 
Church. 
Because the meaning, which the verbal phantasm "Holy Catholic 
Church"  stands for, is one which I have learned by reflecting it in a 
reality I have actually perceived,  I can think about the meaning of my 
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profession of faith without explicitly elaborating an imaginative 
reproduction of the Church in my internal senses.  It suffices here and 
now that I be capable of making such a reproduction.  Of course, as we 
have already noted regarding verbal thinking, my thinking will not be 
complete until I actually reflect the meaning I grasp in the word upon 
some perceptual or quasi-perceptual experience of the reality of the 
Church. Thus, in practice, I will probably imaginatively represent the 
Church to myself according to one or another of its more salient 
features. 
It is, therefore, in an imaginative reproduction of the concrete 
referent of the object,  that the knowledge of faith normally terminates. 
In some cases, this imaginative reproduction will consist simply in a 
recollection of a past perception of the object -- such is frequently the 
case when we think about the Church or the sacraments or various 
aspects of moral life.  In most cases, however, the phantasm which we 
use to represent the intelligible meaning of the statement involves some 
degree of original synthesis by the imagination.  This need for original 
synthesis is most clearly necessary when it is a question of reproducing 
the historical experience of the original recipient of revelation. 
In chapter four of this paper,  we showed how such a synthesis is 
effected.   In the case of faith-knowledge,  the text in which the Word of 
God is embodied provides the external norm; our previous experience, 
both direct and indirect, provides the material; and the light of faith 
provides inner guidance at least to the extent of impelling the mind not to 
rest content with inaccurate representations.  Thus, as I read Mark's 
account of the passion and death of Christ, I form a sensible 
reproduction of it in a phantasm within my internal senses.  This 
reproduction will be the more detailed and accurate as I have seen 
pictures of.the locale, ,have studied R>man and Jewish customs, etc.  The 
light of faith will forewarn me against putting too much stock in my 
representation of those details about which the various Gospel 
traditions are at variance,  leaving open the possibility of schematization 
or symbolism. 
Illuminating this imaginative presentation the light of faith 
renders the phantasm capable of reflecting at least imperfectly the 
intelli.gible aspects which my intellect actually grasps conceptually.    
This I see that the man I apprehend in this presentation is, in fact, the 
Son of God and that his death will be the cause of our salvation.  We saw 
earlier that the conceptual apprehension of meaning supposes the 
determination of the possible intellect by an impressed species received 
from sense experience; and we noted that it is possible to derive such 
an impression from vicarious as well as direct experience.  In the case 
of knowledge by faith, in most cases the raw materials for the 
composition of complex conceptions will already be available to the 
intellect through the ordinary process of intellectual insight outside the 
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context of revelation and faith.  Indeed, it is the apprehension of such raw 
intelligible data in the individual words of the statement that guides the 
intellect in synthesizing the imaginative reproduction of the event.  It 
might, however, be possible for the intellect to abstract individual notes 
from the synthesized.phantasm.  In any case, the actual combination of 
distinct intelligible notes into a complex conception will be based not 
only upon the verbal phantasms but also upon the representative 
phantasms gradually elaborated in the process of interpretation. Thus, 
my intellectual conception of Christ's humanity will be conditioned not 
simply by the sum of intelligible aspects directly expressed in the words 
of the passion narrative,  but also by the way in which the combination of 
these verbally explicated notes are reflected in the phantasm I have 
synthesized. 
We should recall here, of course, that where it is a question of the 
immaterial and supernatural aspects of the presentation,  the 
conceptions that we form directly express only the intelligibility of the 
sensible effects of these realities; consequently, we actually know the 
supernatural reality only in the protective judgment in which 
simultaneously we affirm the causal dependence of the sensible effects 
on the non-sensible reality and deny the direct application of the 
conceptions derived from these sensible effects. Thus, I know the divinity 
of Jesus in his passion only by affirming that this man I see is in person 
the Son of God (embodying all the perfections I know to belong to God 
from seeing his creatures, the most perfect of which is this man),  and 
simultaneously denying that his divine being is in any way measured by 
my conceptions of these perfections. 
F.    THE AFFECTIVE ELEMENT IN THE KNOWLEDGE. 
OF FAITH 
To treat of that properly affective,  mystical knowledge, which is 
the result of the operation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  Such knowledge in itself transcends the normal 
mode, of human cognition through concepts,  phantasms and intuition,  
being based upon the connaturality of the graced believer with the 
revealed object.  In the higher stages of the mystical life this 
connaturality resulting from the unitive tendency of love becomes so 
intense that it can be called "quasi-experimental. " Such knowledge falls 
within the subject-matter of this thesis only to the extent that the believer 
who is privileged to enjoy it must,  in order to recall and reflect upon it 
as well as in order to communicate something of his experience to 
others, translate it, as it were, into the ordinary phantasm-concept 
framework. 
Nevertheless,  though it lacks the full experiential character of mystical 
affective knowledge,  the knowledge of faith is not without an affective 
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dimension.  The realities with which faith deals are of ultimate and 
pressing concern to the believer. God reveals himself to man as a loving 
Father,  who has sent his beloved first-born Son into the world to save 
his errant children from their sin and to restore them to friendship and 
community with himself; he also reveals,  however,  his unflinching 
opposition to sin and his just punishment of those who offend him.  
Accordingly,  for the man who loves him,   God is the greatest and most 
loveable good; for the man,  however,  who prefers sin,   God is at best 
unappealing, or worse, threatening and therefore seen as evil. 
Such affective reactions .are bound to have effects in the 
knowledge of faith, reinforcing or diminishing the realism of the 
knowledge given through belief in the Word of God.  Thus, as God is the 
more perfectly loved, the assent of faith will be all the more prompt; and 
the divine object represented in the phantasms and concepts stirred by 
hearing the Word of God will be all the more real.  Consequently, insofar 
as God is not so loved, his goodness is not appreciated, and the content 
of the phantasms and concepts seems progressively less real. 
G.    EXPERIENTIAL,   CONCEPTUAL AND INTUITIVE 
MOMENTS IN FAITH-KNOWLEDGE 
We have at last arrived on the brink of achieving the goal we 
setfor ourselves in this paper,  the determination of the relationships be-
tween the experiential,   conceptual and intuitive moments in the knowl-
edge of faith. . In terms of this determination,  I trust,   the psychological 
grounds for the implicit,   global experience of knowledge in faith will 
become clear. 
The knowledge of faith consists formally in a judgment,   not 
simply in representations.42   It is, therefore, in judgment that we 
mustcorrelate these moments.  But as we noted in discussing the role of 
belief in the communication process, two judgments are possible within 
faith.  The first implies no explicit grasp of the actual meaning of what is 
attested; it consists simply in the voluntary intellectual affirmation that 
whatever may be the objective meaning of the communique,  that 
meaning is true.  Rarely,  if ever found in its pure state; this "pure faith" 
nevertheless underlies all knowledge in faith.     The second judgment 
takes place in the presence of some explicit understanding of actual 
meaning but not enough to compel the assent of the intellect on intrinsic 
evidence.     This judgment consists in a voluntary affirmation that the 
full objective meaning attested by the speaker is true and that this 
meaning really lies in the direction pointed out by. the imperfect 
understanding possessed by the believer.     This second type of judgment 
goes out to the full truth through its own correct but imperfect 
understanding. 
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1.   The Judgment of Pure Assent 
This judgment terminates explicitly only in the verbal 
phantasm produced in hearing or reading the Word of God,  It is the sort 
of assent simple Christians sometimes give to the Bible or to a dogmatic 
statement.  Its only conceptual content is the bare understanding that the 
text in question is potentially meaningful and that its meaning is true.  
Thus, in the assent of pure faith,  the experiential and conceptual 
moments have minimal content, and in the judgment that unites them,  
the believer explicitly knows no more than the naked fact that the 
sensible signs represented in his sense presentation are potentially 
capable of revealing divine truth to him.  Yet, implicit in this judgment 
there is,  as we have seen,   a kind of intuitive grasping of the meaning of 
the statement.  It is a purely practical intuition:  by it, the believer knows 
only that in seeking to understand the meaning of these unfamiliar signs 
he can attain to supernatural truth and that nothing can be true which is 
not in conformity with the meaning contained in these signs.  In the 
dynamism of the cognitive acts by which the believer attempts to 
penetrate the meaning of the statement of faith, or by which he reinforces 
his belief through consideration of the motives of credibility, or again, by 
which he is led to withhold assent from incorrect interpretations of the 
message,  there is a practical experiential grasp of the full truth of faith.  
This practical experiential intuition of the content of the Word of God is 
the foundation of all knowledge in faith. 
One might give the assent of pure faith without any understanding 
to a particularly difficult text of Scripture,  or to an individual dogma of the 
Church expressed in unfamiliar terms.  But it is difficult to conceive of 
an absolutely pure assent of faith with respect to God's revelation as a 
whole.  In fact, in order for there to be a true act of faith on the part of the 
believer and not a mere interpretative intention supplied by the faith of 
the Church, there would at least have to be a minimal explicit recognition 
that God exists as the source of man's good and that the text which is the 
proximate object of the assent is in fact God's Word, believable in virtue 
of God's own truthfulness and authority. Nevertheless,   even if we grant 
that the pure assent of faith can be given to God's word without any real 
understanding,  it remains true that such assent is possible in particular 
cases and that it underlies all assent with understanding.  The practical 
intuition which is found in such pure assent provides a. basis for the 
notion that the faith of the simple can be explicit in the faith of the 
learned.43  It is also what keeps the material. heretic oriented to the true 
meaning of revelation despite his false explication,  and what preserves 
faith in the believer assailed by a barrage of doubts.  Above this, all 
practical intuition is a goad which drives the believer to try to push 
beyond less perfect to more perfect degrees of understanding.  By it, the 
believer is not given any actual penetration of the meaning of the 
revealing Word's meaning, but he is given a real knowledge of where and 
how to look for understanding, and that practical knowledge is the 
foundation of all further development of actual understanding. 
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2.  Judgmental Assent in Partial Understanding 
The normal situation of the judgment of faith,  however,  involves  
some degree at least of real understanding.  The Word of God is accessible 
to men in human language,  a language which can be understood even 
without any illumination of faith.  The Bible is an open book that can be 
read by anyone who takes it up.  The teaching and preaching of the 
Church is public; the Church's liturgy and dogma are available in 
vernacular as well as classical forms.  Special instruction in the 
teaching of faith is given to those about to be baptized or who express 
even the slightest curiosity about the teaching of the Church and 
Scripture. 
When it is a matter of a judgment of faith combined with real 
understanding of the object of faith,  the experiential moment is 
constituted by the perceptual experience of contemporary supernatural 
realities like the Church and her sacraments,  the Christian mode of life 
of believers, etc,  together with the quasi-perceptual experience (in arti-
ficially synthesized phantasms) of the historical context and the proper 
referent of the statements to which belief is directed. This perceptual and 
quasi-perceptual experience may be more or less complete and detailed. 
In any case it will have the marks of profile and horizon which 
characterize all perception.  Implicitly, therefore, it includes all the 
sensible aspects which belong to realities represented, although here 
and now only a few of these aspects have been explicated and are in 
focus.    No detail which will later come into focus and explicit 
consciousness is really a stranger to this initial perception.  Even future 
events are somehow present in this perception by their anticipation in 
cause and promise. 
The conceptual moment in such a judgment is correspondingly 
rich.  It includes directly- and explicitly all the intelligible aspects which 
the organized and illuminated phantasms are able to reflect, no matter 
how imperfectly.  It includes the material and creaturely conceptions by 
which we know immaterial and divine things,  albeit by a negative 
judgment of their applicability.  Here too, the laws of profile and horizon 
apply.  Not all the intelligible aspects of the realities perceived will 
actually and explicitly be grasped; many remain implicit as more 
particular  determinations of generic conceptions or remain imperfectly 
focused as descriptive definitions.  De facto, it is impossible to explicate 
fully and directly in conceptual terms either material or immaterial 
objects of knowledge.  Material beings, e . g . ,  the concrete sensible effects 
of the divine saving action in history, cannot be fully explicated because 
the concepts in which they are apprehended are abstractive and thus 
dematerialized.  Immaterial beings, on the other hand, cannot be fully 
explicated because the concepts in which they are known only partially 
reflect their real actuality.  
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In the judgment of faith as in every judgment,  the experiential 
and the intuitive moments are united through the mind's reflection of its 
conceptions upon the realistic phantasms; there is also an implicit  
intuitive realization of the extent to which both the phantasms and the 
concepts fail to do justice to the full reality of the object which is known 
in and through these phantasms and concepts.  Unlike the intuitive 
moment which characterizes the judgment of pure assent,  the intuitive 
moment which marks judgmental understanding is not a practical but a 
speculative intuition.  In projecting the mind's vision along the lines 
opened up by the phantasms and concepts which are its counterpart,   
this intuition truly and positively attains the reality revealed.  It remains, 
of course, implicit; any attempt to explicate it necessarily falls short of 
the mark.  But it is real nevertheless.  It is this intuition, given implicitly 
and obliquely in the phantasms and concepts of explicit understanding, 
that is the formal constituent of the global experience of  revealed 
reali t ies.  
H.     FAITH,   THEOLOGY AND.DOGMA:   THE NON-REFLEXIVE 
AND REFLEXIVE STATES OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH 
Apart from mystical development the knowledge of faith exists 
in the believer in two distinct states.44  The first state,  which has no 
special name other than faith itself  one could call it simple faith, is 
constituted by the believer's spontaneous and non-reflexive 
understanding of and assent to the truth of the Word of God.  It involves 
no effort on the part of the believer to re-express his understanding in his 
own terms; its only verbal expression is the original text to which the 
assent was given and by which the phantasms and conceptions were 
composed.    This is the kind of understanding that children and 
theologically unsophisticated adults possess when they recall the answers 
of their catechism.    It is the understanding that spontaneously comes to 
mind as one reads the Bible,  hears a sermon or makes a moral judgment 
in conscience. 
The other state is called theology.  Theology is faith's knowledge 
methodically developed after the manner of a science.  Theology differs 
from simple faith in that it is consciously reflective.  It systematically 
makes use of critical methods: (1) to discern the quality of the. text, to 
interpret its revelation and thus to discern its object more clearly; (2) to 
formulate definitions and classification of the realities spoken of; and 
above all (3) to explain, by demonstration of their causal connections,  the 
meaning and implications of the statements of faith and the realities they 
speak of.  Per se, theology does not have a different material object from 
pure faith; it has a different formal object only insofar as it attempts to 
clarify deliberately and discursively,  by tracing relationships,   the 
understanding and assent given in the spontaneous act of faith.  It may 
happen that the tracing of such relationships leads to the explication of 
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certain intelligible aspects whose existence and nature are not formally 
attested by God.  In such cases theology would pass beyond the limits of 
the material object of faith,  but this is quite incidental. By no means is 
theology's proper object limited to the deduction of these so-called 
"pure" theological conclusions, i. e.,  truths known by deduction from 
revealed truths but in no other  way contained even implicitly and 
obscurely in other truths of faith. 45 
Theology makes a deliberate effort to re-express in its own 
terms the meaning which faith spontaneously grasps in the original form 
in which' the Word of God comes to it.46  The language used by theology for 
the purpose of this re-expression reflects the individual theologian's 
experience and philosophy.  Thus, the theological expression of the early 
Church Fathers reflects a Platonic understanding of the world, the 
theology of medieval Franciscans reflects an Augus-tinian view, the 
theology of Aquinas an Aristotelian view, etc.  We saw in the previous 
chapter that linguistic expression enables one to exercise a reflective 
judgment about the validity of his spontaneous judgments, to preserve 
insights for the future, and to penetrate into the more complex 
relationships which bind one object to another.  But linguistic expression 
also tends to structure thought.  It can blind the thinker to aspects of the 
reality which he has not managed adequately to express; it can also bring 
to explicit consciousness problems or insights which might otherwise 
have passed unnoticed. 
Insofar as these reflexive expressions actually refer to and 
explicate the revealed truth whose understanding they attempt to 
express, the assent of faith virtually extends to them.48  However, the 
suitability of secondary theological expressions for containing the truth 
assented to is not revealed to the individual theologian by any special 
illumination of his judgment.  Neither does the supernatural light of faith 
directly determine the estimation of this suitability.  The light of faith is 
not so clear that in every individual case it permits the believer to 
distinguish clearly the necessary truth of faith from the contingent, 
culturally determined elements of its expression.49 
The reflexive linguistic expression which theology attempts to 
give to the insights gathered by its investigation is subject to the special 
limitations which attend all secondary expression of knowledge. It is 
impossible for the theologian to give perfect expression to the full 
depths of meaning that he grasps in his direct contact with the Word of 
God.  Every theological judgment,  therefore,  must include implicitly an 
intuition of how much the theological formulation leaves unsaid. This 
intuition invites and guides the theologian to perfect his expression and 
to clarify his insight. 
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Insofar as they are interpretive of the Word of God,  the official 
dogmatic pronouncements of the Church's magisterium are in many ways 
akin to theological statements.50  In most cases,  indeed,  they are directly 
occasioned by.theological controversies and bear the stamp of their 
origin.  Dogmatic statements are the Church's attempt to express 
reflectively and methodically the truth she possesses in faith.  Although 
they never canonize any particular school of philosophical or theological 
opinion,51  the dogmas defined by the Church tend to reflect the manner of 
thinking and speaking which marked the prevailing school or schools of 
orthodox thought at the time of formulation.  Thus, the decisions of 
Ephesus I reflect the thinking of the Alexandrian school; whereas the 
decisions of Chalcedon lean more to the expressions of the Antiochean 
school, etc. 
Dogmatic statements,  however,  are not mere contingent 
theological formulations like those elaborated by the individual believer. 
In making them the Church as a whole -- particularly, however, in her 
official teachers,  the bishops and the popes -- is-guided by a special 
assistance of the Holy Spirit.  Thus,  in the ultimate analysis, its dogmatic 
formulations are infallible.    Unlike the individual theologian's 
conceptions and expressions,  the Church's official teaching can never fail 
to conform to and express revealed truth accurately in the core of their 
meaning. 
Nevertheless,  precisely because they are human formulations, the 
Church's dogmatic pronouncements share the character of all human 
noetic expression and representation.  They never exhaustively express 
the fullness of truth latent in the Word of God deposited with the 
Church.52  Every dogmatic formulation leaves much unsaid. Consequently, 
the assent the believer gives to dogmatic formulas must always be 
accompanied by the usual implicit intuition of what remains 
unexpressed,  and the proper interpretation of such formulas demands 
an exegesis not only of what was said positively and explicitly, but also a 
retrieval of what was left unsaid and implicit. 
Moreover, the dogmatic formulations of the Church possess a 
historical character.  They were formulated in response to specific 
controversies and needs of the Church in distinct historical epochs, and 
they bear the stamp of these epochs in the vocabulary and symbol 
systems which they make use of-to re-state and interpret the Word of 
God to the contemporary mentality.  The precise object of the Church's 
faith, therefore, is always clothed in contingent culturally conditioned 
representations which are subject to change in subsequent generations 
and cultures.  In any dogmatic formulation, therefore, there is a subtle 
distinction to be made between the real heart of the dogmatic affirmation 
and the historically conditioned clothing of this core meaning.53  The 
distinction cannot usually be grasped explicitly by the generation 
responsible for the formulation.  What reason, for instance, could have 
suggested to the men of a pre-Copernican world that the descent of Christ 
into hell and his ascension into heaven might not have followed the 
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spatial coordinates of the ancient cosmology.  As Schille-beeckx observes: 
It is only in the train of new human experiences,   new positive 
data,   that the question of the distinction between the "content" 
and the "clothing" of the faith poses itself expressly and that it 
becomes possible to investigate whether the "clothing" equally 
pertains to the dogmatic content or is simply a manner of 
representing these things.54 
Thus,  a kind of "reinterpretation of Dogma" becomes possible. 
Holding fast to the core of meaning in her former declarations, the 
Church, over the course of centuries, comes to explicit  awareness of the 
precise distinction between the core affirmation and its contingent 
clothing.  Consequently, it becomes possible for her to replace the 
outmoded conceptual and imaginative representations by new 
representations more conformed to the contemporary state of knowledge.  
Sometimes it  is a matter of  changing.the imagined frame of reference,  
as, for instance, the abandonment of the Ptolemaic system of cosmology; 
at other times, it is a matter of changing the conceptual system in the 
direction of greater precision, as, for instance, the substitution of a 
modified Logos-anthropos Christology at Chalcedon for the Cyrillic 
Logos-sarx Christology of Ephesus.55 
I. FAITH, THE BIBLE AND THE CHURCH 
We saw earlier that the Church of today depends on the faith of 
the apostolic community for its contact with revelation.  True,  the 
Church does not derive all its certitude of revealed truth from 
Scripture,  nor is she without real and sensible contact here and now with 
realities in which God is revealed.  Nevertheless,  because of the 
historical character of revelation, the original revelatory experience of 
God's people remains normative for all subsequent life in the Church.57 
Without going into the complex of theological problems involved in 
determining the precise relationship between Scripture,  tradition and the 
.magisterium,   we can say this much at least,  that the principal 
depository of the historic revelation is the Bible.  Particular traditions 
may preserve details of that experience which are not immediately 
evident in the text of Scripture.  Likewise, the living experience of faith in 
the Church may give rise to dogmatic insights like the dogmas of the 
Assumption and Immaculate Conception whose connection with Scripture 
is very tenuous.  Nevertheless, at least in a vague and indistinct way the 
words of the Bible embrace the whole of creation and history.  Moreover,   
the Bible is our closest possible link with the original experi ence of 
God's saving interventions in history.58   Scripture gives us our only 
representational contact with Jesus Christ who is the fullness of 
revelation.  It likewise gives us a divinely guaranteed witness to the 
constitution,   life and faith or the apostolic community. 
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In-contrast to the Bible,  dogmatic and theological statements are 
less concerned with presenting descriptively the experience of 
revelation than they are with defining more or less abstract details 
involved in the explanation of revealed truth.  We noted in the preceding 
chapter that the understanding of such abstract, expository statements 
demands that the l istener or reader supply from his own resources a 
concrete, imaginative representation of the object under discussion.  It is 
the Bible, insofar as it is the record of the experience and understanding 
of the original witnesses of the historical revelation, that supplies the 
believer with the guidance necessary to elaborate such concrete 
representations by means of realistic phantasms.  Thus, Scripture is the 
focal point for all dogmatic and theological statements. The 
Christological dogmas,  for instance,  find their real point of reference in 
the descriptive representation which the Bible gives us of the concrete 
man Jesus who lived and taught, died and rose again, in first century 
Palestine.  
It is difficult to discover straight-forward textual proofs in 
Scripture for most of the doctrines of the Church.  Scripture does not 
speak in the technical terms of modern theology and dogma. It is a rare 
biblical statement that can be abstracted from its context and made the 
major premise of some scientific theological deduction.  The value of the 
Bible as the foundation of dogma and theology lies in another direction.    
Repeated reading of Scripture produces a total impression in the 
listener.  This impression consists primarily not in the abstract concepts 
which the words evoke,  but in the complex of realistic phantasms which 
they call up.  Thus,   Mark's Gospel never explicitly calls Jesus God, but 
he unmistakably gives the impression that Jesus was a man who acts as 
only God could act    It is by insight into such phantasms,  not by a 
process of purely conceptual and verbal analysis, that theology and 
dogma principally advance.  The intricate textual and logical 
demonstrations by which the Church and the theologian attempt to certify 
their insights do not represent the actual process of discovery.  They 
pertain rather to the reflective justification of the insight. As we noted 
earlier,  the psychological process of discursive thought is quite 
different from its logical explication. 
The Bible, therefore, is the primary source of the experiential 
moment in the knowledge of faith.59  This is true even when it is a question 
of dogmas dealing with present-day perceptible supernatural realities 
like the Church,  the sacraments,  the life of grace, etc.  For although we 
actually perceive these realities here and now according to their sensible 
appearances,  we see their supernatural meaning only to the extent that 
we see the contemporary realities in relation to the original 
consciousness of the apostolic community.  We understand the 
supernatural  significance of the realities we directly experience as a 
prolongation and explication of the apostles' and prophets' original 
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understanding of them.  Thus, we see the papal office as continuing Peter's 
role in the apostolic community; we see the Mass as the present-day 
form of the Lord's supper,  and so forth. 
In contrast,  the dogmatic and theological formulations of belief 
refer primarily to the conceptual moment in the knowledge of faith. Like 
the conceptual moment itself,  they are meaningful only in relation to the 
Bible.  This is why the medieval scholastics identified the study of 
theology and dogma with the study of the sacred page.60  The present-day 
separation of exegesis and dogmatics is not a healthy situation, though it 
may endure for some years before the practical keys to its solution are 
discovered.61  Of course,  insofar as these disciplines have distinct 
methods and objects, no simple amalgamation of them would be either 
desirable or possible.  Nevertheless, in the knowledge of faith, possessed 
by the individual or by the Church as a whole, the content of the 
conclusions of these two disciplines must be integrated. Dogma ought to 
be seen as the conceptual explication of Scripture, subject like all such 
explication to the intrinsic limitations of conceptual understanding.   The 
Bible, on the other hand, read in the living context of Christian ecclesial 
life, must be seen as the experiential foundation for both the intuitive 
and the conceptual moments of faith-knowledge. 
J.    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The argument of this thesis is now complete. There remains only 
the task of summarizing its conclusions. 
The principal conclusion, stated concisely, is that already with the 
first assent of faith, given even the most rudimentary grasp of the. 
meaning of the Word of God, there is present an implicit, global 
experience of the reality revealed. This experience is not simply 
dynamic, but is truly cognitive.  It consists in an implicit, projective 
intuition of the reality along the lines of meaning indicated by the 
realistic phantasms and intelligible conceptions united by the act of 
judgment. In virtue of, and in the light of this implicit, projective 
intuition,   the believer strives to refine his phantasms and conceptions 
in order progressively to explicate the original global experience.  From 
this point of view, all growth in the knowledge of faith, all subsequent 
theological and dogmatic elaboration, is nothing more than the gradual 
explication of what was already given implicitly in the initial experience. 
A second conclusion which emerges from this investigation is an 
explanation of the primary conclusion in terms of the agencies operating 
to effect this partially explicated global experience of revelation. Since 
there is no question of a clear vision intrinsically evident, the realism of 
the experience is supplied by the assent which faith,  operating through 
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the will impels the intellect to give.  The specification of the experience 
depends entirely upon the hearing of the Word of God, though ordinary 
personal and vicarious experience and conceptual understanding provide 
the raw .materials for the explication of the Word's meaning in phantasms 
and conceptions.  The operation takes place in the internal senses and the 
possible intellect of the believer, with the agent intellect, most probably 
strengthened and elevated by the virtue of faith, providing the 
illumination. 
A third conclusion explains the way in which the various forms in 
which the Word of God is embodied'determine and specify the 
explication.    As the depository of the testimony of the privileged 
witnesses to the original events of historical revelation,  the Bible is the 
principal source for the experiential content of knowledge in faith; that 
is, it is the principal guide to the elaboration of the realistic phantasms 
from which all conceptual explanation must derive and upon which all 
conceptual explanation must be reflected.  In contrast, dogmatic and 
theological statements, insofar as they define and explain abstract facts 
and connections, are the proximate source and norm of the conceptual 
content of faiths knowledge
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EPILOGUE 
The theme underlying this dissertation has been that every 
conceptual explanation must in order to be meaningful be set back into 
the context of living experience which it explicates.  Alone in sense 
experience do we know concrete reality.  If this principle is correct, then 
the highly abstract, conceptual theory which we have outlined in this 
thesis is intrinsically self-effacing.  Like every conceptualization, it was 
conceived and elaborated in order to explicate the implicit content of an 
experience.  In the end, therefore, it must be resolved back into the 
implicitness of the experience of faith-knowledge.  In turn, the very 
consciousness of knowing by faith must resolve back into the primary 
experience faith gives us,  the experience of the loving divine Father, 
who sent his Word into the world he had made in order to save it from 
the power of sin, by revealing himself to mankind, redeeming man by his 
death and resurrection, and forming the new People of God by the power 
of his Spirit.  By faith,  as St. John says (1 John 5: 20): "we know that the 
Son of God has come and has given us understanding, but the goal of faith 
is not to know this act of knowing; rather, it is "that we may know the true 
God and may be in his true Son, who is the true God and eternal life. " 
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speciem representative; ergo habet formalem similitudinem'' [ John of 
St. Thomas,   Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, Naturalis philosophiae 
P. IV, qq. 6,  a.. 3  (ed. B. Reiser; Turin: Marietti,   1937) p.   184 a44-b7] .
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See Peifer, op. cit.., 91-96 
 
 
47 
Ibid., 95 
47 
Not only do both the internal senses and the intellect attain the 
object irrespective of its physical presence or absence,  but also they attain 
it in a more eminent mode of being than these objects have in their physical 
being.    Thus,  the imagination attains the object as represented; the 
estimative sense,  as useful or harmful; memory,  as recognized; intellect,  
as abstracted and universal.    See Gredt,  op. cit. ,  I,  p. 366,  n, 469; Peifer,  
op. cit., 148. 
48 
"Specie expressa  est rei cognitae similitudo, quae cognoscendo 
producitur, et in qua cognoscens contemplatur obiectum cognitum" (Gredt,   
op. cit. ,  I, 364,  n. 468). 
49 
Unfortunately the word "phantasm" has a pejorative connotation in 
much of modern psychology.   It usually denotes in that context an illusory 
or deceptive representation,  a product of hallucinations or fantasy.   
"Image" would probably be the best English equivalent and we will frequently 
use it as such. However, since the word image will not always suffice to 
make clear that we are talking about the expressed species of the internal 
senses and not the mental word or some kind of external likeness,  we will 
also make use of the term phantasm in this technical sense.  The use of 
"phantasm" for the mental image in the senses is listed in Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged,   ed.   P. 
B. Grove and the Merriam Webster Editorial Staff  (Springfield, Mass.: C. G8 
Merriam Co., 1961), 
v. c.  
50 
The classic text on the production and distinction of the expressed 
species is Thomas Aquinas' Summa contra gentiles,  I,   c.   53 (ed. Leonina 
manualis; Turin: Marietti,  1934):   "...  res exterior in-tellecta a nobis in 
intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam,  sed opportet 
quod species eius sit in intellectu nostro,  per quam fit intellectus in actu.  
Existens autem in actu per huiusmodi speciem sicut per propriam formam,  
intelligit rem ipsam.  Non autem ita quod ipsum intelligere sit actio 
transiens in intellectum,   sicut calefateio transit in calefactum,  sed manet 
in intelligente:  sed habet relationem ad rem quae intelligitur,   ex eo quod 
species praedicta,  quae est principium intellectualis operationis ut forma, 
est similitudo illius. 
Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus,  per speciem 
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rei formatus,  intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei 
intellectae,   quae est ratio ipsius,  quam significat definitio.    Et hoc quidem 
necessarium est:  eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et 
praesentem,  in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc 
amplius habet,  quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus 
materialibus,   sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non potest 
esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam forma ret. 
Haec autem intentio intellecta,  cum sit quasi terminus intel-
ligibilis operationis, .est  aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellec-tum 
in actu,   quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis prin-cipium:   
licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo.    Per hoc enim quod species 
intelligibilis est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium,   est similitudo 
rei exterioris,   sequitur quod intellectus intentionem format illi rei similem:   
quia quale est unumquodque,  talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio 
intellecta est similis alicui rei,   sequitur quod intellectus,  formando 
huiusmodi intentionem,  rem illam intelligat " 
51 
See John of St. Thomas,   Cursus,  Phil,  nat ,  p.   IV,  q.   11,  a.2; 
Reiser ed.,  p.   362a7~26. 
52 
"seejbid.,  q.   6,  a.   3; Reiser ed. ,  p.   191a47-b47. 
53 
Peifer,   op.   cit ,   144-46. 
54 
John of St   Thomas speaking of this process in intellectual 
knowledge explains the distinction thus:  operatio intellectus et versatur 
circa verbum producendo illud seu formando et exprimendo, et hoc est 
dicere seu loqui verbum   et secundo versatur circa obiectum quod 
repraesentatur in verbo.    Et circa hoc non versatur producendo,   quia 
intellectus non immutat neque tangit rem cognitam in vi intellectionis:   sed 
versatur apprehendo obiectum et trahendo ad se,   seu faciendo illud unum 
sibi,  ita ut intelligere sit esse ipsummet obiectum apprehensions.    Et hoc 
est intelligere,   scilicet ipsa sit operatio vitalis ut apprehendens:   significat 
enim intelligere apprehendere obiectum" [ Cursus theologicus,  In lam,  d.   
32,  a.   5 (Solesmes ed. ; Paris: Desclee,   1931-      ) IV, p.  79, n.   33] . 
55 
See Peifer, ■ op.   cit. ,   156-160. 
56 
Ibid. ,   162-64. 
57 
See ibid. ,   165-179; for a consideration of the expressed species in 
the internal senses see ibid. ,   105-09. 
58 
" hoc modo aliquid cognisciter secundum quod est in cognoscente 
repraesentatum,   et non secundum quod est in cognoscente existens.     
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Similitudo enim in vi cognoscitiva existens non est principium cognitionis rei 
secundum esse quod habet in potentia cognoscitiva,   sed secundum 
relationem quam habet ad rem cognitam" (Q. D.   De ver, ,  q.2, a. 5,  ad 17. 
59 
St. Thomas speaks of the concept as that by which the intellect 
knows in Super I Sent ,  d. 27,  q. 2,  a. 1 ad 4;  Q. D.   De ver. ,  q. 3,  a. 2  q. 4    
a. 2 ad 3,  taking it as a likeness of the object.    In other places he speaks of it 
as that in which the object is known,   e. g. ,   Super evangelium S.   Joannis 
lectura,  ed. R. Cai.  5th ed.   (Turin: Marietta, 1952) c. 1  lect. 1.   In other 
places still he speaks of it as that which is understood,   e. g. , Q. D. De pot.,  q. 
9,  a. 5; De ver., q 4, a 2 ad 3;  I, q. 28, a. 4 ad 1.~This meaning is also 
implied in Aquinas' frequent use of the phrase "intentio intellecta "   For a- 
discussion of this point see Peifer; op. cit., 183-212; also William W.   
Meiss^er    "Some Aspects of the Verbum in the Texts of St. Thomas, Modern 
Schoolman,  36 (1958),   22-25, 
60 
"Id autem quod est per se intellectum non est res illa cuius notitia 
per intellectum habetur,  cum illa quandoque sit intellecta in po-tentia 
tantu,   et sit extra intelligentem sicut cum homo intelligit res ma-teriales,   
ut lapidem ve animal aut aliud huiusmodi:   cum tamen oporteat quod 
intellectum sit in intelligente,   et unum cum ipso.    Neque etiam intellectum 
per se est similitudo rei intellectae,  per quam informatur intellectus ad 
intelligendum:   intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi ' secundum quod 
fit in actu per hanc similitudinem,   sicut nihil aliud potest operari secundum 
quod est in potentia,   sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam.    
Haec ergo similitude se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium,  
ut calor est principium calefactionis,   non sicut intelligendi terminus.    
Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in seipso concipit 
de re intellecta,   sive illud sit definitio,   sive enuntiatio,   secundum quod 
ponuntur duae operationes intellectus,   in III de Anima0    Hoc autem sic ab 
intellectu conceptum dicitur verbum interius" (Q. D.   De pot. ,  q. 9,  a. 5c), 
61 
".   .   .   conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem 
intellectam,  quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem.    Et 
ideo conceptio intellectus non solum est id quod intellectum est,   sed etiam 
id quo res intelligitur; ut sic id quod intelligitur,  possunt dici et res ipsa et 
conceptio intellectus; et similiter id quod dicitur,  potest dici et res quae 
dicitur per verbum et verbum ipsum . . . "  (Q. D.   de Ver, , q.  4,  a. 2 ad 3).   
In I,  q.   85,  a.   2,  however,  he notes that " species intellectiva secundario est 
id quod intelligitur,   sed id quod intelligitur primo,   est res cuius species 
intelligibilis'est similitudo. " 
62 
1 si quando D.  Thomas docet verbum seu conceptum non solum 
esse medium cognoscendo ut quo,   sed etiam esse cognitum ut quod loquitur 
ratione sui repraesentati,  quatenus in ipso conceptu habet obiectum reddi 
intellectivum et immaterializatum seu denudatum condicionibus 
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materialibus,   et sic non intelligitur ipse conceptus ut quod,   inquantum est 
qualitas quaedam informans intellectum:   sed res excogitata et formata per 
ilium conceptum cognoscitur ut_quod,   et sic comparatur ad rem extra, et 
induere potest rationem ideae" [ John of St.   Thomas,   Cursusjheol. ,  In 
Iam,  q. 15,  d. 21,  a. 1 (Solesmes ed. ) II,   p.   537b,   n.  11]  
63 
See Peifer,   op. cit.,  180-215; Meissner,  loc. cit,,   24-25, esp.   
note 26. 
64 
See Thomas de Vio Cajetan,  In De ente et essentia,   c. 1,  q.  2 ad 
3 (ed.. M. H. Laurent; Turin: Marietti, 1934), p. 25,  n. 14. 
Footnotes to Chapter IV; 
1 
On the interpersonal character of all human knowledge see Remi 
Kwant, Encounter, trans. R C. Adolf, 2nd ed. (Duquesne Studies,   Philos. 
series,  n, 11; Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1965), 25-50, 
2 
Regis,   op.   cit.,   267. 
3 
In II De anima,  lect. 13,  nn. 390-91; see Regis, op. cit , 268. 
4 
See Thomas Aquinas,  In libro De memoria et reminiscentia, lect. 
2,  n. 319  (ed. R. M. Spiazzi,  3rd ed.; Turin: Marietti, 1949). After observing 
that magnitude, motion and time are known by sense, Thomas distinguishes 
between two ways in which something can be perceived by sense:   "Uno 
quidem modo per ipsam immutationem sensus a sensibile, et sic 
cognoscuntur tam sensibilia propria quam etiam communia,  a sensibus 
propriis et a sensu communi.  Alio modo cognoscitur aliquid quadam 
secundario motu,  qui relinquitur ex prima immutatione sensus a sensibile.    
Qui quidem motus remanet et quandoque post ab-sentiam sensibilium et 
pertinet ad phantasiam, ut habitum est in libro De anima.  Phantasia autem 
secundum quod apparet per huius immutationem secundariam est passio 
sensus communis: sequitur enim totam immutationem sensus, quae incipit 
a sensibilibus propriis et terminatur ad sensum communem.    Unde 
manifestum est quod praedicta tria, scilicet magnitude,  motus et tempus,   
secundum quod sunt in phantasmate comprehenduntur et cognoscuntur per 
sensum communem." 
5 
 See Regis,   op. cit.,  271. 
 
6 
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See Guzie,   op. cit. ,  68.    Note that strictly speaking the word 
phantasm refers to the sensible image precisely in relation to the operation 
of the intellect. However,  it is also used in a broad sense to refer to the 
expressed image of the imagination both as constituted in itself and as 
modified by the activity of the cogitative sense, 
7 
 See Regis,   op.   cit. ,   271-275. 
8 
Aquinas says:   "Quod ..  sensu propria non cognoscitur,   si sit 
aliquid universale,  apprehenditur intellectu    Si vero apprehenditur in 
singulari,  utputa cum. video coloratum,  percipio hunc hominem vel hoc 
animal,  huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam,  
quae dicitur et ratio particularis,   eo quod est collati-va intentionem 
individualium,   sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium. 
"Nihilominus tarn en ha ec vis est in parte sensitiva:   quia vis 
sensitiva in sui supremo participant aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in 
quo sensus intellectui coniungitur.      .  .   . 
"Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura 
communi: quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectui in eodem subi-ecto; 
unde cognoscitur hunc hominem prout est hie homo,  t hoc lignum prout est 
hoc lignum.  Aestimativa autem non apprehenditur aliquid individuum,  
secundum quod est sub natura communi,  sed solum secundum quod est 
terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cogniscit 
agnus non inquantum est hie agnus sed inquantum est ab eo lactabilis; et 
hanc herbam inquantum est eius cibus.  Unde alia individua ad quae se non 
extendit eius actio vel passio,  nullo modo apprehendit sua aestimativa 
naturali,  Naturalis enim aestimativa datur animalibus utper eam 
ordinentur in actiones proprias, vel passiones prosequendas vel fugiendas. 
In II De anima,  lect. 13,  nn. 396-98). 
9 
Here is to be found the function of the cogitative sense in 
gathering the experimentum from which the intellect is able to draw the 
universal intelligible [See Thomas Aquinas,   In XII libros -Metaphysicorum,   
I,  lect.  1,  n. 15  (ed. M. R. Cathala and R M. Spiazzi; Turin: Marietti, 1950)] ; 
also its function in preparing the phantasms for intellection (See Contra 
gentiles,  II,   c.   73). 
10 
See Guzie,   op. cit. , 70o 
11 
See Regis,  op. cit. , 261-276. 
12 
See I,  qq. 84-88. 
13 
See In III De anima,  lect.  8; see also I,  q. 76,  a. 2 ad 4. 
14 
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I,  q. 79,  a. 2c. 
15 
Aquinas writes: "  ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est 
immateriale  sed quia Aristotiles non posuit formas rerum naturalium 
subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt 
intelligibiles actu:   sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium 
quas intelligimus,  non essent intelligibiles actu" (I,  q. 79,  a, 3c).    See also 
Regis,   op. cit. , 223 and D. M. De Petter, "De Oorsprong van de zijnskennis 
volgens Thomas van Aquino, " in Begrip en werkelijkheid,   ed._cit.,  118-
124. [ This article first appeared in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie,   17(1955).]  
16 
See Regis,   op. cit , 222-224. 
17 
See I,  q. 54, a. 4; q. 79,  a. 3. 
18 
"Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente et iterum ab eis 
per virtutem intellectum agentis species intelligibiles abstrahuntur.    
Illuminantur quidem,  quia sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad 
intellectivam efficitur virtuosior,  ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus 
agentis reduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahuntur. 
Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus,   
inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in  nostra 
cognitione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus secundum 
quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur" (I, q. 85,   a. 1 ad 4). 
19 
See De Petter,  "Oorsprong.  .  .   ," 114-124.    John of St. Thomas 
describes the causality of the phantasm as being neither efficient 
instrumental nor purely material,  but rather "objective instrumental" and 
"objective material," and again,   "matter after the manner of an object "    
See Cursus,  Phil,   nat. ,   P. IV,  q. 10,  a. 2; Reiser ed. ,   III,  p. 304a 15-313b 
26; also P. I., q. 26,  a. 2; Reiser ed., II, 529a 12-b 22.  See also Peifer,   op. cit. , 
124-31 and Regis, op. cit. , 235-36. 
20 
It is not the phantasm itself which is rendered actually intelligible,   
for this would require that the phantasm be dematerialized. Rather,  it is in 
the intelligible species produced by the agent intellect together with the 
phantasm that the object is represented intelligibly in act.    See John of St. 
Thomas,  Cursus, Phil, nat.,   P. IV,  q. 10,  a. 2; Reiser ed. , III,  p. 308 b 17- 
309 b 34.   In a less proper sense, however, the phantasm itself is rendered 
intelligible,  namely, insofar as the intellect reflects its conception back 
upon the phantasm and views the intelligible aspects of the object 
precisely as they are embodied in the phantasm. 
21 
See I,  q.   76, a.   2 ad 3 and 4. 
22 
" intellectus,  per speciem rei formatus intelligendo format in 
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seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam 
significat definitio.  Et hoc quidem necessarium est:  eo quod intellectus 
intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem,  in quo cum intellectu 
imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam 
intelligit rem ut separatum a conditiombus materxalibus, sine quibus in 
rerum natura non existit;  et hoc non e s s e  nisi intellects sibi intentionem 
praedictam formaret" (C, G.   I,   c. 53). 
23 
Speaking of the human intellect Aquinas says;   " proprium eius 
est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter 
existentem,   non tamen prout est in tali.materia.     Cognoscere vero id 
quod est in materia individuali non prout est in tali materia est abstrahere 
formam a materia individuali,  quam repraesentant phantasmata" (I,  q. 85, 
a. lc). 
2 4  ■ ■ 
See De Petter,  "Oorsprong ," 125. 
25 
"Intellectus enim possibilis,  sicut et quaelibet substantia, operatur 
secundum modum suae naturae.  Secundum autem suam natu-ram est forma 
corporis.  Unde intelligit quidem immaterialia, sed inspicit ea in aliquo 
materiali. Cuius signum est quod in doctrinis universalibus exempla 
particularia ponuntur,  in quibus quod dicitur inspiciatur.  Alio ergo modo 
se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasmata quo indiget,  ante speciem 
intelligibilem:   et alio modo postquam recepit speciem intelligibilem.  Ante 
enim,  indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem:   unde se habet ad 
intellectum possibilem ut obiectum movens.    Sed post speciem in eo 
receptam,  indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei:   unde 
se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens; secundum enim imperium 
intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei 
intelligibili,   in quo re-splendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in 
exemplato sive in imagine"  (C. G.   II,   c.   73). 
26 
"Intellectus autem humani,  qui est coniunctus corpori,  pro-prium 
obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per 
huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum 
aliqualem cognitionem ascendit    De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod 
in aliquo individuo existat,  quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de 
ratione naturae lapidis,   est quod sit in hoc lapide,   et de ratione naturae 
equi quod sit in hoc equo,   et sic de aliis.    Unde natura lapidis, vel 
cuiuscumque materialis rei,   cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi 
secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens.     Particulare autem 
apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem.    Et ideo necesse est ad hoc 
quod intellectus intelligat suuin obiectum proprium,   quod convertat se ad 
phantasmata,  ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem" 
(I,  q.   84,  a.   7c). 
27 
"...  operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae,  intellectus autem 
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hominis est in sensitive,  sicut dicitur in secundo De anima.  Et ideo propria 
operatio eius est intelligere intellegibilia  in phantasmatibus,   sicut 
intellectus substaritiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se 
intellectas" (In lib De mem, et remin. ,  lect. 2,  n. 317). 
28 
See I,  q. 57,  a. 2c; also a. 1 ad 2. 
29 
See I,  q. 58,  a. 4c; also C. G.   Ill,  c. 108,  n. 4; and Super II Sent. ,   d. 
3,  q. 1,  a. 6. 
30 
Super III Sent. ,  d. 35,  q. 2,  a. 2, sol. 1; see also I,  q. 79, a. 8.     This 
is the reason why the human intellect is called "ratio" rather than 
"intellectus, " for few natures are simple enough for the human intellect to 
grasp immediately in their distinctiveness; instead the intellect must 
proceed laboriously and discursively to its definitions and classifications. 
31 
To explain the details of this process would take us too far 
afield.    Happily an excellent though brief account can be found in Regis,   
op. cit. ,   283-306. 
32 
The necessity and nature of this implicit and intuitive moment 
corresponding to the explicit conceptual moment in human intellectual 
knowledge has been well described by De Petter in "Implicate Intuitie, " in 
Begrip en werkelijkheid,   ed. cit.,  25-43 (this article appeared  
or ig ina l ly  in  Ti jdschr i f t  voor  Phi losophie,  I  [1939]) .  
33 
Ibid., 30 
34 
See ibid-  32-33; also De Petter's "Zin en Grond van het oordeel," 
in Begrip en werkelijkheid,   ed. cit. ,   74-93.' 
35 
Regis,   op. cit. ,   312. 
36 
Ibid., 312-13. 
37 
"Het menselijke oordeel is derhalve de akt waardoor het kennend 
subject zich formeel bewust wordt van de in de abstract begripsinhoud 
geimpliceerde intuitive zijnsinhoud,   en op grond hiervan de abstracte 
begripsinhoud naar het concrete en dus werkelijk bestaand op bevestigende 
wijze terugvoert" (De Petter,  "Zin , " 9 1 ;  see also "Implicite Intuitie, " 
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32. 
38. 
See I,  q.   14,  a.   14c; q.   58,  a,   4. 
39 
See Q. D.   De ver. ,  q. 9,  a.  lc. 
40 
Regis notes:   "Within this intelligible whole constructed by the 
intellect,   concept nouns are what substance is in the extramental thing; 
they are the stable,  permanent element remaining identical despite the 
attribution of a multitude of predicates.    This is why they are subjects, for 
what characterizes substance is precisely,   as its name indicates, its 
support of accidents,  its giving them existence.     Concept verbs,   on the 
contrary,  have an entirely different role to play in the intellect's synthesis 
of the concepts of apprehension.    Their function relative to the subject is 
informative,  actualizing.  They are its form, its acts just as accidents are 
the perfective form or substance; they express action,   passion,   existere,   
insofar as they inhere in the subject,   insofar as the subject is their source 
and term.  Since action, passion and existence are always acts whose 
perfective elements (concept verbs) are always predicates par excellence,  
and since no other concept can play the role of predicate par excellence 
unless the verb be present to help it perform this function,   'the verb 
always signifies what is predicated"1 (pp. cit. ,   320 
41 
See ibid.,  320-21; also Guzie,   op. cit.,  115-19; and Bernard Lonergan,   
"The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St.   Thomas Aquinas," Theological 
Studies,  8 (1947),   39. 
42 
" duplex est operatio intellectus.  Una, quae dicitur 'intelligentia 
indivisibilium', qua cognoscitur de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero,  qua 
componit et dividit,  scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam 
formando.  Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus,  quae sunt in rebus 
respondent.  Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei,   secundum 
quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet,   sive sit res 
completa ut totum aliquod,   sive res incompleta,  ut pars vel accidens,   
Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei,   quod quidem. resultat ex 
congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam 
rei concomitatur,  ut in substantiis simplici-bus" [ Thomas Aquinas,  
Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate,   ed. Bruno Decker,   2nd ed.   
(Studien u. Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters,   4; Leiden: Brill, 
1959),  q. 5,  a. 3c.    (All subsequent references to Aquinas' Super Boeth.   De 
trin, ,  are to this edition)] . 
43 
See Regis,   op. cit. , 329-31. 
44 
De Petter, "Zin. ...," 90-91. 
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45 
See Regis,   op. cit. ,   331-33. 
46 
See De Petter,   op. cit ,   81-91. 
47 
"Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus; idem 
autem non adaequatio sibi ipsi, sed aqualitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo 
invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid 
proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet,  sed aliquid ei 
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Non enim omnis qui cogitat, credit; cum ideo cogitent plerique ne credant:   
sed cogitat omnis qui credit, et credendo cogitat, et cogitando credit" [ 
Aurelius Augustinus,  De Praedestinatione sanctorum,   c.   ii,  n,   5 (P. L.  44,  
963)] . 
 
156 
"...  dicitur cogitare magis proprie consideratio intellectus quae est 
cum quadam inquisitione,  antequam perveniatur ad perfectionem intellectus 
per certitudinem visionis" (II-II,  q.   2,  a.   lc). 
157 
"Actuum enim ad intellectum pertinentium quidem habent firmam 
assensionem absque tali cogitatione,   sicut aliquis considerat ea quae scit 
vel intelligit:   talis enim consideratio iam est formata. Quidam vero actus 
intellectus habent quidem cogitationem informem absque firma assensione:   
sive in neutram partem declinent,   sicut accidit dubitanti; sive in unam 
partem magis declinent. sed tenentur aliquo levi signo,   sicut accidit 
suspicanti; sive uni parti adhaereat,   tamen cum formidine alterius, quod 
accidit opinanti.    Sed actus iste qui est credere habet firmam adhaesionem 
ad unam partem,   in quo convenit cre~-dens cum sciente et intelligente:   et 
tamen eius cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem,   in quo 
convenit cum dubitante,   suspicante, et opinante.    Et sic proprium est 
credentis ut cum assensu cogitet .   .   ." (II-II,   q.   2,   a.   lc). 
158 
See Dhanis, loc.   cit. ,   211-12. 
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See Garragan,  op.   cit. ,  73-80,  on the nature of historical certainty.    
See I-II,  q.   14,  a.   6 ad 3 on the necessity found in contingent particulars. 
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Plato,   The Apology,   39E-43,  par.   31,  in Loeb Classical Library: 
Plato,  I,   ed.  H.  W.   Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,   I960),   139-
41. 
Footnotes to Chapter V; 
1 
Even one who does not subscribe to Rahner's theory of the 
supernatural existential must respect his criticism of the extrinsicist 
position regarding man's experience of himself as purely natural.    See Karl 
Rahner,  "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, " in 
Theological Investigations,  I,   ed.   cit. ,   298-302. 
2 
See Schillebeeckx,  "L'Aspect non conceptuelle de la connaisance de 
foi: La Problematique," in Approches Theologiques,   I, _ed. cit. ,   314-15. 
3 
"  de substantiis illis immaterialibus secundum statum viae nullo 
modo possumus scire quid est non solum per viam naturalis cognitionis,   
sed etiam nee per viam revelationis,  quia divinae revelationis radius ad nos 
pervenit secundum modum nostrum ut Dionyisus dicit.  Unde quamvis per 
revelationem elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum,  quod alias esse nobis 
ignotum,  non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia" 
(Super Boeth.   De Trin. ,  q. 6,  a. 3, par. 2). 
4 
 II-II,  q. 175,  aa. 4-5;   Q. Do De ver. ,  q. 13,  a. 3. 
5 
 II-II,   q. 174,  a. 2 ad 4;   see Q. D. De ver. ,  q. 12,  a. 12 ad 2. 
6 
Q. Do De ver.,  q. 13, a.  3;   II-II,  q.  175, a. 4 ad 3. 
7 
"Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei, quamvis 
ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat,   sed an est solum. Primo,  
secundum quod perfectius cognoscitur ens efficacia in produ-cendo res.  
Secundo prout nobiliorum effectuum causa cognoscitur,   qui cum eius 
similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis eminentiam eius commendant.  Tertio 
in hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur elongatus ab omnibus his quae in 
effectibus apparent" (Super Boeth.  De Triru ,  q. 1, a.  2c,  par. 3). 
8 
See Basil Davidson, Africa: History of a Continent (New York: 
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Macmillan,  1966),   171-77; also Basil Davidson and the editors of Time-Life 
Books,  African Kingdoms,  in (The Great Ages of Man series; New York: 
Time Inc., 1966),  59-60,   178. 
9 
See Co G.,  III,  c. 154; also the texts of Aquinas' treatment of 
prophetic knowledge in II-II,  q. 173,  a. 2c.    What is formal in 
prophetic knowledge is the divine light (II-II,  q. 171,  a. 3 ad 3). 
10 
See Q. D. De ver. ,  q. 12, a. 7c. 
11 
See Thomas Aquinas,  Super evangelium S. Ioanms lectura,   ed, 
R. Cai,   5th ed.   (Turin: Marietti, 1952),  c. 11,  lect 7,  n. 1579. 
12 
Both in Q. D. De ver. Q. 12, a.7 and in  II-II,   q. 173,  a. 2, St. Thomas 
stresses the inadequacy of a mere apprehension of species. There must be a 
judgment before the communication is consummated. See Paul Synave and 
Pierre Benoit,   Prophec_y_andJinspiration,   trans. A, R. Dulles and T. L. 
Sheridan (New York: Desclees Co. ,   1961), 64-65. 
13 
See the excellent study of this matter by J. De la Potterie, 
"L'Onction du Chrétien par la foi, " Biblica,   40 (1959),   12-69.    
This work shows clearly the dependence of this inner light of faith 
on the Word of God in the apostolic teaching for its specification. 
14 
See C. G,, III,  c. 154,  also Super Boeth. De Trin. ,   q0 1,  a.1,par.   
3O 
15 
"Fides principaliter est ex infusione ,   sed quantum ad 
determinationem suam est ex auditu, " Super IV Sent. , d. 4,  q. 2,  a. 2, sol. 
3 ad 1.   See also  II-II,  q. 6,  a. 1c.  For a thorough comparison of the 
light of faith with the light of prophecy,   see Juan Alfaro, 
"Supernaturalitas fidei iuxta S. Thomam," Greg.   44 (1963),  533-41. 
16 
"Formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima secundum quod 
manifestatur in Scripturis sacris et in doctrina Ecclesiae" (II-II, 
q. 5, a. 3 ad 2). 
17 
" fides ex duabus partibus est; a Deo scilicet ex parte 
interioris luminis,  quod inducit ad assensum; et ex parte eorum quae 
exterius proponuntur,  quae ex divina revelatione initium sumpserunt: 
et haec se habent ad cognitionem principiorum, quia utriusque fit 
aliquae cognitionis determination  Unde sicut cognitio principiorum 
accipitur a sensu, et tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur est 
innatum ita fides est ex auditu et tamen habitus fidei est infusus" 
(Super_Boeth. De_Trin. q. 3, a. l and  4; see also Super I Sent ,  prol.,  q. 
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1, a 5, sol.;  Super III Sent., d. 14, a. 1, sol. 2 ad 1;   Super IV_Sent. , d. 4, q. 2, 
a. 2 sol. 3 ad 1; Q. D. De anima,  q. unic., a. 5 ad 6;   I, q. 1l l ,   a. 1, ad 1;   I-
II,  q. 62,  a. 3;  II-II,  q. 6,  a. 1. 
18 
This is the conclusion of the very thorough studies of Benoit 
Duroux,   "Illumination de la foi chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, " 
Freiburger Zeitschrift,   3 (1956),   28-38; Mo   Seckler,  Instinkt und 
Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin (Mainz; Matthias Grünewald,   1962) [ 
regrettably this work was unavailable to me,   though its argumentation is 
summarized in Schillebeeckx,  "L'aspect non conceptuelle  de foi, " 315-
321],  and Alfaro, _loc. _cit ,   Schillebeeckx (loc. cit. ,   315-21),  however,  
takes exception to an exclusive interpretation of the illumination of faith 
under the aspect of instinctus and assent. 
19 
R. M. Schultes,  Introductio in historiam dogmatum (Paris: 
Lethiellieux, 1922),  74-85,  has shown that for the thirteenth century-
scholastics,  especially Aquinas,  the term "articulus fidei" has a very 
technical sense.  It meant the primary truths necessary for salvation and 
distinguished one from another by the distinct difficulties they offer for 
belief.  Other truths are revealed and believed insofar as they are related to 
these articles.  In the fourteenth century, however, nominalist theologians 
began to use the term indiscriminately for all revealed truth.    Denying all 
articulation within the deposit of revealed truth, the nominalist theologians 
denied the possibility of theological reasoning operating within the object of 
faith and revelation,  Instead they made a complete separation of the objects 
of faith and theology:  faith has as its object all the truths of revelation and 
has assent as its only act; theology,   on the contrary,  has as its object those 
new truths which can be deduced by pure reasoning from truths of 
revelation and has as its act deduction.    It was this nominalist notion that 
was adopted by many of the classic commentators on St. Thomas and gave 
rise to the erroneous notion that for St. Thomas theology was a purely 
deductive science based upon revealed truths but ordered to an object 
completely extrinsic to faith. Schultes1 conclusions have been confirmed by 
Albert Lang in "Die Gliederung und die Rdchweite des Glaubens nach 
Thomas von Aquin und den Thomisten, " Div. Thom.  (Frib.. ),   20 (1942),  
207-236; 335-46; 21 (1943),   79-99; and Die theologische Prinzipienlehre 
der mittelalterlichen Scholastik (Freiburg im Br. : Herder,   1964). 
20 
See II-II,  q.   1,  a.   8. 
21 
The immediate effect of faith is a "simplex cognitio articulo-rum,  
quae sunt principia totius christianae sapientiae" (Super HI Sent.,   d.   35,  
q.   2,  a.   1,   sol.   l a d  1.    See also Super I Sent.,  prol., q. 1,  a. 3,  q'la 3, sol, 
2;  Super III Sent.,  d. 24,  a. 2,  sol. .1 and 2. 
22 
On the distinction between knowing in faith and from faith, see In 
Div. nom.,   c. 1,  lect,. n. 11. 
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23 
See II-II,  q. 1,  a. 6 and 8-9. 
24 
See M. Labourdette,  "La théologie,  intelligence de la foi, " R Thom.   
46 (1946), 12-16,  for a treatment of the formally illuminative character of 
faith; also Schillebeeckx,  "De la foi apostolique ," 69-76. 
25 
Labourdette,  loc. cit. ,   12-13. 
26 
The precise reason why God spoke to man and became incarnate in 
Christ was to reveal to man his supernatural destiny and to teach him the 
means by which God would bring man to that destiny. See  I,  q. 1, a. 1; also Q. 
D. De Ver.,  q. 14,  a. 2 and a. 3 ad 9. 
27 
Alfaro,  loc. cit. ,   535-40; and Douroux,  loc. cit. ,   32-38. 
28 
See esp. Douroux,  loc. cit. 
29 
'     Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,  Le sens du mystère et le claire 
obscure intellectuel (Paris: Desclee de Br. , 1934),  51-56,  58-61,  
254-86 and esp.  331-39. 
30 
We might note that insofar as Christian art is an extension of the 
preaching of the Church,  the Word' of God also comes to us in visual,   
iconic and non-iconic symbolic phantasms and in the non-verbal auditory 
phantasms of music.    These forms in fact play a very important role in the 
knowledge of faith,  but as they depend upon and supplement the verbal 
Word of God we shall not treat specially of them. 
31 
See Alonzo Scho'kel,   op. cit. ,   38-45. 
32 
See Jean Levie,  The Bible: Word of God in Words of Men, trans.   
S. H. Treman,  298-301,   esp.  300-01. 
33 
On the normative function of Scripture in the Church's preaching 
see Yves Congar, "Bible et Parole de Dieu, " in Les voies de Dieu vivante 
(Paris: Cerf, 1962),   41. 
34 
See Levie,   op.   cit. ,   298-99. 
35 
See Heinrich Kahlefeld,   Parables and Instructions in the Gospels,   
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trans. A. Swidler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 90-94, on the 
distinction between the contextual meaning of Jesus' words in his own 
preaching and in the evangelist's narration of them. 
36 
For a positive evaluation of demythologizing as a method for 
uncovering and clarifying theological truth see Heinrich Fries, 
"Entmythologisierung und theologische Wahrheit, " in Gott in Welt: Festgabe 
fur Karl Rahner,   ed.   J. B. Metz et. al.  (Freiburg: Herder,  1964),   I, 366-391. 
37 
In treating of prophetic knowledge,  Aquinas has treated at length 
of the interaction of phantasms and concepts in revealed knowledge; see esp.   
Q. D.   De Ver.,  q. 12,  aa. 7, 9, 12, and 13;   II-II, q. 173, aa. 2, 3;  q. 174, aa. 2, 3;  
q. 175, aa. 1 and 4.   Regrettably, neither he nor his commentators seem to have 
made any effort to explain the knowledge of faith along similar lines. 
38 
It should be noted that there is a special problem of the certitude 
of such a reflection of an article of faith in perception ( s e e  II-II, q. 1,  a 3 ad 
4).  Thomas would explain the judgment given in such a perception of faith as 
participating in the certitude of the applicable universal article of faith.     
Consequently, should this judgment de facto be false, because the 
bread was not validly consecrated or some such thing,  this erroneous 
judgment i-pso facto would not be a judgment of faith but only a 
conjecture (see I,  q. 14, a. 13c)« 
39 
See Philippe,  op. cit., 195-200. 
40 
See Conley,   op. cit. ,   132-37. 
41 
See M.  Labourdette, "La vie théologale selon S. Thomas, " 
RThom.   60 (I960), 364-80; also Philippe, op, cit., 195-200; and M. D. 
Chenu, "L'amour dans la foi," in La Parole de Dieu,   ed. cit.,  I, 108-
111.  Aquinas  says explicitly:  "Inchoatio etiam fidei est in 
affectione,  inquantum voluntas determinat intellectum ad 
assentiendum his quae sunt fidei.  Sed voluntas nec est actus caritatis 
nec spei,  sed quidam appetitus boni repromissi" (Q. Do   De ver.,  q. 14,   
a, 2 ad 10. 
42 
"...  fides  hominem divinae cognitione coniungit per 
assensum" (Q. Do   De ver., q. 14,  a. 8 c ;  see also II-II, q. 1, a. 2c. 
43 
See II-II, q. 2,  aa. 5-7. 
44 
Schillebeeckx,  "Qu'est que la théologie, " in Approches 
thgol. 
ed. cit.,   88-89. 
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45 
See R. Gagnabet,  irLe nature de la théologie speculative," 
RThom 44 (1938), 1-39,  213-255,  645-674.  In the wake of 
Gagnabets~articles,  and in response to the approximately 
contemporary publications of J.-Fr. Bonnefoy [ "La théologie comme 
science et lexplication de la foi selon saint Thomas d'Aquin, " £TL 
14 (1937) ,  421-426,  600-631; 15 (1938), 491-516]   and Louis 
Charlier, [Essai sur la problème théologique (Thuillies: Ramgall, 
1938)],  a vast literature grew up in the late thirties and extending 
even to the early fifties.  The center of this controversy was the so-
called "theological conclusion"and the notion that the object and 
activities of scientific theology are extrinsic to the knowledge of faith. 
Some have persisted in holding an extrinsecist notion of theology 
as a deductive science.  A particularly unfortunate example of this position 
mars the otherwise excellent work of F. Muniz ["De diver sis muneribus S.   
Theologiae secundum doctrinam S. Thomae, " Ang.   24(1947),   93-123],     
Convinced that Aristotelian-Thomistic demonstration has as its object 
exclusively the discovery of new truths, rather than causal explanation,   
Muniz was forced to relegate all theological consideration of directly 
revealed truth to a non-scientific, "sapiential" function.  Had he had a 
clearer understanding of the nature of demonstration,  he would have seen 
that only discourse about the fundamental articles of faith belongs to this 
non-scientific "sapiential" function,   and that the scientific function of 
theology is operative even within the deposit of revealed truths insofar as it 
explains secondary revealed truths by connecting them with the articles. 
For a more balanced account of the various functions of theo-
logical discourse see Labourdette, "La théologie ... ," 24-25,   34-35; Reginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange,  La synthése thomiste (Paris: Desclee de Br. 1946),   
108-113 [ The position taken here constitutes a notable advance over the 
earlier and more widely known views of the author]  ; Schillebeeckx,   
"Qu'est que la théol. ," 95-136; and Kevin Conley,   op. cit. ,   66-103 [ 
Conley's work is particularly good in its treatment of the primarily 
contemplative nature of theology,  pp.   81-89] . 
Even when theological reasoning does lead to discovery of new 
aspects of revealed realities,  the process by which the discovery is made 
is much closer to the inductive methods of the sciences than to a purely 
deductive process of the mathematical type.    See Labourdette, loc. cit. ,   39. 
 
46 
M. D. Chenu,   "Vocabulaire biblique et vocabulaire théologi-
Parole de Dieu,  ed. cit. ,  I,   171-86.
47 
See Yves Congar,   La foi_et_la théologie  (Le mystere chrgtien; 
Tournai: Desclee,  1962), 197-201. 
48 
The formal quo object of theology is neither purely human nor 
purely divine,  but is both divine and human (see Congar,   op.   cit. , 129-30).     
The theologian does not assent to his theological explanation by faith [ s ee  . 
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Congar's review of the articles of J. F.  Bonnefoy in Bthom. 5 (1937-39),   
502-03] ; nevertheless he assents by faith to the revealed truth which his 
theological explanation contains and explains. This revealed truth is 
embodied for him in the representations of his imagination and conceptual 
understanding,   though he recognizes intuitively that it is more extensive 
and more profound than his representations explicitly delineate.  It is,   
therefore, in and through these theological representations that he gives 
his assent to the reality; apart from such representations he simply has no 
noetic contact with the revealed reality (see Schillebeeckx,   "Le concept de 
verité, " 239-40). 
49 
See Schillebeeckx,  "De la foi », 69-76; also «Le concept de 
vérité",  237-242. 
50 
Jo R. Geiselman [art.  "Dogma, " in Handbuch für theolo-gische 
Grundbegriffe,   ed. H. Fries (Munich: Kosel, 196 2), I,  233]   observes:    
"Doqmen sind menschliche,  wenn auch authentische,   autoritative und 
unfehlbare Aussagen über das Wort Gottes.   Dieses ist göttlich, absolut,  
unausschöpfbar.  Jene sind menschlich,  d. h. relativ,   und umfassen nur 
je einen Teil des Gotteswortes, so das nicht nur ein tieferes Erfassen 
des Gotteswortes und ein Fortschreiten in der Erkenntnis im Laufe der 
Geschichte möglich, sondern auch tatsachlich erfolgt sind." 
51 
See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,  La sens commun: La 
philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques,   4th ed.  (Paris: 
Desclee de Br., 1936), 365-378;  also Congar,  La foi ,  65-66. 
52 
53 
See Congar,  ibid. ,   70-71. 
Schillebeeckx,   "Le concept ,".239-40. 
54 
"C'est seulement à la suite de nouvelles expériences 
humaines,  de nouvelles données positives,  que la question de la 
distinction entre le 'contenu' et le 'revétement' de la foi s ' e s t  
expressément posée et qu'il a été possible d'examiner si le 
'revétement1 n'etait qu'un simple manière de se représenter les 
choses ou appartenait également au contenu dogmatique" (ibid. ,   
240). 
55 
See Aloys Grillmeier,  Christ in Christian Tradition,   
trans. J.  S. Bowden (New York: Sheed and Ward,1965), 329-495. 
56 
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See Schillebeeckx,  loc. cit. ,   237-42. 
57 
See Vat   II,   De rev. ,   c. 1,  nn. 9-10,  and  c. 6,  n. 21. 
58 
See P.   Grelot,  "Exégèse,  théologie et pastorale, " NRT 98 
(1966),  132-36. 
59 
   See M. D. Chenu, Vocabulaire ...,, 186. 
60 
See Johannes Beumer,  "Das katholische Schriftprinzip 
in der theologischen Literatur de Scholastik bis zur 
Reformation," Schol. 16 (1939), 24-52. 
61 
A notable body of literature has grown up on this point. 
Some of the best contributions can be found in Herbert 
Vorgrimler's Biblical versus Dogmatic TheolojyL  ed1_cit1_ 
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PHILOSOPHIA AND SACRA DOCTRINA 
New insights into Thomas Aquinas understanding of the relationship 
between science and philosophy, Sacred Scripture and theology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At first sight it would appear unlikely that anything new can be said about this topical complex 
about which so much ink has been spilled. Yet I claim here to do just that. Historical research has 
overthrown mighty pillars of the classical neoscholastic approach to the topic. 1) We now see 
more clearly than before, that the expression sacra doctrina in the decisive Quaestio prima of 
the Summa theologiae was for Thomas a technical term, whose meaning is not simply to be 
equated with scientific theology. 2) More and more attention is paid to Aquinas commentaries 
on the Bible and on Aristotle, which thus come to be seen as important sources for understanding 
his theology and philosophy. 3) The relationship between metaphysics and natural philosophy for 
Thomas is seen to differ from that propagated by classical neothomism. The Aristotle 
commentaries show that a) Aquinas so-called natural philosophy was not a speculative 
metaphysics, but rather an empirical natural science of physics, chemistry and biology; that b) his 
psychology, ethics and social teaching were likewise empirically based human sciences; and that 
c) his metaphysics is based neither on an intuition nor on an abstraction of being and is concerned 
in the first place not with immaterial being, but rather with a dimension of being revealed in the 
empirical-material environment of daily experience, a dimension opened up by the so-called 
negative judgment of separation, which recognizes that being as such is not exclusively material. 
These new insights, which I shall discuss further in the course of this essay, imperate, I am 
convinced, a new discussion of the relationships between the Bible, theology and philosophy as 
understood by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 
 
Two directions of human knowing 
 
 The prevailing understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology for Aquinas 
was often presented in such a way as though it were a matter of two different levels of knowledge 
 German critics speak of Stockwerk-Theologie i.e. two-story thinking: below lies  the natural 
level of thinking, above the supernatural level. By contrast, my thesis is that we have to do here 
with two distinct but related directions of knowledge: one from below, i.e. from the natural world 
of human experience, the other from above, from the revealed point of view of God himself. 
 
1. Science from below 
 
 For Thomas our knowledge is fundamentally rooted in sense perception. Through the external 
and internal senses, in particular through the imagination, the material world surounding us, i.e. 
the external reality, is re-presented in the body/soul unity which constitutes the knowing human 
subject. These re-presentations Thomas, with Aristotle, calls phantasmata or experimentum. 
By his natural powers, the human being knows only what is, in some way or other, contained in 
this re-presentation, either directly as a sensibly perceptible object, or indirectly as a causal 
relationship to another object which may not be directly perceptible. It is the task of 
understanding and reason to recognize such causal relationships. Concepts, for Aquinas, are 
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relational constructions, not immediately intuitive illuminations; they are not abstracted simply by 
leaving out particulars, but rather they are built up dialectically on the basis of discursive inquiry 
into the empirical data presented in phantasms. In the course of this by no means simple process 
of conception and explanation of the sensibly perceived world surrounding us, we discover at 
various points in cosmology and anthropology/psychology, that, beneath (or perhaps better 
within) the material reality which we perceive, there are immaterial realities which serve as the 
cause of empirically observable phenomena. 
 
Up to this discovery, we move on the level of natural and human science. (Our habitual 
distinction between natural philosophy and natural science, between empirical human sciences 
and rational psychology, ethics and social theory, was completely foreign to Thomas, as it was for 
his mentor Aristotle.)  However, with the discovery of immaterial being in the form of a remote 
immaterial mover and remote efficient cause of physical changes and an immaterial soul as the 
cause of properly human knowledge and volition, a new dimension of being makes ist appearance 
as we recognize that being is not to be equated with materiality and that the potency/act structure 
is found in material and immaterial being as well as a composition of essence and existence. The 
recognition of this deeper dimension of being through this negative judgment of separation is 
what makes a metaphysics possible as a first science of composite being. For Thomas, in contrast 
to thinkers inspired by Augustine, in particular the Franciscan schools, whose influence reaches 
down through the Schulmetaphysik of the 17th/18th Centuries down to many a neothomist of 
the 20th Century, metaphysics rests not on intuition or abstraction, but rather on this separation 
judgment. 
 
This new meta-physical science concerns itself with being as such, i.e. with being as the 
common dimension of composite beings (thus not including divine being), be they material or 
immaterial. However, such a metaphysics is likewise bound by the dependence of all human 
knowledge on the sensible phantasmata, which are mans point of contact with external reality. 
We continue to see being as such only as it reveals itself in our phantasms of sensible being: 
without these, Thomas says in In Eth. Nic. VI, lect 7, our metaphysical concepts are mere empty 
words. Thus metaphysics likewise concerns itself primarily with perceptible reality, however, at a 
deeper level than that of the natural and human sciences. It is able to make statements about the 
immaterial causes of material being and its sensible phenomena and in dependence upon sensible 
realty to make deductive statements about the nature of such immaterial beings, which are known 
not by abstraction but rather by remotion, the removal of material conditions through analogous 
predication. 
 
This is the background for properly grasping Thomas understanding of the relationship between 
revelation, faith and theology. 
 
The way Thomas understood natural knowledge, both physical and metaphysical, can be 
illustrated by a metaphor. The scientist or philosopher can be compared to a geologist, who is 
situated in a deep valley surrounded by high mountains which mark the boundaries of his field of 
vision. On the basis of observations on the alluvial deposits and the geological strata, the 
geologist is able to make a variety of judgments about the mountain landscape beyond his field of 
vision, though this is known only as the cause of what he observes. Though imaginable, the 
landscape beyond the mountain rim is in fact only known by inference and as a function of what 
is directly observable. Based on his broad fund of experience, the geologist is thus able to 
imagine what the world beyond his perceptual horizon might be like. But he must continually 
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remind himself that his inferences and images are known only indirectly in models, not in the 
reality itself. So it is with our natural knowledge, be it physical or metaphysical. It is knowledge 
from below which looks up to the boundaries of our experiential horizon and looks beyond this 
only in analogies structured by removal of material conditions. 
 
2. Science from above 
 
Returning to the geology metaphor, we recognize that, for the geologist in the parable, there is 
theoretically another mode of knowing open to him. If  he could use an airplane or climb the 
highest peak, he could look down on his landscape from above. Then the relationship of the 
mountains and valleys, the watercourses and the plains would be immediately clear, without 
having to rely on inferences based on observations from the valley floor. Note, however, that this 
mode of knowing also has its limitations: it lacks the immediacy of field observation, the details 
revealed only to direct investigation. For Thomas, this perspective from above is what is 
characteristic of revelation and faith knowledge. This is what Thomas has in mind when he uses 
the technical term sacra doctrina!in the first question of the Summa theologiae. 
 
According to Thomas, following Aristotle, there are four scientific questions to be asked in any 
discipline. The first question An sit?!asks if there is a subject open to scientific inquiry. In S.T., 
I, q.1, a.1 the question is posed, is there a sacra doctrina as a distinct form of knowledge?. 
Answering yes, because there is a corresponding subject for such inquiry, Thomas proceeds in the 
next articles to pose the question Quid sit?. He answers with a fourfold definition of that 
subject in terms of the four causes: material cause (of what is the subject composed?), formal 
cause (what are the generic and specific aspects setting it off from other subjects of knowledge?), 
efficient cause (under what causal agent and in what process has it come into being?), and final 
cause (to what does it tend, what does it produce?). Applied to the topic sacra doctrina, this 
analysis yields the following definition: sacra doctrina is a body of knowledge about God and 
creation (material cause) communicated by God through the sacra scriptura (efficient and formal 
cause) to endow believers with understanding of God and the world from the point of view of 
God Himself and the saints and angels in heaven enjoying the beatific vision (final cause). The 
next question is Quomodo sit?, what are the generic and specific properties of the subject? This 
question is complemented by the question Propter quid sit?: why does the subject have these 
properties?. Thus in the following articles Thomas asks if sacra doctrina is speculative or 
practical, argumentive, metaphorical, etc.  
 
Note that Thomas speaks here of the subject of the sacred teaching. Methodically, it is essential 
to note, for Thomas, the difference between the subject and the object of a scientific discipline. 
The object of a science is the body of truths contained therein: materially this is the sum of the 
real objects known in the propositions of the discipline, formally it is the aspects of these real 
objects which are brought to light in the propositions of the science. The subject of a scientific 
discipline is, by contrast, the topic about which the discipline makes its statements, i.e. it is the 
grammatical subject of the main propositions formulated by the discipline. Corresponding to the 
sentence subjects are the sentence predicates, which are identical with the formal object of the 
discipline. They bring to expression and therefore to conscieous cognition the individual aspects 
of the (material) object (= subject) known. The reason for this relationship lies in the discursive 
character of human knowledge. Unlike the angels, we do not have immediate and comprehensive 
access to the ideas of things; we know not instantaneously but only successively, attending to one 
aspect after another and expressing in propositional form the particular aspect of the subject to 
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which we attend at the moment of making such a statement. In this sense, one can say that the 
formal object of a discipline is the sum total of the propositions or statements made in the 
discipline. What makes such statements scientific is that reasons are given, why the predicates 
should belong to the subject, i.e. why the property expressed in the predicate truly belongs to the 
subject. 
 
The aim of science is thus to give reasoned knowledge, i.e.not only to establish what can be said 
of a subject, but also and more importantly why it can be said of the subject. Questions of fact 
must normally be answered empirically by appeal to experimentum or to the testimony of 
credible witnesses. The function of reasoning, by contrast, is to discover middle terms linking 
subject and predicate. There are two types of such reasons. Quia-reasons are immediate causes of 
knowing, but not necessarily causes of being. Thus one answers the question An sit? by 
pointing to phenomena manifesting the existence of a subject of predication. Thomas explains the 
existence of sacra doctrina by calling attention to mans need for more information about divine 
things than philosophy and normal science can supply. Such reasons are either secondary causes 
of bieng, e.g. remote ends, or simply causes of knowledge, e.g. emperical phenomena. Propter 
quid-reasons, by contrast, are proper and immediate reasons for both being and knowing. Sacra 
doctrina is speculative, because it deals with God and his creation and governance of the world; it 
is argumentive because it is a science, it is metaphorical because it deals with objects beyond 
human comprehension. Propter quid-reasons are identical with the four causes by which a subject 
is defined. As the discussion of the 1st Question of the Summa theologiae shows, it is impossible 
to understand what Thomas is trying to say, if one does not take into account this methodology 
 
Thus for Thomas the sacra doctrina is a participation in the knowledge of God and the blessed. 
In this way it is comparable to the view from above in the parable of the geologist. It is a teaching 
about the way God sees himself and his creation, from the cause, so to speak, rather than from the 
effects, which are the object of mans natural mode of knowing. Thus it is matutinal knowledge 
from cause to effect as distinguished from vespertinal knowledge from effect to cause. 
Nevertheless, there is an important restriction, which Thomas notes. Normally God does not give 
human beings directly this view from above as long as they are in this earthy life. Normally the 
beatific vision is granted only in the next life and it is a mode of knowing which radically 
transcends the normal human mode of knowing from cause to effect. Thus this view from above 
is communicated directly only to a few privileged human beings in this life, the authors of the 
books of the Bible and a few other mystics and prophets. Enlightened by revelation and inspired 
by the Holy Spirit, the prophets and apostles put their divine experiences and insights into human 
words for us. Thus Thomas uses the term sacra scriptura in the 1st Question as equivalent to 
sacra doctrina. Sacra scriptura, he goes on to explain,  is the divine teaching in the form of 
biblical text. 
 
Our analogy of the geologist can illustrate this relationship of sacra doctrina and sacra scriptura. 
Assuming that he cannot himself climb the highest peak or fly over in an airplane, our geologist is 
forced to rely on descriptions brought back by others who do just this. These witnesses bring their 
own individual experience, observation talents and literary gifts to the testimony  they give. Each 
has his own particular perspective based on personal gifts and interests and on the concrete 
conditions prevailing at the time his observations were made. All this gives a personal, historical 
coloring to the descriptions the observers formulate, when they sit down after the fact to describe 
their experience. This personal and historical coloring must be taken into account by our 
geologist as he reads their reports. All of the observers shared in principle the same view from 
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above, but their reports differ greatly depending on the particular perspective of their  
observations and their ability to describe what they see in words (we leave out here, for the sake 
of the example, the ability of the observers to bring back photos to illustrate their observations). 
Thus the geologist must interpret the texts, taking account of what he knows about the 
idiosyncracies of the observers and the conditions under which they made their observations. This 
is precisely what the theologian must do when he attempts to understand the sacra doctrina 
contained in the sacra scriptura. First he must attempt to understand each text in its historical 
context, then he must compare the different observations to reconstruct the big picture. Since he 
is not ordinarily endowed with special mystical gifts, the theologian must do this methodically, 
relying on the help of others, historians and theologians, to try to understand the sacra doctrina as 
it is imparted in the Bible. 
 
 
A biblical theology 
 
For Thomas, the authors of the Bible, however, are themselves not mere seers and hearers of 
revelation; they are themselves theologians, who, each in his own time and place, presented the 
insights they received in a form suited to his own audience. Thus Moses formulated the revelation 
he received for a primitive people untrained in Aristotelian natural science, which explains his 
metaphorical way of speaking in describing creation. Paul, by contrast, is for Thomas the paragon 
of a theologian. In his writings he poses questions, explains concepts, develops metaphors and 
models, proves theses and answers objections. Thomas reads the pauline corpus  as a 
systematically composed theological handbook. Thus, to explain the relationship of theological 
work to the sources of the sacra doctrina in the Bible, Thomas appeals to the model of a scientia 
subalternata, i.e. a science which borrows its principles from another science, in this case, from 
the science of God and the blessed. What he means by this expression is illustrated by the science 
of astronomy. An astronomer need not master the whole of theoretical mathematics to calculate 
the movements of the heavenly bodies; it suffices that a mathematician explain to him those few 
equations he needs to perform his calculations. Thus, for Thomas, astronomy is subalternated to 
the science of mathematics. So it is with theology. The sacra doctrina is a divine teaching, which 
enables us to participate in the divine view of reality from above. Schooled by this teaching, we 
can not only recognize realities completely hidden from our natural powers of knowing or at best 
can be made out as hidden causes of what we naturally know; in addition, we can view the 
objects of our natural knowledge in this divine light, seeing them from above, from Gods point 
of view. 
 
What is the content of this divine teaching through the Holy Scripture. Because Thomas sees the 
biblical authors as inspired theologians, who view and explain things from Gods point of view, 
Thomas conceives the content of the Bible as being much broader than modern biblical scholars 
are inclined to do. The Bible is for him much more than the history of Gods interaction with 
mankind and his Chosen People. For Thomas, the Bible contains not only historical but also 
scientific and metaphysical truths. So, Thomas believes, God instructs us about his own 
trinitarian mode of being and circumincessive mode of living, about the events of creation and the 
nature of creatures, about human nature and about the ontology of grace, about the events in 
Paradise and the ontological effects of the original sin, about Gods historical intercourse with 
mankind and with his Chosen People, his Covenants and his Laws, about the natural foundations 
of ethical principles and social realities, about the Incarnation of Word of God, its ontological 
presuppositions and consequences for his life, death and resurrection, about the working of the 
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Holy Spirit in the community of the Church, the ontological working of the means of salvation 
and the perfection of all creation in the eschaton. Thus, for Thomas, this divine teaching includes 
not only truths which without revelation we could never know, but also many truths which in 
principle we could know in the natural way. Such truths too we see from Gods perspective from 
above, a perspective, however, which necessarily transcends our comprehension. 
 
 
The work of the theologian 
 
Where both cognitive directions meet in connection with a particular object, they remain, for 
Thomas, distinct cognitive perspectives, which are not entirely commensurate with each other. 
Again this persisting distinction between the two perspectives is illustrated by the geologist 
metaphor. Just as the geologist draws upon his own observations and explanations to interpret the 
observations of the witnesses to the view from above, so alsothe theologian uses his empirical, 
from below knowledge to interpret the texts of the sacred authors: in doing so, however, a 
certain incommensuability between the statements of the sacred authors and the interpretations of 
the theologian remains. Propositions of faith may be illuminated by propositions of natural 
knowing, but they are not thereby turned into propositions of reason; neither are propositions of 
reason replaced by statements of faith. 
 
What then is the task of the theologian? First of all, as we have seen, in the reading of the Holy 
Scripture: this is the unique and unsurpassed original revelation, the original holy teaching. 
Reading the holy text, the theologian receives, like every other believing reader, the sacra 
doctrina as Gods revelation in words of human beings addressed to other human beings. The 
theologian receives the contents of the sacra scriptura globally as Gods holy teaching and thus as 
truth, even though he does not immediately understand every proposition of that teaching. This is 
the global assent of fatith, supported by the undeceivable authority of God and transmitted 
through the Church. Having given this global assent, the theologian now attempts with the aid of 
his previous knowledge to penetrate and to understand the content of the sacred text. In doing so 
he is aided by the Tradition expressed in the explanations of the church fathers and doctors of the 
church and guided by the rules of speaking laid down by the magisterium. 
 
The comparison of the individual holy testimonies with each other, their confrontation with 
statements of other teachers and with his own observations and insights awaken questions in the 
mind of the theologian. Other  questions are put to him by his students and colleagues. Objections 
from opponents awaken further questions. Such questions constitute for Thomas, as for medieval 
scholasticism generally, the basis of systematic theology. Such systematic questioning 
corresponds in our geologist metaphor to the work of the geologist when he attempts to reconcile 
the statements of other researchers with his own obervations and insights in order to generate a 
systematic overview of this field of research. In both cases, however, the divergent perspectives 
retain their identity even when they meet and cross over. It lies in the nature of things, that the 
questions which the theologian thus puts to the text go beyond what is directly intended by the 
biblical author, though the do not, of course,.go beyond the intention of the divine author. No 
question, however abstruse or trivial, can be excluded apodictically, for many a question, 
however, the honest theologian must confess that he can give no answar or at best a very 
conjectural one. Such conjectural answers are what Thomas calls rationes convenientiae; these 
are plausible, but by no means compelling arguments for answering questions, which cannot be 
clearly answered on the basis of explicit divine revelation or naturally acquired cognition. 
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Thus understood, theology is for Thomas not a rationalistic activity on the outward periphery of 
revelation, faith and the Bible, as the barock and neoscholastic Konklusionstheologie would 
have one believe, but it is rather an activity, which is carried out within the sacred teaching itself: 
it is the attempt, with human means (experience and reason) to orient oneself within the sacred 
text, to understand its statements and their implications, to recognize connections between truths 
of faith among themselves and in connection with truths of reason, to enter into the images, 
explanations and argumentations of the sacred author and to be instructed by them. Thus, the 
proper task of the theologian is not to deduce ever more abstruse conclusions from revealed 
premises, but rather to penetrate and interpret the central propostions of the divine teaching. 
Whether or not in the course of doing so, new, unintended conclusions are drawn, is a question to 
which Thomas paid little or no attention. In fact the whole preoccupation with degrees of 
certitude so typical of barock and neoscholastic theology (the so-called notae theologicae) is a 
topic quite foreign to Aquinas way of doing theology. Even the rough distinction between 
binding propositions of faith and discussible opinions is something he seldom engages in. For 
him, it is understanding, not certification which is in the foreground. 
 
 
The return to Holy Scripture 
 
Systematic theology is for Thomas not a goal in itself. Its results are not merely grounded in the 
biblical teaching, they are developed to serve the better understanding of the sacred teaching as 
this is unsurpassedly contained in the sacred text, to which the theologian must always return. 
Thus our familiar separation of biblical and systematic theology was quite foreign to Aquinas, 
since for him the sacred authors are not only the original recipients of revelation, but also the 
paragons of theology par excellence. Thus every theologian is obliged time and again to sit at the 
feet of these privileged theologians. Furthermore, for Aquinas the acquisition and elaboration of 
systematic theology is ordered to contemplation, by which is meant not the mystical vision but 
rather the scientific form of contemplation relating concepts to phantasms, i.e. a quiet, pleasureful 
reflection on the results of scientific theological investigation. Science, for Thomas is not 
primarily the hectic search for ever new discoveries, but rather the contemplative enjoyment of 
what has already come to be known -- what the ancient Greeks called theoria. Such 
contemplation is restful but not static. Like all human knowing it is discursive. Our intellectual 
vision can only focus on one aspect at a time, now on the whole picture, then on this or that 
detail. Only briefly does the mind repose in the contemplation of a particular view, then it must 
move on. Thus for scientific contemplation guidance is helpful, i.e. a text which successively 
brings to expression the diverse aspects and dimensions of the contemplated object. As a guide 
for theological contemplation, the texts of the Bible are unparalleled and unsurpassable, because 
they are the divinely inspired vehicles of the original revelation. Where can one better 
contemplate the truths of christology than in the narratives of the evangelists and the theological 
discourses of St. Paul and the other epistle-writers? Where can one better contemplate the 
mysteries of creation than in the Genesis narrative and in the Psalms and the prophets. 
 
This return to Scripture is also illustrated by our geologist metaphor. Because our geologist 
himself has not flown over the landscape he studies or viewed it from the highest peak, he must 
rely on the written accounts of those observers who have done that. Even when he has integrated 
their descriptions and explanations into his own systematic overview, he does not simply put 
these works aside. Time and again he will return to them, because they are the irreplacable 
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perceptual and conceptual mirror for his own mental reconstruction of the landscape as seen from 
above. Enlightened by the fund of his knowledge about the terrain, when he returns to these 
reports, he is able to understand ever better what the observer saw and was trying to express in his 
text. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the geologist reader, aided by his prior knowledge, is able 
to see things in his minds eye clearer than the original observer. Be this as it may, he still 
remains dependant upon the original account of the observations, at the very least as the nexus for 
his contemplation of his acquired knowledge, but also in the hope of discovering this or that 
detail, which previously had escaped his observation. So also the practiced theologian, at the 
close of his systematic elaboration, must return time and again to the biblical text. In the reality 
described and explained there he is able to recognize depths of meaning, which may very well go 
beyond what the individual human author himself was able to see or intended to express, though 
not of course beyond what the divine author intended to communicate. Thus implicit in the 
realities, which are directly described and explained in the sensus literalis, there is a deeper 
level of meaning, the sensus plenior, which the theologian on the basis of his systematic work 
is able to uncover, when he rereads the biblical text. Thus for Thomas the principal and most 
exalted task of the scientific theologian is not the production of systematic handbooks and tracts, 
but rather the ongoing commentary on the books of Holy Scripture. 
 
 
Scripture, systematic theology and philosophy in the context of Thomas literary 
production 
 
As is well known, Thomas literary production is divided among three classic genre cultivated by 
the university theology of the late 13th Century. 
1) The best known genre is that of his systematic-theological works. To this genre belong his 
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard -- a work of his youth as a bachelor in 
preparation for his promotion to a full professorship als magister -- but also his two 
Summas, the Summa contra gentiles, written for the instruction of theologians engaged in 
dialog with other religions, and the unfinished Summa theologiae, written for beginning  
students of theology, such as those he had to teach in the Dominican study houses in Italy 
after leaving Paris. To this category belong also his publised  Quaestiones disputatae and 
Quastiones quodlibitales, products of his professorial teaching as a Parisian magister. 
Likewise belonging to this category are a variety of smaller tracts answering questions put 
to him by other Dominicans or containing expertises commissioned by church authorities 
2) The second major category of his works is that of his biblical commentaries, for the most 
part revised versions of his university lectures -- in his day the Parisian master had to 
lecture on the Bible, not on texts of systematic theology; that was left to the bachelors. 
His lectures on Job, Psalms, Canticle of canticles, Isaia, Jeremia, Lammentations, 
Matthew, John and Paul have come down to us. In addition he edited a collection of 
patristic notes to the gospels, published under the title Catena aurea 
3) The third group consists of his published commentaries on the books of Aristotle, 
Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius and Gratian. These works are an embarassment for 
many a neothomist. What moved him to give so much attention to such recalcitrant, oft 
out-dated works. The reply, that these works enjoyed a special popularity and authority in 
the Parisian university scene, is correct but insufficient to explain the amount of energy 
Thomas put into the task of commenting on them. Likewise inadequate is the explanation 
that he wanted to give his students and colleagues needed assistance in combatting the 
philosophical rationalism, which had captured the university milieu as a result of the 
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influence of Averroes commentaries on Aristotle. No, the most important reason why 
Thomas devoted himself to this arduous task was his desire to teach his students to think 
philosophically as the necessary basis for their efforts to think theologically. He was 
convinced that one can properly understand the sacred teaching from above only when 
one has first mastered the natural scientific way of thinking from below. 
 
Thomas saw the sacred teaching as being threatened not only by rationalistic Aristotelianism 
based on Averroes but also by fideistic Platonism based on Augustine. Whereas Averoism 
exaggerated the cleft between human science and theological faith, Augustinianism 
threatened to eliminate the persisting differences between the natural way of thinking from 
below and the supernatural way of thinking from above. That this was the real motive behind 
Aquinas meticulous commentaries on the books of Aristotle, is confirmed by his 
commentaries of the works of Proclus, Boethius, Gratian and Pseudo-Dionysius. In these 
works Thomas is preoccupied with questions of epistemology and methodology, the 
distinction between the human and the divine ways of knowing between the Aristotelian and 
the Platonist ways of thinking. To put it shortly, Thomas commented on Aristotle to teach his 
pupils the empirical-dialectical way of thinking proper to natural human knowing and to 
acquaint them with the most important results of the natural and human sciences, not only 
metaphysics, but also physics, astronomy, meteorology and earth sciences, chemistry, 
biology, psychology, ethics, social and political science. Thus it is no wonder that his 
colleagues from the Arts Faculty of the University of Paris paid more attention to his death 
than his colleagues from the Theological Faculty! 
 
 
The fate of Thomas vision in subsequent generations 
 
With this program Thomas in fact was unsuccessful. His immediate pupils were insignificant 
as philosophers and theologians. It was the platonizing Albertists and Franciscans who 
dominated the schools in the generations after Thomas. The Thomists adapted their way of 
thinking, allowing themselves to be lead by the questions and objections posed by scholars of 
the other schools. When one reads the Summen with eyes open, one quickly notes that the 
arguments used by Thomas to answer questions of theological interpretation are taken not so 
much from metaphysics as from the natural and human sciences. In the debates following 
Aquinas death, the discussion moves rather to the metaphysical level. Duns Scotus 
inaugurates modern metaphysics as a science of common being, which, unlike Aquinas, he 
sees as an abstraction from physical being, something which can be investigated by 
conceptual analysis independent of phantasms.. Losing sight of the perceptual basis of 
metaphysics for Aquinas, later Thomists jumped aboard the Scotistic train. 
 
Even among Thomists the commentaries on Aristotle fell into oblivion and with them 
Aquinas clear distinction between the two modes of knowing, the human mode from below 
and the divine mode from above. The meticulous empirical dialectical construction of 
concepts which Aquinas practiced in the Aristotle commentaries was neglected by his 
epigones and was soon forgotten. In their place were cited the concise formulations of 
definitions and divisions found in the theological Summas: these were presented apodictically 
as though originating from immediately evident conceptual abstraction or intuition. The 
dialectical quaestion-method was replacet by the dogmatic thesis-method. Even among 
Thomists one finds philosophy and theology presented as deductive sciences. Indeed the 
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original meaning of demonstration was completely lost from view, demonstration being taken 
as proof instead of explanation. What was an explanation for Thomas becomes a rational 
proof for his epigones. Texts of the Bible and the church fathers, instead of being sources of 
questions are reduced to the function of suppyling proof texts. Statements of the magisterium 
rather than scripture become the principle source of theological truth. Thus in the late 
scholastic controversies between Thomists, Scotists Albertists and Nominalists it is the 
question of certitude which moves to the fore. An attempt is made to specify exactly the 
degree of certitude attached to a particular thesis and its proofs via the so-called notae 
theologicae and to sharply delineate between truths of faith and truths of reason. 
 
Particularly disasterous was the typically modern separation of rational philosophy and 
empirical science. Already late scholasticism had neglected the empirical roots of the 
Aristotelian natural and human sciences, relying on texts rather than observation, and often 
refused to take new empirical discoveries into account. A dogmatic attitude came to prevail in 
the Suaresian Schulphilosophie which dominated  the late 17th and 18th Centuries. From 
this philosophical dogmatism, empirical-experimental, natural and human sciences 
increasingly emancipated themselves, refuting one Aristotelian school thesis after the other. 
The school philosophers, who meanwhile had absorbed a good bit of Cartesian rationalist 
methodology, were soon in full retreat. Christian Wolff provided them with a saving solution: 
he placed metaphysics at the beginning of philosophy and drew out of that metaphysics a non-
experimental, rational philosophy of nature and rational psychology, ethics and social theory, 
thus turning the Aristotelian-Thomasic scheme on its head. Though this solution promised to 
shield philosophy from the attacks of the empiricists, it was soon wiped out by the criticism 
of Immanuel Kant. 
 
 
The skewed approach of neothomism 
 
Meanwhile the Thomistic tradition had pretty well dried up. Wolffian rationalism was ended 
by Kant. The dramatic social changes marked by the French Revolution put an end to the 
classical Enlightenment. After 1815 reaction was in the air. In the spirit of romanticism, the 
Middle Ages were rediscovered and with them scholasticism. Unnerved Cartesians read 
Thomas Summen and thought they found there a new basis for their rationalistic and fideistic 
ways of thinking. This was the birth of neoscholasticism. 
 
Soon the neoscholastics believed themselves strong enough to enter into conversation with 
modern philosophy, Kant in particular, and with the modern empirical sciences. This was 
particularly true of the Louvain School founded by G. Maréchal and of the Transcendental 
Thomism represented in the present by Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan with their 
disciples. Neothomism tended by and large to discount the Aristotle commentaries as though 
Thomas intended in them only to present Aristotles views, not his own. Instead, the 
neothomists sought to exerpt Thomas philosophy from his theological works by selecting 
from them what they saw as truths of reason as opposed to truths of faith. These truths of 
reason were then inserted into a systematic scheme closer to Christian Wolff than to Aquinas. 
Little attention was paid to the careful methodology of science outlined by Thomas in his 
commentaries on Aristotle. As a result, the critical distinction made by Thomas between 
knowing from below and knowing from above was blurred. Thomas philosophy was seen as 
an ontology from above, based on an intuition of being that, according to E. Gilson, was 
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first made possible by the revelation of the divine name and thus could serve as the 
foundation of a specifically Christian philosophy. This opinion can still be found among 
leading Thomists. For them Thomas was not a pure Aristotelian, instead, they assert,   he 
attempted to synthesize Platonism and Aristotelianism. With a distinction between intuitive-
rational philosophy and empirical-rational science the tensions between philosophy and 
science were papered over. In this way, the neothomists were able to achieve notable 
successes; they are taken seriously by modern philosophers and scientists. However, the 
positions they take have little in common with the real thinking of Thomas as science from 
below. To this real Thomanic philosophy, historical research had to burrow through 
mountains of prejudices and false assumptions. 
 
In theology the situation is little better. For the most part Thomistic theology was taught by 
the thesis method of the manualists. Definitions were apodictically postulated, rather than 
being methodically constructed on the basis of perceptual experience. Thomas explanations 
were reduced to rational proofs. Even when, as in the Dominican Order, systematic theology 
was taught on the basis of the Summa theologiae, the dialectical methodology of Thomas was 
little attended to. Connections with modern biblical exegesis or natural and human sciences 
were largely ignored. Biblical exegesis and systematic theology were rigidly separated. 
Exegesis exhausted itself in text criticism and realia; biblical theology was seldom explicitly 
treated, and when, then completely cut off from speculative dogmatics and ethics. Thomass 
biblical commentaries were hardly attended to. Theories of doctrinal development fortified 
the cleavage between the Bible on the one side and dogma on the other. Not the Bible but 
rather the oracular declarations of the magisterium were most often taken as the foundations 
of systematic theology. For many neothomists, Thomas Aquinas had pretty well settled all the 
major questions of systematic theology, at best there remained place at the periphery for new 
deductive discoveries in the fields of Mariology and Josephology. Small wonder then, that 
historical research has had to remove so much debris to recovedr the real theology of Thomas 
Aquinas. 
 
 
The future of Thomasic thinking 
 
The revolution in the Catholic Church in the wake of Vatican II has swept away Neothomism 
of the old style. Historical research has opened up a way to rediscovering the real intentions 
of Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing between knowledge from below and knowledge from 
above. This gives us a chance for a new beginning. 
